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Contemporary neuroscience is an ambivalent discipline. 
There are large efforts in numerous subfields, but, on the 
other hand, it is difficult to obtain a coherent overall picture 
and a general understanding of  the nervous system and of  
the brain from all these investigations. Neuroscientific re-
search spends major efforts on special aspects of  the nerv-
ous system and on detailed phenomena, performance fea-
tures, brain areas or functional circuits. Data is gained from 
neural defects or diseases – as, e.g., Parkinson, Huntington, 
addictions or lesions of  special brain areas –, the behaviours 
of  bored captive animals are investigated – as, e.g., Macaques 
or rodents –, this is aligned with anatomical findings and 
magnetic resonance images, and interpretations of  special 
phenomena are issued – as, e.g., perception, pain, emotion, 
memory, reflexes, motor activity, language, attention, plas-
ticity, cognitive capabilities, consciousness and social aspects. 
Lots of  information and findings are interpreted in segregat-
ed manner by this way, but this is typically examined in mul-
tifarious studies with few regard to each other or to external 
aspects, known phenomena or to research results from other 
part disciplines. This leads to a picture to the research results, 
which is greatly multifaceted, but poor in its comprehensive 
understanding of  the matter.
I am pretty convinced that the nervous system is indeed a 
“system”, which functions as a coherent whole for any pur-
pose. From my point of  view, the neurosciences and each of  
its part disciplines should always spend significant efforts to 
support this view and to explain the brain as a unified sys-
tem. But this does not occur to a serious extent, at least not 
as far as I have been able to take note of  the concepts. That’s 
why I am disappointed with the contemporary approaches, 
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research strategies and results in this discipline and why I am 
looking for a way out of  this shortage.
A special example of  the misery in neurosciences is the 
usual dealing with the concept “self-regulation”. Wagner and 
Heatherton (2014) investigate the capacity of  humans and 
animals to “inhibit prepotent responses in order to obtain 
later, larger rewards (i.e. delay of  gratification)” (709). They 
explain self-regulation as general capability to control behav-
iour: “At its core, self-regulation is concerned with starting, 
stopping, or modifying thoughts, emotions, or behaviour in 
order to pursue goals or stay in line with societal norms.” 
(710) This is what I would actually associate with the con-
cepts “self-control” and “impulse control”, but never with 
“self-regulation”. Yes, self-regulation should include this type 
of  self-control, but it should actually include much more as-
pects and boundary conditions. I would tend to reserve term 
“self-regulation” for a matter which is much more complex, 
and which refers to the capability of  the human to regulate 
his affairs under real-life conditions, comprising evolution-
ary pressure and stress due to competing needs, competing 
natural laws, competing fellow man as well as due to compet-
ing environmental and social developments. Self-regulation 
is a term, which cannot be missed, when trying to explain 
the whole complexity of  human existence, but Wagner and 
Heatherton (2014) tend to block this concept for simple 
self-control under no (remarkable) circumstances or under 
a specialised test condition – that the choice between two 
rewards must be made.
The dealing with the concept “reward system” is the next 
shortcoming. It is a usual way to investigate behaviours and 
neural processes in scenarios with rewards with different val-
ues and probabilities – see e.g. Rushworth et al. 2014, 504. 
This is just one of  the few abilities to bring investigations on 
several types of  neural processes, as, in this case, of  the deci-
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sion making system in the frontal cortex, a step forward. But 
this type of  research seems at the same time to induce a per-
ception on the reward system, which is totally misleading – it 
draws a picture at which rewards are seen as an idiosyncratic 
quirk and a weakness of  humans and animals. But I would 
tend to see the reward system as one of  the most important 
features of  the human brain, which is the actual basis for the 
development of  culture and economic growth. Of  course, 
reward related behaviours may sometimes turn into weak-
nesses, but this is only a side effect. Actually they are one of  
the greatest inventions of  the Evolution, what will be dis-
cussed in this book in connection with the concepts “artifi-
cial/ virtual needs” and “growth needs”. But neural research-
ers, as e.g. Rushworth et al. 2014, tend rather to describe 
the reward system as a special peculiarity of  mammals and 
humans, without mentioning that this might be one of  the 
greatest inventions on the way to the contemporary society.
Another point is the relationship between information 
and purpose. It is clear that it is one aspect of  the brain that 
it is an information processing engine, which exploits per-
ception for produce controlled behaviour. But it is also clear, 
that it is no computer. Contrary to computers, it is induced 
by purposes and inherent regulation mechanisms, which are 
incorporated as motivations and emotions. This is also in-
formation, but which plays a specific role and which causes 
continuous self-optimisation. Contemporary neuroscientific 
concepts do regularly not indicate this aspect thoroughly, or 
they ignore or deny it completely (see, e.g., Tononi 2012 and 
section “Tononi, G.: The integrated information theory of  
consciousness” in chapter “Consciousness” in Part 2 of  the 
book).
That concepts are developed into wrong directions, which 
lead into dead ends rather than to a coherent understanding 
of  the whole nervous system as well as of  the system hu-
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man under real-life conditions, is symptomatic for the neuro-
sciences. I would not suspect that these aberrations are made 
by intention, no! But they might be provoked by the limita-
tions of  the research methods, which are available today, and 
by the extremely specialised research culture.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a meth-
od which is an important basis for contemporary neural 
research, is just not really functional, because it visualises 
only metabolic processes (power supply for information 
transport) rather than neural excitation processes (informa-
tion transport; note: it will never be possible to understand 
a computer by concentrating on the currents in its power 
supply units). And even if  functional magnetic resonance 
images (fMRI) would be functional, it is just not possible to 
make such images of  managers or alpinists under real-life 
conditions. And even if  this would be possible, it might 
hardly be possible to interpret the complex neural data and 
interrelate it with the complex contexts of  action and cogni-
tive operation in these real-life scenarios. That’s why neural 
research must be specialised and can only investigate particu-
lar phenomena under simplified boundary conditions. So it 
is no wonder that it produces large amounts of  ambiguous 
findings rather than general models. But it would be recom-
mendable to cultivate also always the latter aspect.
It is important to get a comprehensive understanding of  
the whole system, reaching from the most detailed micro 
structures and atomic processes, i.e. from the micro level, up 
to the general conceptual ideas, i.e. the macro level. Because 
of  the highly specialised research in this day and age, there is 
actually no lack of  micro-level models. But the macro level 
is largely underrepresented, not least because of  the extreme 
complexity of  the nervous system apparatus. This book tries 
to make a contribution in this field, by proposing a special 
macro-level model, called “suitability probability processor 
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model” (SPP model). I am sure that there are much more 
ingenious solutions implemented in the nervous system than 
nowadays known, namely at the macro level. The SPP model 
is an attempt to discover some of  these ingenious concepts.
The suitability probability processor model (SPP model), which 
is proposed in this book as an appropriate macro model of  
the brain, is just an attempt to capture a more systemic claim 
than available until now. Special advantages of  this model 
are that it involves rewards, purposes, emotions, motivations 
as well as self-regulation and self-optimisation under real-life 
conditions as crucial components, and that it tries to com-
bine all important aspects to a coherent concept. But this 
can only be a small step in the right direction, if  at all, while 
remarkable progress might need big efforts of  generations 
of  scientists at both the macro level and the micro level.
It is difficult to achieve progress in understanding the 
brain as a coherent system, and the SPP model does not 
contribute additional empirical findings – it is rather only 
another macro-level interpretation of  well-known facts and 
part models. Thus, it is questionable if  such a general model 
can be a valuable contribution on the path of  knowledge. 
But, on the other side, it would be a failure to neglect such 
kinds of  attempts, at least if  there are ideas available of  how 
to solve the brain puzzle in an unconventional way.
In this book, the brain is characterised as suitability prob-
ability processor (SPP) in contrast to computers, which are 
arithmetic logic processors. Both types of  engines process 
information continuously, at which subsequent operations 
are dependent on precedent operations or external events. 
How the sequence of  operations or the reaction to external 
events is selected in each case, depends on logical or binary 
decisions, respectively, on computers, and the main differ-
ence of  brains, compared to computers, is, that brains fol-
low a completely different paradigm in this respect. They 
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base sequences of  operations as well as reactions to external 
events on a suitability probability evaluation process, which 
is continuously ongoing in crucial brain areas. This is a cen-
tral thesis of  this book, and it is the reason why concepts 
like “suitability probability evaluation” and “suitability prob-
ability processor” are introduced here. What this means is 
explained step by step in chapter “The SPP model”. Note: 
There are many differences between brain and computer, but 
there are also commonalities on an abstract level – more de-
tails see in section “Commonalities and differences between 
brain and computer” in the second-last chapter (in Part 2).
The book is divided into two parts: Part 1 – “The Brain as 
Suitability Probability Processor” and Part 2 – “Excursions 
to the current state of  science”. Part 1 provides the complete 
description of  the SPP model and of  some supposed con-
sequences. Part 2 comprises additional background informa-
tion, composed of  references to important scientific sources 
and further discussions of  special aspects. It is recommend-
ed to read Part 1 and follow the numerous references to Part 
2, which are included in Part 1, rather than to read Part 2 
continuously.
Before we start, it should be made clear that the human is 
composed of  at least 3 complex systems and that we will pri-
marily focus on one of  these systems. The three systems are 
the body with its biochemical (physiological) structures and 
processes, the central nervous system (CNS) with the brain, 
which regulates human’s affairs in his environment, and the 
combination of  autonomic nervous system (ANS) and neu-
roendocrine system which takes control of  the well-being of  
the body by mediating between body and CNS. Our focus 
lies on the brain and the central nervous system (CNS), while 
the connections to body, ANS and neuroendocrine system 
are only mentioned in passing.
Note: There is also the talk of  the peripheral nervous sys-
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tem (PNS), which connects the CNS with limbs and body, 
and which includes the spinal cord and peripheral nerve 
cords; this is seen here as being subsumed under CNS; in 
the functional sense the PNS is indeed not a separate system.
There are many introductions into the brain structures 
and processes available. So it is rather not necessary to add 
another or better one. But we will nevertheless start with 
a short introduction into some “neuro basics”, because it 
is necessary to prepare the ground for the description of  




Note: This chapter summarises basic knowledge from var-
ious popular sources (without known references) as well as 
information from Popper and Eccles 2006 and Gazzanega 
and Mangun 2014. Beside this, it is also influenced by find-
ings and theses that are proposed or discussed in this book, 
particularly in Part 2, but also in the other chapters of  Part 1.
Purpose, perception and motor control
The task of  the central nervous system (CNS) is basically 
very simple: It has to fulfil a purpose by controlling appro-
priate actions on the basis of  suitably filtered information 
from sensory perception. This is and remains the ultimate 
principle, independent from the complexity of  the implica-
tions which may evolve over time.
The purpose is survival and thriving as social being un-
der the conditions of  evolutionary competition. This has to 
do with metabolic homeostasis, prevention of  painful states, 
satisfaction of  needs, emotions and rewards. Stimuli and 
control loops of  these types are incorporated in the brain 
processes via multifarious mechanisms. This matter refers to 
concepts like hypothalamus, endocrine system, homeostatic 
regulation, pain sensation, limbic system and reward system. 
This is summarised hereinafter as “emotional-motivational 
system” (see also sections “Homeostasis, pain, emotions and 
rewards” and “The emoti(onal-moti)vational system”).
Perceptual information is gathered by the five classical 
senses – vision, hearing, taste, smell, touch – and also by a 
couple of  further senses, like temperature, as a variant of  
taste, balance, pain, proprioception etc. This means always 
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that sensory receptors or organs stimulate afferent nerve 
cords, which send electrochemical signals to synapses in the 
spinal cord, subcortical circuits or sensory areas in the cere-
bral cortex. These sensory signals elicit typically as patterns 
of  multiple stimuli and they are transmitted via multiple 
nerve cells to the target brain areas and target synapses. They 
take effect in various ways by different types of  information 
processing, which might be called transformation, projec-
tion, communication, distribution or funnelling. The univer-
sal basis for this informational processes is the organization 
of  the brain as a network of  nerve cords which are linked 
over an almost endless number of  synapses, but which are 
typically established and adapted in a well-organized manner. 
The two basic transport mechanisms at synapses are excita-
tion and inhibition.
Appropriate actions are produced via specialized areas in 
the so called “motor cortex”, electrochemical transmissions 
of  signals through efferent nerve cords to muscles, and mus-
cle contractions which are caused by this way in a controlled 
manner. These processes can only function sufficiently if  
occurring well-integrated with other types of  processes, as, 
e.g., sensation (see above) – mainly also via the so called “so-
matosensory system” (proprioception) – and regulation of  
vigour, balance and smoothness, e.g. via circuits in the cere-
bellum and basal ganglia.
One of  the most important features of  the brain is also 
that perceptual and sensory information is not processed in 
its entirety, just as it occurs in environment and body, and as 
it excites the afferent nerve cords in every second, but that 
this huge bulk of  information is reduced to the relevant sub-
sets by clever filter and transformation processes. This leads 
to the basic structures and information processing principles 
of  the brain.
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Excitation, inhibition, pattern transforma-
tion and circuits
Smart information processing is not only required for filter-
ing and transformation of  sensory information, but also for 
all other tasks of  the brain, as, e.g., activity control, pattern 
recognition, evaluation of  present and memorized patterns, 
and decision making. The basic solutions for these types of  
tasks, that might have to be exploited in very complex com-
binations and scenarios in the end, are again quite simple.
The brain, particularly the part which is called cortex or 
neocortex, is organized in modules, each consisting of  a net-
work of  synapses between greater amounts of  neurons. A 
synapse is a link between one neuron and another. It can 
influence the degree of  excitation in the target neuron on 
the basis of  the degree of  excitation in the source neuron. 
A synapse can either have excitatory character, so that the 
excitation in the source neuron increases or amplifies the 
degree of  excitation in the target neuron, or it can have in-
hibitory character, where excitation in the source neuron de-
creases the degree of  excitation in the target neuron. That 
also inhibition is available as counterpart of  excitation is es-
sential for the excitation waves which flow through the brain. 
Without this feature, the neural networks would not be able 
to balance any process, and there would be nothing else than 
constant excitation overflow.
“The yin and yang of  excitation and inhibition probably 
arose as an early feature in the evolution of  the nervous 
system. In his studies of  spinal cord reflexes, Charles Sher-
rington found that excitatory and inhibitory neurons were 
always in tandem and that together they provided the algebra 
of  the nervous system: ‘The net change which results there 
when the two areas are stimulated concurrently is an algebra-
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ic sum of  the plus and minus effects producible separately 
by stimulating singly the two antagonistic nerves’ (Sherring-
ton, 1908, 578). The algebra of  the cortex has proved to be 
more elaborate, but the principle of  controlling the balance 
between excitation and inhibition is a fundamental property 
needed for cortical computation, and not simply as a means 
of  stabilizing excitation.” (Douglas and Martin 2014, 81)
The direction of  the information transport over synapses 
has typically one-way character. Each synapse has a certain 
transmission factor, which is basically stable, but which can 
be justified. The plasticity of  the brain is based on the ability 
to establish and dissolve synapses and to justify the transmis-
sion factor of  each synapse in fine gradations.
But what are the findings for a brain module. How is in-
formation processing, so processing of  excitation patterns 
and flows, organized in a module? This can be made clear by 
the statement that modules are typically organized as multi-
ple layers of  neurons (typically six layers) in which each layer 
has multiple synaptic links to the next layer. So a module 
is typically a synaptic multilayer network. The way they are 
organized is partially described in the literature as maps or 
spatial maps: “We know that most classes of  information 
represented in the cerebral cortex are topographically encod-
ed on anatomically two-dimensional ‘maps’. The cortex is 
made up of  dozens of  these small topographic maps. The 
two-dimensional structure of  the primary visual cortex, for 
example, provides a topographic map of  the world as seen 
by the retina […]. At each point on that map, the firing rates 
of  neurons tell us something about what the retina sees at 
that location in the visual world. What is hugely important is 
that this basic organizational structure has turned out to be 
almost entirely universal in the mammalian brain.” (Glimch-
er 2014, 684, and references therein)
Explanation: “firing rate” means excitation, i.e. excitation 
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is transmitted in nerve cells and over synapses as electro-
chemical impulses with greater or smaller firing rates.
It is known – from neurosciences just as from informatics 
(artificial intelligence) – that neural multilayer networks are 
excellent performers of  pattern transformation tasks. This 
means that, for instance, the following types of  tasks can 
easily be solved by a well-trained synaptic multilayer network; 
well-trained means that the transmission factor of  each syn-
apse is justified precisely for the task of  the network:
• Projection, transformation: A picture is provided as pix-
el array, by a neuron per each pixel. The excitations of  
the neurons represent the brightness of  the pixels. The 
picture contains an object (a house) which can be larger 
or smaller, dependent on the distance. Scale the object to 
a uniform size, independent from the size in the original 
neuronal excitation pattern, representing a pixel pattern.
• Object detection: An array of  neurons represents a pic-
ture, either sent by the retina or by another transfor-
mation module, as e.g. the network from the example 
above. The picture contains an object, e.g. a rectangle or 
a house or a cat. Detect the type of  the object.
• Decision making: A large collection of  input neurons 
represents information that has been transformed by 
upstream modules from various primary sources, in-
cluding external sensory information (sight, hearing), so-
matosensory information (position of  body, arms, legs 
etc.) and stimuli of  pain, which are incorporated via pain 
sensation. A decision has to be made, what is the right 
response in terms of  an appropriate activity procedure, 
to be elicited in the motor cortex. An appropriate multi-
layer network works as decision making map for the final 
selection of  the winner pattern in this case.
The brain is able to process at each second a multitude 
of  such types of  tasks in parallel. This is only possible with 
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complex projection cascades, what means that the output 
information from one module is typically transmitted or dis-
tributed to further target modules and that this occurs again 
and again over several cascades until the right information 
processing results can be achieved. But it is clear that such a 
strategy can only work for a system which is equipped with 
effective adaptation abilities and with a mechanism that forc-
es continuous self-optimisation. But the brain is such a sys-
tem. It has been optimised by evolutionary forces over ages.
The result is a sophisticated structure, which is described 
by Douglas and Martin 2014, “Organizing Principles of  
Cortical Circuits and Their Function”, and references there-
in, as follows (79):
“A quick look at the composition of  the neocortex is in-
structive. In each cubic millimeter of  cortical gray matter we 
find up to 100,000 neurons, about 100 million synapses, and 
4 km of  axon […]. By contrast the white matter, which is 
generally thought to contain most of  the wiring of  the brain, 
contains only 9 m of  axon per cubic millimeter. These bald 
numbers suggest that the processing strategy of  the neocor-
tex is to exploit direct broadband transmission for local cir-
cuits in the gray matter and to use the white matter only for 
long-distance, low-bandwidth transmission. The implication 
of  this is that most of  the synapses made in any area origi-
nate from neurons within that area, not from outside sourc-
es, like the thalamus or other cortical areas. Thus, we should 
first look to the local circuits if  we are to understand how 
the neocortex performs its multifarious tasks of  perception, 
memory, cognition, and action. Of  course, the long-distance 
external inputs to these local circuits are not incidental play-
ers, since some of  them connect cortex to the peripheral 
structures, like the spinal cord, while others connect cortex 
to itself  and to other essential machinery like the basal gan-
glia, claustrum, brain stem, and cerebellar nuclei.”
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Explanations: The neocortex is the largest part of  the 
cerebral cortex, attributed to sensory perception, motor 
control, cognition, reasoning and language. An axon is an 
extension of  a neuron (nerve cell) for the transmission of  
excitations to other neurons or to glands or muscles. Thal-
amus, basal ganglia, claustrum, brain stem and cerebellum 
are subcortical brain areas with prominent control functions.
Another point is that connections between grey matter 
modules via white matter pathways are not only organised in 
one-way directions or cascades, but that there are also loops 
and circuits. This means that excitations might flow from one 
module in a special brain area to another module in another 
brain area, that it might there take excitatory or inhibitory 
effects, and that the resulting signals might turn back to the 
original module in any form. This kind of  loop organisation 
or circuitry might also realize circular interconnections over 
multiple modules and brain areas, enabling mutual interac-
tion and feedback control, wherever identified as beneficial 
by evolutionary optimisation. This basic capability is par-
ticularly exploited for the interactions between the cerebral 
cortex (e.g. motor cortex or frontal cortex) and subcortical 
areas (e.g. basal ganglia or hypothalamus), but also for any 
other interactions and control loops (e.g. between the differ-
ent language areas).
The division of  the brain into areas and grey matter mod-
ules, and the installation of  appropriate white matter path-
ways, control loops and circuits in a sensible way should 
be the crucial key to its effectiveness as a unified system. It 
is hardly imaginable that a human designer is able to con-
struct such a brain apparatus to a sufficient extent, even if  
he would have comprehensive knowledge on all principles, 
what he preliminary does not. But the evolution, as a design-
er who is much more awesome than the human, was able to 
do this; though only on the basis of  a resource which seems 
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rare to us: time.
This was a short glimpse of  certain basic organization 
principles of  the brain. But important features have not been 
examined yet, like memory, associations, emotions and needs 
– this is the topic of  the next two sections. And nothing is 
told about the control mechanisms and the question how 
the brain works and optimises as a whole and how this is 
driven by the demands of  environment, body and human 
needs – this is attempted to be answered by the SPP model 
in the next chapter.
Memory
Memory is primarily divided into procedural and declarative 
memory, at which only the contents of  the latter can be con-
sciously remembered.
Procedural memory, so the non-conscious part, refers 
to the sensory areas and motor areas of  the cortex which 
are responsible for perception and motor control. This is 
the part of  the cortex where all kinds of  well-trained reac-
tions and behaviours are stored. This includes processing of  
perceptual patterns via cascades of  sensory modules, which 
are well-adapted to the behavioural purposes. Each kind of  
motor activity can only be executed in controlled manner 
if  guided by rich amounts of  sensory information, what in-
volves typically multiple senses. The procedural memory is 
the location where appropriate skills are stored in terms of  
sensorimotor procedures.
Although this memory content cannot be consciously re-
membered in full detail, it can nevertheless indirectly be in-
cluded into memorizing processes and it can always be (re-) 
activated. This works via the declarative memory, as we will 
see.
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Declarative memory divides into associative long-term 
memory, episodic memory and short-term memory. The as-
sociation cortex is the location where the external world 
and the own existence in this world is internalised. This takes 
place via connections between sensory experiences and mo-
toric capabilities, that are coded in secondary, tertiary and 
further specific (e.g. language) and unspecific associative ar-
eas in the cerebral cortex. One can, e.g., feel an object by 
cutaneous sensing, see it by visual detection and name it by 
linguistic processing, with the result that this object (or this 
type of  object) is represented in the involved parts of  the 
associative networks. This leads to an internal world view 
which is constantly modified and developed and where no 
piece of  memory is stored without integration into the exist-
ing interconnections.
The access to this store, writing and reading, leads over 
the short-term memory (see in the following) and the con-
trol processes of  the brain (see chapter “The SPP model” 
further down).
The episodic memory is located in cortical areas that are 
called hippocampus and temporal lobe. These regions are 
known for capabilities like spatial navigation, perception of  
time, episodic memory over weeks and mediation between 
the brain control system (or short term memory) and the 
associative long term memory.
There are two further remarkable characteristics – inte-
gration of  procedural memory and of  emotional-motiva-
tional sensation. All procedural sensorimotor excitation 
sequences that are involved in real-time activity, are always 
also part of  the traces in the episodic and associative mem-
ory. This occurs in the form of  microrepresentations of  the 
procedural patterns. These can henceforth be used to include 
these opportunities into memorising and evaluation process-
es and to reinstate the detailed procedural patterns whenever 
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necessary (see also Part 2 – chapter “Emotion, motivation 
and memory” – section “Microrepresentations of  senso-
ry-perceptual experiences, actions, internal thoughts, and 
emotions in the episodic memory”; see also Davachi and 
Preston 2014).
Emotional-motivational sensation is bound into hip-
pocampus and temporal lobe via specific pathways and cir-
cuits. This has mainly two important consequences: These 
signals are integrated into each piece of  memory in terms 
of  emotions or feelings, and they take control over what is 
stored with which strength in terms of  positive or negative 
values, to be encoded as excitatory or inhibitory effects at 
synapses. More details about emotional-motivational sensa-
tion see in the next section below and at the beginning of  
the next chapter.
Short-term memory does not exist as a dedicated store. 
What was meant by this concept has rather to be attributed 
to the control processes that are constantly ongoing in the 
brain. This is examined below in section “The control levels 
of  the central nervous system” in chapter “The SPP model”.
Notes:
• The statements from the last two paragraphs above 
might be scientifically controversial. They are close to 
the border between the current state of  science and the 
theses that are proposed in this book.
• The concept “working memory”, which is also some-
times used, can be interpreted in various ways – this dis-
cussion will not be adopted here.
• For more details about memory see chapter “Emotion, 
motivation and memory” in Part 2.
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Homeostasis, pain, emotions and rewards
As stated above, the central nervous system of  the human 
is devoted to the purpose of  his survival and thriving as so-
cial being under the conditions of  evolutionary competition. 
Perception, sensorimotor functions, memory and other “in-
formational-functional parts” of  the nervous system pro-
vide the capability to comply this requirement. But a cru-
cial question is, how the necessity to follow the evolutionary 
pressure is bound into the brain processes – this is essentially 
realised via the following four systems: the autonomic inter-
face, involving homeostatic regulation, the sensory system, 
namely pain sensation, emotional processing, and the reward 
system.
1) The autonomic interface integrates the nervous sys-
tem with the autonomic nervous system and the metabolic 
processes of  the body. The main interfaces for these pro-
cesses are a subcortical area which is called hypothalamus 
and the endocrine system, including a larger collection of  
glands, like pituitary gland, pineal gland, thyroid gland, ad-
renal gland, pancreas gland, ovaries gland, testes gland and 
others.
The core part of  the control processes which occur on the 
behalf  of  these interfaces is called homeostasis. This com-
prises, according to Maslow 1987, 15, and references therein, 
the regulation of  metabolic balances like “(1) the water con-
tent of  the blood, (2) salt content, (3) sugar content, (4) pro-
tein content, (5) fat content, (6) calcium content, (7) oxygen 
content, (8) constant hydrogen-ion level (acid-base balance), 
and (9) constant temperature of  the blood […] minerals, the 
hormones, vitamins, and so on”. This is linked to feelings 
like hunger, thirst, cold, hot, sexual arousal etc. This includes 
also a control loop that is called hypothalamic-pituitary-adre-
nal (HPA) axis and which is connected with the regulation of  
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stress levels in the nervous system and the metabolic system 
in consistent manner.
This includes also regulation of  the balance between sym-
pathetic and parasympathetic nervous system, which are two 
parts of  the autonomic nervous system. The former repre-
sents preparedness for action and the latter rest and diges-
tion, and the autonomic regulation processes include always 
regulation of  the balance between both aspects of  life, and 
thus between sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous sys-
tem.
2) The sensory system has two main aspects:
• Information: provide signals for sensorimotor control 
or for the informational aspect of  cognitive processes 
and decision making processes (see something, smell 
something or feel something which is not painful).
• Motivation: pain sensation.
Only the latter aspect is of  interest here. This refers pri-
marily to the sense of  touch and the somatosensory system, 
whose signals are typically bound into cortical processes via 
a subcortical area which is called thalamus. This comprises 
sensory signals representing, for example, touch, vibration, 
heat, (the somatosensory component of) balance and pain. 
However, only pain is of  interest here. This takes partially 
effect via explicit pain receptors in body and skin, and par-
tially via the normal receptors if  they are confronted with 
overmodulation, e.g. due to too much pressure or heat.
Besides this there are signals of  pain which are produced 
by other senses, like vision (dazzling light), hearing (loud 
noise) or taste (bitter). But these are difficult cases – the 
transition between information and pain is widely adaptable, 
and domain specific investigation is needed for understand 
how these types of  perception patterns turn into pain and 
motivational stimuli.
3) Emotional processing is particularly attributed to a 
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brain area which is called amygdala. This is associated with 
extraordinary excitation states that are caused by alarming 
environmental stimuli. This comprises fear and anxiety, but 
also pleasure and delight and a wide range of  other feelings, 
which occur due to interactions with the natural and social 
environment. The amygdala, and thus emotional processing, 
is closely linked to other areas and systems, like habenula, 
which represents the olfactory sense, the autonomic inter-
face or the reward system (see next paragraph).
4) The reward system is connected with concepts like 
mesolimbic dopamine system or mesocorticolimbic dopa-
mine system. It represents emotions and the pursuit of  any 
type of  good feelings or rewards, at which this is seen as an 
open system with no determination or restriction, what kind 
of  desires might occur with this behalf. The reward system is 
mainly represented by the following subcortical components: 
amygdala (representing emotions), septal nuclei, nucleus ac-
cumbens, ventral tegmental area and pathways to several 
substructures of  the basal ganglia (striatum, caudate nucleus, 
putamen, substantia nigra etc.). Neurotransmitters, which 
play an important role in this system, are dopamine, seroto-
nin, glutamate and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA).
This was a short overview of  the four major systems which 
convey the evolutionary pressure into the nervous system. 
The processes which are released in the brain by these sys-
tems are typically named feelings, emotions, motivations or 
needs. This comprises a multitude of  types of  excitations 
which have different purposes and which are experienced 
in a quite different manner. But there are also good reasons 
to see this as a unique system, which is in fact composed 
of  multiple components, but which are also balanced to 
one another in a systematic way. However, since we try to 
understand the brain as complete system, what can only be 
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achieved by some kind of  abstraction and generalisation, it 
is suggested to emphasise the commonalities. That’s why this 
aspect will be discussed hereinafter as “emotional-motiva-
tional system” (see next chapter).
In fact, are the signals and excitation patterns from these 
four systems bound into the other areas and processes of  
the nervous systems in a way which is quite similar. This 
occurs mainly via interconnections to cortical areas that are 
attributed to memory, behavioural control and cognitive 
control. These are mainly the memory regions entorhinal 
cortex and hippocampus as well as the regions which are 
called cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex, and which are 
linked to decision making and control functions. Most of  the 
pathways and loops of  these systems are cross-linked via the 
structures of  the basal ganglia. Thus, the basal ganglia is the 
crucial key component of  the emotional-motivational system of  
the brain. Each type of  feeling, emotion, motivation or need 
is conveyed via this intermediary device.




This chapter develops a model of  the brain as a system. This 
is done as combination of  some abstract concepts, with the 
consequence that a lot of  detailed findings is provisionally 
eliminated by generalization. Domain specific neuroscien-
tific research leads regularly to a scattered concept of  the 
human, composed of  multifarious pieces of  knowledge, but 
making holistic explanations of  the brain as a system typi-
cally more complicated. The SPP model tries to counter this 
tendency by an attempt to compound the puzzle a little bit. 
The risk is that the degree of  abstraction and synthetisation 
goes too far, so that the model is detached from evidence 
based scientific research. But there are strong indications 
that the developed concepts are not completely wrong, what 
is outlined in accompanying chapters and sections in Part 2, 
which are referred to in various passages in Part 1.
The findings and theses which are described in this chap-
ter are primarily based on the following sources: Popper and 
Eccles 2006, Gazzanega and Mangun 2014, Singer 2004, 
Block 2009, Tononi 2012, Maslow 1987 and Kahneman 
2012.
Referring to Singer 2004, it should be mentioned that this 
chapter is not consistent to his descriptions in all respects, 
but that some of  his proposals have been adopted and oth-
ers have been incorporated in a creative way. Referring to 
Kahneman 2012 it should be mentioned that only the ba-
sic idea of  his book – about the “two systems” – has been 
incorporated in section “The two types of  consciousness”, 
but that this section is also supported by some of  the other 
sources and notably by the other parts of  the SPP model.
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The emoti(onal-moti)vational system
A key point for the understanding of  the brain is that it is an 
engine that follows purposes prior to the fact that it is an en-
gine that processes information. And each kind of  purpose 
is elicited by evolutionary pressure. That evolutionary pres-
sure is conveyed into the brain processes is the only reason 
why the brain functions and is optimised in any way. Ani-
mals, humans and brains would not exist without purposes 
of  this kind.
The evolutionary pressure takes mainly effect via the 
autonomic interface, involving homeostatic regulation, the 
sensory system, namely pain sensation, emotional process-
ing, and the reward system. The corresponding excitation 
patterns are experienced as feelings, emotions, motivations 
or needs. This has been described above in section “Home-
ostasis, pain, emotions and rewards”. An important finding 
was also that this comprises multiple components, which are 
indeed quite different, but which are bound into the other 
brain processes in a similar way, at which the basal ganglia 
takes effect as an important crossway in each case. A con-
clusion was that these systems have certain commonalities, 
so that it is adequate to generalize them under the concept 
“emotional-motivational system”.
Another rationale for this generalized view is also that the 
brain is in the end a complete system, which must be able 
to balance all aspects of  life to each other. This is only pos-
sible if  there is a unique value system, which makes unified 
weighting of  all types of  emotions or motivations possible, 
independent from how different they might be. Systemat-
ic decision making and pattern selection is only possible if  
there is a common denominator available. This works only 
on the basis of  a single currency, so a common emotion-
al-motivational value system.
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Consequently to this consideration, it might not be wrong 
to compress all types of  feelings, emotions and motivational 
excitations to a common concept – we propose term “emoti-
vation” for this aspect and will use it hereinafter consistently.
The consequence is also that there can be the talk of  emo-
tivational excitation patterns, emotivational values, and the 
emotional-motivational system can also be named emotiva-
tional system.
This concept, including the finding that there must be a 
common unified value system in the brain, is an important 
basis for the further concepts of  the SPP model. Without 
this value system, the brain would not be able to balance all 
aspects of  life with each other.
The control levels of  the central nervous 
system
As most crucial topic, the SPP model tries to clarify how 
the human is controlled by his central nervous system. This 
occurs via several control levels which are functioning hand-
in-hand and which represent different levels of  complexity 
of  the same coherent system.
Notes:
• Term control is always meant in the sense of  regulation, 
feedback control, loop control or control circuits, but 
never in the sense of  steering. Steering makes no sense, 
because the purpose of  the nervous system is to regulate 
the interactions between human and environment for 
the benefit of  the human, what means that natural laws 
must always be involved via feedback control.
• The descriptions of  the first two levels can still be seen 
as a summary of  indisputable basic knowledge while the 
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conceptual character of  the SPP model starts with the 
descriptions of  the higher levels (3), (4) and (5).
(1)	 Unconditioned	reflexes
The most elementary control level is provided by uncondi-
tioned reflexes that are typically established by reflex arcs 
in the spinal cord. These are links between afferent nerve 
cords, receiving signals from specific receptors, and efferent 
nerve cords, stimulating specific muscle contractions. These 
reflex arcs can have excitatory or inhibitory character. They 
are important for all types of  quick reactions that are always 
required in the same manner. The body with its limbs, recep-
tors and muscles is determined by the DNA, and so are the 
unconditioned reflexes. Both body and appropriate uncon-
ditioned reflexes are no matter of  plasticity in the individual, 
they are rather formed by the evolution via DNA variability 
in coherent manner.
An example is the interplay between antagonistic muscles. 
If  an arm is bent by the biceps, it is always required that the 
triceps is released and vice versa. This is achieved by propri-
oception in the involved muscles and mutual inhibition of  
the appropriate motor nerve cords. The interaction of  all 
muscles is coordinated by proprioception and well-adapted 
reflex arcs and control loops, at which only the most fun-
damental part is coded as unconditioned reflexes – for the 
other parts see the next control level.
Another example are protective reflexes, as the cough 
reflex, preventing impurity of  bronchia and trachea, or the 
corneal reflex, protecting eyes against foreign particles.
There is a lot of  protective and coordinative behaviour 
already coded at the lowest control level. This is a basic pre-
condition for the ability to enfold more complex behaviours 
via higher control levels without larger risks and loss of  ef-
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ficiency.
Note: We are talking here about control level (1) of  the 
central nervous system, but when dividing between central nerv-
ous system (CNS) and peripheral nervous system (PNS), 
control level (1) would refer to the latter; however, this is not 
very relevant, because there is no functional border between 
CNS and PNS; it is rather the case that the majority of  the 
peripheral nerve cords is bound into the CNS.
Level attributes: Qualified perception: no. Emotional-mo-
tivational binding: no. Procedural memory: no. Declarative 
memory: no.
(2) Sensorimotor procedures
The next control level is provided by the sensorimotor con-
trol system. First of  all, this comprises perception – by in-
cluding all senses, afferent nerve cords and sensory cortices 
–, motor control – via the motor cortex, afferent nerve cords 
and innervations of  muscles –, and the direct links between 
sensory and motor cortices. This system allows coordinated 
action on the basis of  external and internal sensory infor-
mation (e.g. sense of  touch, proprioception), qualified per-
ception (e.g. detection of  objects by vision) and feedback 
control (e.g. detecting provoked modifications). Concept 
“procedures” means that this is about activity sequences 
which are composed of  single activities, and which can be 
initiated, interrupted, varied and terminated at any time – 
why and how this occurs is explained by the next control 
level “voluntary movement” (see below). The procedures are 
encoded in the procedural memory in terms of  well-trained 
behaviours, habits and conditioned reflexes which can be ex-
ploited by the higher control levels for any purpose. (Note: 
levels (1) and (2) are seen as not involving purposeful com-
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ponents directly on their own; the purposeful components 
of  habits and conditioned reflexes are incorporated via level 
(3).)
Level (2) comprises also a complex neural infrastruc-
ture which is required to turn intended actions into smooth 
well-regulated movements and which supports body control 
in general. Characteristics of  this type can be attributed to 
subcortical structures and namely to the cerebellum. This 
includes features like tonicity, posture and balance.
Qualified perception, as e.g. detection of  objects by cu-
taneous perception and vision or differentiation of  tone 
pitches and sequences, is included as crucial ingredient at all 
control levels, starting from (2).
Level attributes: Qualified perception: yes. Emotional-mo-
tivational binding: no. Procedural memory: yes. Declarative 
memory: no.
(3) Voluntary movement (activity control)
The voluntary movement level adds decision making, pat-
tern selection, impulse control, vigour control, modulation 
and multiplexing to the level-two procedures and level-one 
reflexes. And this is the first level which binds excitation pat-
terns into the system that represent emotions, motivations, 
needs or purposes. The most crucial cerebral areas repre-
senting level-three characteristics are the basal ganglia (BG) 
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The mechanisms 
of  control level (3) are functioning in close cooperation with 
control levels (4) and (5), at which both areas play also an 
important role.
Decision making occurs at all levels starting from (3). But 
level (3) is associated with the primary type that might be 
called affective or impulsive decision making. This means 
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that a specific stimulus or a combination of  stimuli attracts 
attention and triggers connected sensorimotor procedures 
immediately. This is connected with concepts like stimu-
lus-response association, conditioned reflex and habit. These 
types of  direct reactions to stimuli or of  habitual behaviours 
can be learned, adapted and also dissolved again at any time.
The decision making process has two aspects:
• paying attention on an internal or external stimulus and 
adopting it as a need (goal decision making, primarily 
done via the basal ganglia),
• and selecting a sensorimotor pattern to be excited and 
executed as starting point for the reaction (sensorimotor 
pattern selection or motor decision making, respectively, 
mainly processed in the anterior cingulate cortex).
The first reflex may then trigger further sensorimotor se-
quences, so that longer habitual behaviours can be triggered 
by this mechanism.
Following the characterisation until her, this seems like 
talking about impulsive or compulsive behaviours, while it 
should actually be attempted to explain the opposite, ac-
cording to term “voluntary” in the level name. So, how can 
this type of  mechanism turn into “voluntary movement”? 
Via the involvement of  four specific basal ganglia circuits 
that are crucial for the ability to stop impulsive reactions and 
compulsive sensorimotor sequences, to start the search for 
alternatives and to influence and modulate all kinds of  be-
haviours in a more regardful, controlled and even voluntary 
way.
That impulsive/ affective/ compulsive behaviour may turn 
into voluntary/ regardful/ controlled behaviour is the result 
of  the interplay between levels (3), (4) and (5), while lev-
el (3) alone would not have this potential; impulse control 
(level three) would not make sense without the search for 
alternatives (level four/ five). But the fact that higher control 
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potential is basically incorporated makes the characterisation 
“voluntary” appropriate for level three. How this potential is 
exploited is outlined in the descriptions about levels (4) and 
(5) below.
However, the crucial basis for all these performance fea-
tures is provided by four basal ganglia circuits, as mentioned 
above. “The basal ganglia (BG) is composed of  several heav-
ily interconnected nuclei at the base of  the cerebrum. A se-
ries of  anatomically distinct parallel circuits through the BG 
receive afferent projections from and project back to corti-
cal regions that mediate skeletomotor, oculomotor, frontal 
associative, and limbic functions.” (Turner and Pasquereau 
2014, 435).
These four basal ganglia circuits are interconnected as fol-
lows (ibid. 436):
• the skeletomotor circuit with the motor cortex, con-
trolling sensorimotor functions for the body,
• the oculomotor circuit with the frontal eye cortex, con-
trolling eye movements,
• the associative cortex with the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, representing cognitive functions and
• the limbic circuit with the anterior cingulate cortex, rep-
resenting emotions.
The specific control functions that are attributed to these 
four circuits, can perform independently in parallel. Besides 
this, these circuits are also integrated by some kinds of  “pro-
jection”, “communication”, “convergence” and “funneling”. 
Pathways are mentioned, for example, which support projec-
tions from limbic regions to nonlimbic frontal cortical areas 
or to motor cortices.
The result is that oculomotor control and associative re-
flection takes place in parallel to and widely independent 
from skeletomotor control. One can move into one direc-
tion while his eyes and thoughts wander into two other direc-
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tions. Another result is also that the influence of  emotion-
al-motivational excitation (limbic) can always be regulated in 
relation to action (motor) and thinking (associative).
The most interesting and also best analysed circuit is the 
skeletomotor circuit. It is connected among other things with 
the characteristics impulse control/ intervention, vigour con-
trol, modulation and reinforcement-driven skill learning. Im-
pulse control means that impulsive reactions, once selected 
via the affective decision making mechanism, can be inter-
vened again very quickly via a special “hyperdirect pathway” 
so that there is no sign outside the individual which could be 
an indication for the actual impulse. Vigour control means 
that amplitude, speed and force of  movements can be con-
trolled through the impact of  emotional-motivational excita-
tions. Modulation is continuous fine-grained vigour control 
for each small part of  sensorimotor sequences. Skill-learning 
is only possible if  well-trained behaviours are partially dis-
rupted (via control level three) and varied (via control levels 
four and five), so that new opportunities and sensorimotor 
patterns can be developed. The intervention and vigour con-
trol mechanisms in the basal ganglia are crucial for all these 
capabilities of  the motor control system.
These great abilities are at the same time accompanied 
with large potentials for malfunctions. Parkinson’s disease, 
for example, is attributed to troubles with the skeletomotor 
circuit (namely with the dopamine system, which is involved 
here), and smooth habitual motor activity is only possible 
without the excessive interventions in the basal ganglia, that 
are a typical complication of  Parkinson’s disease. See also 
Turner and Pasquereau 2014, 440ff.
How all these mechanisms exactly work, is still a matter 
of  research. But it is known that they work and where they 
work. However, the basal ganglia comprises a great multi-
plexer component with parallel processing and intermedi-
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ation abilities between motor control, associative-cognitive 
functions and emotional-motivational influences on the one 
hand, and between control levels (3), (4) and (5) of  the nerv-
ous system on the other hand.
On a summary, voluntary movement means making deci-
sions about the right reactions and habitual behaviours due 
to perceptual excitation patterns (external stimuli) and emo-
tional-motivational excitation patterns (internal stimuli), and 
to do this always with the ability to interrupt or prevent these 
reactions if  recognised as inappropriate for any reason. Seen 
on a more detailed perspective, this comprises also control 
and fine-grained modulation of  movement vigour in terms 
of  amplitude, speed and force.
Based on the assumption that there are other (more qual-
ified) decision making mechanisms provided by the higher 
control levels (4) and (5), it is also the task of  the voluntary 
movement level (3) to adopt these decisions and proceed 
with the selected sensorimotor patterns, just as if  these be-
haviours were directly initiated by the level-(3) mechanisms, 
and always with the potential to interrupt it and return the 
control again to the higher levels.
For more details about the basal ganglia circuits see also 
chapter “Basal ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex” in Part 2 and 
Turner and Pasquereau 2014.
Level attributes: Qualified perception: yes. Emotional-mo-
tivational binding: yes. Procedural memory: yes. Declarative 
memory: no.
(4) Situational preparation
It would be ideal if  reflexes and habits worked always in a 
suitable way to the benefit of  the individual. Then, control 
level (3) would be enough. But there are many reasons why 
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affective and habitual movements may become inappropri-
ate. Activity is stopped then, and the search for alternative 
reactions or behaviours, so sensorimotor patterns, is started. 
This is the task of  control level (4). It has major implications.
Firstly it must be clear that control levels (3) and (4) are 
not working alternately. It would be odd-looking if  beings 
act and stop acting (while thinking) in turn. It is rather typical 
that this occurs in parallel. Each type of  activity sequence 
can be seen as a continuous series of  junctions between pos-
sible alternatives to proceed. So it is only logical that future 
decisions are evaluated by one type of  neural processes while 
activity control is ongoing by another type of  neural pro-
cesses. The precondition that this can occur in parallel is a 
neural system that can manage both types of  processes in 
segregated systems. As outlined above, the brain is equipped 
in this way, at which the four basal ganglia circuits, as de-
scribed at level (3), play a crucial role. Activity control is 
executed by the skeletomotor circuit while preparation of  
the next decision(s) occurs at the same time by the associa-
tive-cognitive circuit.
The level-four decision making system is described in the 
literature as “value-guided decision making” (see in Rush-
worth et al. 2014, references therein and section “Decision 
making in the frontal cortex” in chapter “Basal ganglia (BG) 
and frontal cortex” in Part 2). It is attributed to specific 
structures in the prefrontal cortex (particularly ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and the adjacent medial orbitofrontal cor-
tex) and to the anterior cingulate cortex. The frontal cor-
tex areas are known for making decisions between different 
possible reward goals by evaluating reward magnitude (size) 
and reward probability. This occurs, for example, as binary 
decision between two different reward goals that are pres-
ent, but also as search/ engage decision between a present 
reward goal and better opportunities in the future. Like all 
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other types of  decisions (and pattern transformations), these 
decisions are processed by synaptic multilayer networks that 
are well-trained for this purpose. It can be assumed that a 
decision occurs regularly as maximum function of  a neural 
multilayer map in a grey-matter module, so that excitation is 
finally concentrated to a specific bundle of  output neurons. 
This information is then transferred via white-matter axons 
to further modules and brain areas, where it takes effect for 
successive stages of  the neural processes.
Once a decision for a reward goal is made, the next step 
is to select an appropriate activity pattern for achieve the re-
ward goal. This task is known as typically done in the anteri-
or cingulate cortex. But this is now again a common ground 
between levels (3) and (4), i.e. this part of  the decision-mak-
ing cascade occurs also for affective level-three decisions in 
the anterior cingulate cortex, so that only the reward-goal 
decision part is the real unique feature of  the value-guid-
ed level-four decision making processes. The result is that 
control level (4) represents in particular weighing between 
opportunities, like different reward goals and needs or the 
question whether to proceed with activity towards a specific 
goal (engage) or classify this as inappropriate and intervene 
(search).
Regarding decision making processes via cascaded and di-
versely connected neural modules and multilayer maps, Sing-
er 2004 points to the fact, that multiple competitive process-
es are typically involved, and to the phenomenon, that slight 
variability in signal processing can result in different deci-
sions (see in Singer 2004 under headline “Different forms of  
knowledge”/ “Verschiedene Formen des Wissens”).
These decisions are processed in close cooperation be-
tween the frontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, the 
basal ganglia and the emotional-motivational system. The 
frontal cortex selects the reward goals and needs which will 
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have priority, decides what the next goal is and whether ac-
tivity has to proceed or must be intervened in favour of  a 
more complicated search for alternatives. The decision re-
sult takes effect via the multiplexer in the basal ganglia (e.g. 
via the skeletomotor circuit). The anterior cingulate cortex 
selects and manages the activity sequences consequently to 
the goal which has been prioritised in the basal ganglia (im-
pulsive/ affective) or in the frontal cortex (value guided). The 
emotional-motivational system supplies the values which are 
always the driving factors for these processes.
A further task of  the frontal cortex is also to manage the 
handover between affective/ habitual behaviours and appro-
priate value-guided forecasts that might be performed in par-
allel for their support, and, if  necessary, the interruption of  
activity in terms of  impulse control for deeper preparation; 
the anterior cingulate cortex and the basal ganglia circuits 
are involved in this kind of  operations. Another task of  the 
emotional-motivational system is also to bind vigour control 
and modulation into activity sequences, what takes effect via 
the basal ganglia circuits.
At level (4), the focus for all these processes is always the 
current situation of  the individual. The general aim is to act 
in the current environment for the own benefit. Forecasts 
and value-guided considerations about alternative goals and 
activity patterns concentrate on the current spatiotemporal 
surroundings and opportunities. It is clear that humans go 
mostly far beyond this limitation and reflect often experienc-
es and opportunities that are far in space or in time, but this 
is a contribution of  level (5) and level (4) is only involved in 
this via close cooperation with the level-five processes.
Declarative memory does not make sense until the af-
fective/ voluntary level (3). Conditioned reflexes and habits 
follow a determined schema of  direct interactions with the 
environment, so that there is no room for distant positions 
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in space and time or for alternatives. But this changes with 
level (4). Preparation and value-guided decision making 
means involving similar experiences in the past and at differ-
ent locations, comparing them and developing ideas (alter-
native candidate patterns) of  what may happen due to which 
potential decision. This requires some basic kinds of  mem-
ory and cross-modal associations and the ability to involve 
this into the evaluation processes. That’s why the develop-
ment of  declarative memory may have started with the first 
types of  level-four processes at any stage in the phylogenet-
ic history. The powerful declarative memory system as it is 
developed in the human brain today goes far beyond these 
requirements - this is clearly an outcome of  control level (5) 
(see below). But because situational preparation processes at 
level (4) execute typically in close cooperation with level-five 
processes, it stands to reason that the full capabilities of  the 
memory system can also already be involved in level-four 
control processes.
Level attributes: Qualified perception: yes. Emotional-mo-
tivational binding: yes. Procedural memory: yes. Declarative 
memory: yes.
(5) Creative preparation
Control level (5) bases still on value-guided decision making 
and on the same circuits and loops in the prefrontal cortex, 
anterior cingulate cortex and basal ganglia as exploited on 
level (4), but it goes beyond the spatiotemporal scope of  
current activity. It involves interpretation of  past experienc-
es, forecast to future activity and implications over a larger 
spatial range. It corresponds with means that can be used 
for planning and modelling (e.g. paper and pen) and with 
communication and interaction in societal contexts. It leads 
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not always to a result for initiate the next activity, but rather 
to kinds of  long-term preparation for hypothetical activities 
that might become due in the future. Conclusions and deci-
sions for current activities are naturally also always possible.
Association and cognition without spatial and temporal 
limit is closely connected to the development and exploita-
tion of  declarative memory. Target oriented movement 
towards far locations require complex spatial maps in the 
hippocampus. The ambition to recognise structural object 
relationships and interrelations in complex processes require 
cross-modal associations with no limit; difficult challenges 
can only be tackled if  using all senses in cooperation, or even 
through the development of  additional senses by technology 
(e.g. infrared sensor, radar, microscope, magnetic resonance 
imaging). Planning requires the perception of  time as well 
as linking memorised experiences and new ideas with time 
scales, what is facilitated via the entorhinal cortex (see also 
section “The types of  memory” in chapter “Emotion, moti-
vation and memory” in Part 2).
By this way, creative preparation opens the path to inter-
nalise a world model, organise collaborative activity and to 
take control over processes and developments in the exter-
nal world.
Language plays a particular important role in the level-five 
control processes. It is clear that language is developed for 
communication purposes. It can be used to coordinate ac-
tivity and adjust world models between individuals; with li-
braries and modern communication technologies, this works 
not only in direct team contexts, but also in societal contexts 
over large spatial and temporal distances – virtually from the 
first book in history over the other side of  the globe and the 
outer space to the here and now.
But language has, besides communication, another im-
portant aspect. It is also the most significant means of  mod-
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elling of  the world, which takes also effect when not acting 
directly in societal contexts. We are social beings to such an 
extent, that we, even if  we are alone, process associative and 
cognitive patterns in a way as if  we communicate with an im-
aginary counterpart or with ourselves. This is not only true 
for spoken or written language, but also for other means of  
communication like used in art and engineering (e.g. pictures, 
mathematical models and so on).
Returning to the neural processes in frontal cortex and 
basal ganglia, it is likely that linguistic capabilities are mainly 
linked to the associative/ cognitive circuit of  the multiplexer in 
the basal ganglia – see also Chan, Ryan and Bever 2013 and 
section “Basal ganglia (BG) and language” in chapter “Basal 
ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex” in Part 2. This means that 
language might be an inherent ingredient of  associative and 
cognitive processes rather than of  skeletomotor activity con-
trol processes. Another consequence is that the development 
of  cognitive capabilities is, in return, closely bound to the 
development of  language (and of  other forms of  communi-
cation). There are few results of  associative thought that are 
not devoted to communication at the same time in any form.
In relation to creative preparation, it can be stated that writ-
ten and spoken language is implicitly a kind of  associative/ 
cognitive process, and that creative preparation, if  ongoing in-
ternally, might partially be a kind of  linguistic simulation, i.e. 
it is silent speech. The vigour control mechanism in the ba-
sal ganglia plays the crucial role for switching between quiet 
simulation and loud articulation. An important result of  this 
view is also that spoken language and thinking can only be 
processed simultaneously, while skeletomotor and oculomo-
tor activity control occurs in parallel to thinking. This makes 
speech (e.g. at a presentation) the most difficult control task 
on level (5); short pauses must be exploited as good as possi-
ble to remember the context and to plan the next sentences, 
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and a good speech is usually based on thorough preparation.
What is traditionally specified as short term memory is 
nothing else than the constantly ongoing control process-
es in basal ganglia, frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex 
and in the memory system. The memory system is insofar 
involved as value-guided decision making means evaluation 
of  experiences and associations, what means memory recall. 
Recall or reinstatement of  declarative memory content does 
not occur without evaluation, and evaluation means nothing 
else than assessment of  declarative memory content in rela-
tion to a goal and, in case of  situational preparation, also in 
relation to perceptions from the external environment.
The control processes can short term switch between var-
ious goal-pattern combinations within the time frame of  less 
than one minute, what is traditionally attributed to the con-
cept short term memory. But in reality it is continuous in-
termediation between emotional-motivational patterns and 
goals on the one hand and memories, sensorimotor patterns 
and perceptions on the other hand.
A peculiarity of  level-five control is also that hypothetical 
evaluation processes, which do actually not lead to visible 
results by visible activity (so to physical results in the envi-
ronment), can turn into kinds of  situational preparation and 
of  activity (levels four and three) by developing and exploit-
ing means for the expression of  intermediate data. Most of  
human activity fits to this category. Planning, engineering, 
bureaucracy, science, journalism etc. produce nearly nothing 
than intermediate results that can be communicated. Human 
activities which lead directly to final results (e.g. products) 
are nowadays more an exception while external representa-
tions of  associations and ideas that develop in the cortex are 
the rule. This kind of  development might not occur without 
reason, since level-five control is a social achievement, which 
bases significantly on communication, and there might be, 
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respectively, a general inherent pursuit to exploit lower con-
trol levels prior to higher control levels or to reduce complex 
problems – like the long term aspiration of  a goal –, to easy 
solutions – like immediate production of  intermediate data 
(see also section “Efficiency through delegation and struc-
turing”). Language (and each kind of  communication) is, 
in the light of  this view, again an exceptionally interesting 
feature – it is a great bridge between both level-five associa-
tions and level-four-to-three activities, typically maintaining 
representations of  the former in the external world (texts, 
figures, videos etc.).
Note: Control levels (1)-(4) may correlate with System 1 
from Kahneman 2012, and control levels (4)-(5) with Sys-
tem 2 from the same book. More details see in Part 2, chapter 
“Psychology”, section “Kahneman, Daniel: Thinking, Fast 
and Slow”, and in Kahneman 2012, “PART 1. TWO SYS-
TEMS”, 17ff.
Level attributes: Qualified perception: yes. Emotional-mo-
tivational binding: yes. Procedural memory: yes. Declarative 
memory: yes.
The attention assessment controller (AAC)
The control levels (3) voluntary movement, (4) situational 
preparation and (5) creative preparation are working in a 
highly integrated way. The brain areas and modules which 
facilitate these types of  control, so basal ganglia, frontal cor-
tex, anterior cingulate cortex and the emotional-motivational 
system are closely connected to each other and to the cere-
bral cortex by strong pathways and loops. Some processes, 
like skeletomotor control, oculomotor control and associa-
tive processes occur in parallel, but the overall working prin-
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ciple is coordinated interaction and steady integration and 
handover between the three levels.
So it is adequate to combine these levels under a joint con-
cept – let us call it “attention assessment controller” (AAC).
What does this stand for?
Attention means decision making and pattern selection 
in two regards:
• selection of  a stimulus or a reward or a need, respective-
ly, which turns into the prevailing goal,
• and, subsequently, the constant sequential selection of  
associative/ cognitive or sensorimotor patterns, which 
are excited for approach the goal step by step.
This occurs in three modes, according to the control lev-
els (3), (4) and (5): activity control, situational preparation 
and creative preparation.
In this context, attention is meant in the neurophysiologi-
cal sense, so in terms of  active pattern selection and decision 
making processes, as outlined above, rather than in the sense 
of  (passive) psychological attention towards a perceived 
stimulus (like a whistle or a speaker’s voice). However, the 
latter can also be seen as one of  the observable effects of  
the former.
Note: The thesis is here that attention towards a perceived 
stimulus is only possible if  any kind of  internal state is active 
or potentially active that classifies the stimulus as relevant. 
This can be any emotional-motivational pattern, so a need 
that is either already excited or that is in standby. Perceived 
signals that do not meet an emotional-motivational pattern 
or a need are hindered in becoming stimuli and thus are reg-
ularly ignored.
Assessment means that the excitation patterns that are 
circulating in the system, so in the areas that are attributed 
to the control levels (3), (4) and (5), are constantly evaluated 
and assessed, and that they are only potentially persisted on 
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the basis of  the resulting values. This evaluation and assess-
ment process is the primary mechanism for establish pat-
terns in the memory system, namely in the declarative part 
and indirectly also in the procedural part.
It can be supposed that this occurs in two respects:
• As association between informational patterns on the 
one hand – e.g. perception patterns, microrepresenta-
tions of  sensorimotor patterns, spatial patterns, patterns 
representing time – and emotional-motivational patterns 
on the other hand – e.g. patterns representing autonom-
ic states, pain, emotions or rewards. This occurs in the 
association cortex and primarily in the entorhinal cortex, 
which is seen as hub to all other areas of  the memory 
system and as multimodal association area, supporting 
unspecific associations between various modules and 
association areas with more domain specific determina-
tion. Moreover, the entorhinal cortex is an area of  the 
memory system where emotional-motivational signals 
are directly in-bound by strong pathways from lower 
regions, namely via the basal ganglia. This area is also 
called limbic association cortex. See also chapter “Emo-
tion, motivation and memory” in Part 2.
• As excitatory and inhibitory effects at synapses in all 
brain areas, at which excitations represent positive values 
and inhibitions represent negative values. The associa-
tivity and synaptic plasticity in the whole brain is con-
stantly developed and optimised for the service of  the 
human species. This occurs at all synapses of  the brain 
in a more or less indirect way via the primary mechanism 
from above.
Summarising, one can state that evaluation and assess-
ment is the (only) mechanism for establish memory content 
in the brain and that there is no memory without emotion-
al-motivational value. The finding, that the brain is con-
52
stantly optimised by the assessment process, might not only 
be true for the networks of  synapses (the “software”), but 
eventually also for the long-term development of  the whole 
brain structure and of  the body (the “hardware”), since what 
is assessed is the performance of  the complete organism.
Note: The concept attention assessment controller might not 
be very far from what is traditionally called limbic system, 
but the latter has got various meanings over the time and the 
former is introduced and preferably used here for the ability 
to make better clear what is meant.
The concept attention assessment controller (AAC) will now 
be outlined in more detail with the help of  figure 1, which 
shows the crucial elements of  this concept. This representa-
tion bases on scientific findings about structures, pathways, 
circuits and control mechanisms in the brain, and it should 
be considered that it is an attempt to summarize the vari-
ous findings within a simplified set of  abstract principles. 
But simplification must not be wrong in general, since na-
ture is often based on simple principles which seem only 
complicated as long as they are not well-understood. The 
summarising view, which is provided by figure 1, and the 
explanations below are an effort to not lose the sight of  the 
essential aspects, despite the extraordinary complexity of  the 
neurological matter.
A condensed abstract perception, which combines the 
most important aspects in hypothetical manner and which 
ignores a lot of  secondary aspects, can be seen as useless 
by domain experts, who focus on the highest level of  detail. 
But it might be a necessary supplement to domain specific 
knowledge, to also ask for holistic, systemic or interdiscipli-
nary views.
The pillars of  the AAC concept are the interplays between 
“assessment” and “attention control” as well as between 
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“activity mode” and “preparation mode”. The descriptions 
of  the brain structures and processes from above are now 
summarised again in accordance to these concepts.
Assessment
Assessment means continuous evaluation and assessment 
of  the results that are achieved by the control processes of  
the brain. The general aim and purpose of  human activi-
ty is always survival and thriving as social being under the 
conditions of  evolutionary competition. This purpose is 
bound into the brain processes via the emotional-motiva-
tional system, comprising patterns from autonomic interface 
(including homeostasis), pain sensation, emotional process-
ing and reward system (see box “Emv”/ ”Emotivations”). 
The consequence is that storage of  excitation patterns in the 
memory system takes always effect on the basis of  emotiva-
tional values that are emitted by the emotional-motivational 
system. These values are an inherent ingredient of  each type 
of  memory content, at which this occurs as emotivational 
association in the association cortex and as excitatory and 
inhibitory effect at all synapses in the brain. The emotiva-
tional value, which applies to an informational pattern – rep-
resenting perception, sensorimotor procedure, space or time 
etc. – can be gradual positive or gradual negative. It can be 
assumed that there is no memory content, no synapse and 
generally no part of  the body which is not assessed and en-
dued by a value by this way.
Assessment is represented by the two assessment symbols 
in figure 1. Perception and sensorimotor activity is always 
assessed directly (see the “Asm” symbol at “SC”/ “Sensory 
cortex” and “MC”/ “Motor cortex”). This basic stuff  hap-
pens always, also if  the individual follows level-three reflexes 
and habits without thinking twice, i.e. without impulse con-
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trol or appreciable level-four or level–five incidents (“level” 
means control level – see above; level three refers also to the 
“activity mode” and level four and five refer to the “prepara-
tion mode” – see below).




























AGD  Affective goal decision
Asm  Assessment
ED  Encoding decision
Emv  Emotivations
MD  Motor decision
Mpx  Multiplexer
Prep  Preparation
RS  Reward system
VGD  Value-guided goal decision
Areas
ACC  Anterior cingulate cortex
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DM  Declarative memory
 (association cortex, tem-
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MC  Motor cortex
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SC  Sensory cortex
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The other “Asm” symbol represents assessment in the 
“Declarative memory” (“DM”). This is the mechanism of  
how experiences establish, which can be consciously remem-
bered and which can be exploited via association process-
es, level-four/ five control processes (see above) or by the 
“preparation mode” (see below), respectively.
Attention control
Attention control means, first, selection of  a stimulus or a 
reward or a need, respectively, which turns into the prevail-
ing goal, and, second, selection of  associative/ cognitive or 
sensorimotor patterns, which are excited for approach the 
goal step by step. The first is represented in figure 1 by the 
two goal decision symbols (see “VGD”/ “Value-guided goal 
decision” and “AGD”/ “Affective goal decision”), the sec-
ond by the “MD” symbol (“Motor decision”).
The trigger for a decision can elicit from inside or from 
outside of  the organism. Internal triggers are, of  course, 
signals from the emotional-motivational system. Needs re-
quire attention and reactions, and this cascade is processed 
via goal decision (“AGD”/ affective, “VGD”/ value-guided), 
motor decision (“MD”) and resulting behaviours (see the 
three symbols in figure 1). During the released activity, the 
same functional chain works also as control loop for contin-
uous corrective control.
External triggers can occur via any perception pattern. 
But perception takes place through a complex cascade of  fil-
ters (mainly in the sensory areas), whereat the last and most 
important filter is the emotivational filter – only if  a per-
ception pattern meets any kind of  interest, in terms of  an 
emotivational pattern that is in standby, it can happen that 
an external stimulus turns into a goal decision.
Affective goal decisions (“AGD”) are the standard, which 
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has been developed long ago in the phylogenetic history. 
This refers to control level three (see above) and to the ac-
tivity mode (see below). Value-guided decisions (“VGD”) 
occur when impulsive or habitual behaviours are detected 
as not suitable, what happens the more often the higher de-
veloped the individual and the more exploratory the current 
course of  action is. This refers to level-four/ five control (see 
above) and to the preparation mode (see below).
The crucial point of  attention control is the evaluation 
process. The basic principle of  each kind of  evaluation and 
decision is comparison of  concurrent value-added neural 
patterns, which may come from similar or rather different 
sources. The first stage – goal decision making (see the GD 
symbols in figure 1) – compares concurrent emotivational 
patterns which are sent from the autonomic interface, pain 
sensation, emotional processing or from the reward system. 
These patterns are comparable, and one of  it gets tempo-
rarily the priority, what is a more or less stable result, but 
which can change at any time and which can switch between 
multiple goals with high frequency.
The second stage – motor decision making (see the “MD” 
symbol in figure 1) – compares the selected goal, providing 
a demanded value, with value-added solution patterns that 
are available in the memory system and which have got their 
values by the assessment process during storing. This can 
be multiple concurrent sensorimotor patterns, or it can be 
one or no pattern (in consequence of  informational pre-fil-
tering). The pattern is selected in the end, which meets the 
demanded value best.
The second stage – motor decision – can also backlash 
towards the primary stage – goal decision. This may happen 
directly, e.g. if  no sufficient solution is found, or via a detour 
through the triggered sensorimotor procedure and another 
intervention in the BG multiplexer (“Mpx”), forcing further 
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decision making procedures.
However, this works similar to other control mechanisms. 
The evaluation process or the complete functioning of  the 
attention assessment controller can be seen as just another 
variant of  a control loop with nominal-actual value compar-
ison. At the decision making cascade, the nominal value is 
emitted by emotivational patterns representing needs, and 
the actual values are the selected solution patterns. The sys-
tem is balanced if  activity is ongoing on the basis of  stable 
goal and habitual behavioural sequence. So it is a kind of  ac-
tivity regulation system. Intervention is necessary if  activity 
is inappropriate.
For the whole attention assessment controller (AAC), the 
set value might be the total absence of  deficiency needs, and 
the actual value is provided by any kind of  deviation from 
this general aim. Or, along with rewards and artificial/ virtual 
needs, the set value is aesthetic experience and the actual 
value is its absence, and balance is provided if  no deficiency 
need is active and, possibly, if  aesthetic experience is on-
going as demanded (the role of  artificial/ virtual needs and 
aesthetics is explained below, starting with section “Higher 
needs”). Intervention is necessary if  needs occur, so nearly 
always. The result is that the AAC makes the brain a great 
self-regulation system, which regulates human affairs in the 
process of  evolutionary competition.
All the goal decisions and sensorimotor decisions occur 
as suitability probability evaluation processes in synaptic multi-
layer networks or decision making maps, respectively. What 
this means is described in section “Universal suitability prob-
ability evaluation” below. A short explanation of  multilayer 
networks and decision making maps has already been provided in 
chapter “Neuro basics” above.
It is important to note (again), that term attention is meant 
in the sense of  “neural attention”. This has little to do with 
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the well-established concept of  attention towards an exter-
nal stimulus, as, e.g., a whistle, a speaker’s voice or a concert. 
Term attention is here used in the sense of  attention towards 
neural patterns, or filtering and selection of  neural patterns 
and turning excitation processes towards these patterns. The 
conventional well-established attention concept is only one 
of  the observable phenomena, which may occur due to neu-
ral attention.
Activity Mode
The activity mode is linked to level-three control, the skel-
etomotor and oculomotor circuits through the basal ganglia 
(see symbol “Mpx”/ ”Multiplexer” in figure 1 with the con-
nection between “MC”/ “Motor cortex” and “Sensorimo-
tor functions”), affective goal decisions (“AGD”) and mo-
tor decisions (“MD”). How these loops for direct activity 
control work is determined by informational and emotiva-
tional filtering of  memorised neural patterns.
Informational	filtering means alignment of  neural ex-
citations to the informational state of  the individual in the 
environment. This refers to perception and the influence of  
perception results on decision making and pattern selection 
processes (see “Sensory organs” and “SC”/ “Sensory cor-
tex”). This includes external perception, as vision, sound, 
touch, taste etc., and internal perception, as, e.g., proprio-
ception.
Emotivational	filtering means alignment of  neural ex-
citations to internal need states. This is managed via the in-
fluence of  the emotional-motivational system in the basal 
ganglia circuits (see the connection between “Emv”/ “Emo-
tivations” and “Mpx”/ “Multiplexer”) and via “AGD”/ “Af-
fective goal decision” and “MD”/ “Motor decision”, which 
are controlled by emotivational values as described above 
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under “Attention control”.
These “Activity Mode” control loops build the funda-
ment on which higher-order control mechanisms, as lev-
el-four/ five control and “Preparation Mode” can evolve.
Preparation Mode
The preparation mode is linked to level-four/ five control, 
the associative circuit through the basal ganglia (see symbol 
“Mpx”/ “Multiplexer” in figure 1) and associative processes 
that are mainly controlled by areas in the prefrontal cortex 
and that are able to exploit and influence declarative memory 
contents (see symbol “Prep”/ “Preparation”). This is a great 
play with all the options that are available in the neural pat-
tern library, primarily in the declarative part, what includes 
that different contents can be combined to one another in 
any form, which is not predetermined.
This is an excitation control process, which is continuous-
ly ongoing in the brain independently from and in parallel 
to sensorimotor and oculomotor control processes, what is 
mainly a merit of  the four basal ganglia circuits that are rep-
resented by symbol “Mpx”/ “Multiplexer” in figure 1 (see 
also the descriptions under “(3) Voluntary movement (ac-
tivity control)” in section “The control levels of  the central 
nervous system”).
These associative processes can be seen as a kind of  in-
formation processing, but which is certainly lead by pur-
poses and values. They follow the principles of  attention and 
assessment, just as this is true for activity control processes. 
This includes selection of  a (hypothetical) goal, evaluation 
of  associative patterns that might be consistent to the goal 
and selection, assessment and storage of  resulting patterns. 
This is a constant evaluation process which reorders and 
recombines the neural patterns in the declarative memory 
60
continuously and which produces always completely new 
representations of  pattern combinations in the associative 
areas. This is the type of  process, which can be experienced 
as conscious thinking under certain circumstances (more de-
tails see below in sections “The two types of  consciousness” 
and “Conscious experiences”).
The potential to interact with the control of  real activi-
ties is always included. The associative preparation processes 
are sometimes completely detached from the sensorimotor 
control processes, so in the creative preparation mode (control 
level five), but they can also be closely linked to the current 
activity context in the sense of  the situational preparation mode 
(control level four). In the latter case, goal decisions are not 
always only hypothetical, only influencing internal associa-
tive processes, but they can rather also become real in the 
sense of  the decision making apparatus for sensorimotor 
behaviours. This aspect is represented by symbol “VGD”/ 
“Value-guided goal decision” in figure 1. This type of  de-
cision making occurs always in close cooperation with the 
functions “AGD”/ “Affective goal decision” and “MD”/ 
“Motor decision”, what is supported by strong direct path-
ways between the appropriate areas in the brain, and what is 
represented by related connectors and arrows in the figure. 
The primary mechanism for this interplay is impulse control 
due to inappropriate habitual behaviours, what is processed 
in the basal ganglia circuits by (quick) inhibitive interven-
tion of  sensorimotor activity and as handover to deeper val-
ue-guided decision making processes, before more suitable 
behaviour can be started again.
It is an interesting finding that linguistic capabilities and 
processes, although connected with motor control of  vocal 
cords and eyes among other things, can be mainly attributed 
to the associative circuit. There is a large distributed network 
of  language in the brain, including a ventral semantic stream, 
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a dorsal phonological stream, a speech perception pathway, 
and an articulatory loop. Due to current scientific findings, 
this network corresponds more with the associative basal 
ganglia circuit rather than with one of  the motor control 
circuits (see also section “Basal ganglia (BG) and language” 
in chapter “Basal ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex” in Part 
2). This suggests that language is close to association and 
preparation and, vice versa, that associative and preparative 
processes are significantly linked with linguistic processes. 
This is no coincidence, because it is clear that thinking, asso-
ciation, planning (preparation) is mainly cultivated in social 
contexts, and thus always based on communication. Hu-
man’s understanding of  the world develops in multimodal 
associations, whereat naming and linguistic communication 
plays always a crucial role. This means also that language is a 
great phenomenon, which provides external representations 
of  parts of  the processes that are internally ongoing in the 
associative areas with the behalf  of  the associative basal gan-
glia circuit.
Asking for the relation and priority between preparation 
mode and activity mode, it can be asserted that the prepara-
tion mode refers to reason and the activity mode to action, 
impulsive/ habitual behaviours and instincts. A conclusion 
could be that well-controlled behaviour, which is always 
based on the detour over the value-guided decision making 
system, should, along with the development of  culture, be-
come more and more the rule and that impulsive behaviour 
should become more and more the exception. This percep-
tion is totally wrong.
The truth lies rather in a close and well-organised cooper-
ation between both systems. Decisive association processes 
and considerate behaviours can only enfold when the pro-
cesses of  this type are not always exploited for demands that 
can be solved by routine behaviours. That’s why the strategy 
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must always be to develop bunches of  more suitable behav-
ioural sensorimotor patterns for tasks that may occur repeat-
edly in similar manner. Only if  this pursuit is cultivated in 
distinct manner, it is possible to get enough leeway for the 
ability to manage real difficult tasks via the preparation mode 
in a good manner. A rich library of  sensorimotor patterns is 
the crucial basis for high effectiveness of  the whole system, 
at which few small value-guided impulses are enough for 
steer action always into a successful direction.
The preparation mode, on his part, is typically aligned 
with the general pursuit to feed the library of  routine behav-
iours with as many suitable patterns as possible, or at least 
as necessary. This might be an inherent instinct of  the as-
sociative control machinery, which occurs for its own relief  
and its ability to remain efficient. This is why our life is often 
more determined by learning and training than by effective 
action and why brain growth occurs to a decisive extent for 
complex sensorimotor processing, besides declarative mem-
ory and higher-order control mechanisms (see also the next 
section below).
Note: The activity mode and the unconscious part of  situa-
tional preparation may correlate with System 1 from Kahneman 
2012, and the conscious part of  situational preparation as well 
as creative preparation in general may correlate with System 2 
from the same book. More details see in Part 2, chapter 
“Psychology”, section “Kahneman, Daniel: Thinking, Fast 
and Slow” and in Kahneman 2012, “PART 1. TWO SYS-
TEMS”, 17ff.
That’s it about the attention assessment controller concept. 
This is a model of  the major control mechanisms in the brain, 
which might be little bit too brave, which is not free from 
synthetic ingredients and which will definitely need further 
critical review. But, on the other side, it would be a failure to 
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not try such kind of  complement to the usual neurological 
research strategies, which occur in highly specialised manner 
and which lead to a certain degree of  blindness for greater 
interdependencies and for the holistic and systemic aspects 
of  the brain.
Nature is often based on very simple, but efficient con-
cepts. It seems often confusing to us because we are not able 
to understand the brilliancy of  these concepts. Regarding the 
brain, there are two opportunities: deploring that it is too 
complicated to understand exactly how it works as complete 
system, or trying interim concepts, which may not be finally 
correct, but which reflect the suspicion that there must be in-
genious intermodal concepts behind these endless bunches 
of  nerve cords and synapses. The SPP model is an attempt 
to cultivate the latter idea.
The biggest open question:
Regarding the capability of  the basal ganglia to manage 
skeletomotor control, oculomotor control, associative pro-
cesses and limbic processes widely independently in parallel 
by segregated circuits, it is a big remaining question, of  how 
the involved cortical areas are able to realise these divided 
processes on the first hand, to interact partially on the sec-
ond hand and to do this without indulging in total confusion 
and chaotic flow of  excitation on the third hand. See also 
“Question 1” in chapter “The biggest open questions” at 
the end of  Part 2.
Efficiency	through	delegation	and	struc-
turing
The processes of  interaction and handover between con-
trol levels (1) to (5) include a constant natural pursuit for 
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efficiency. The higher levels, particularly level (5), are mainly 
associated with all kinds of  trouble or complication, while 
the lower levels (1) to (3) are rather associated with smooth 
behaviours, pleasant habits and well-trained skills that can 
be used without greater amounts of  conscious attention. Of  
course, higher-level ambitions lead also regularly to satisfying 
achievements and aesthetic elations in the end. But this is a 
complicated detour that is only taken when unavoidable. The 
natural pursuit of  the brain is rather being always competent 
and successful without greater mental efforts in terms of  
conscious reflection.
In fact, it is never possible to manage life mainly by lev-
el-five efforts. This approach would only lead to disasters, 
because explorative behaviours consume always too much 
time and too much other resources. The whole system can 
only act in sufficient manner if  level (4) and particularly level 
(5) are reserved for exceptional cases and for extraordinary 
issues, while the majority of  the daily requirements is suc-
cessfully managed by well-trained lower-level skills. That’s 
why the system acts in a way, so that each activity, habit and 
attitude is constantly optimised by feedback control. The ef-
fects and results, that are achieved, are always incorporated 
into the memorising processes as values, leading to the con-
stant adaptation of  sensorimotor-emotivational patterns and 
associative-emotivational patterns (so of  the solution pat-
terns), with the result that improvement occurs in the neural 
pattern library always as implicit ingredient of  activity and 
preparation processes. Acting and thinking means implicitly 
always reinforcement-driven learning and refinement of  all 
parts of  the solution pattern library.
This path of  constant optimisation occurs not only be-
tween the levels, but particularly also inside of  level (5), 
including world models, communication processes and in-
tellectual ambitions. To solve long-term problems in an in-
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tellectual way means always to find simple solutions for dif-
ficult problems, opening the room for manoeuvre for facing 
further issues with higher complexity.
Only if  the brain structures and contents are optimised 
in this way and tasks are regularly delegated from higher to 
lower control levels, or from complex to simple solutions 
(inside of  level five), the brain will have enough remaining 
higher-level resources when extraordinary issues have to be 
managed additionally. It is a natural quality of  the brain, that 
it fits this demand always in widely sufficient manner. This 
strategy is challenged in crisis situations. But the brain is so 
powerful that it is basically capable to return regularly more 
or less quickly to the path of  constant optimisation, so that 
there is nearly no problem that cannot be solved in the end.
But there are also reasons why the optimisation strategy 
or the whole system, respectively, reaches its limits – either 
temporarily or long-term – this topic will be broached by 
“The 4DI model” – see the appropriate chapter below.
Universal suitability probability evaluation
This section tries to explain why there is the talk of  “suita-
bility probability evaluation” and why the brain is classified 
as “suitability probability processor”.
Term “evaluation” has to do with the following concepts 
or aspects of  the brain or of  the SPP model, respectively:
• Emotivational signals that are emitted by the auto-
nomic interface, pain sensation, emotional processing 
and by the reward system. These signals are transferred 
to crucial parts of  the brain, as the basal ganglia (multi-
plexer, affective goal decision making), the frontal cor-
tex (associative control, value-guided decision making) 
and the association cortex, namely the entorhinal cortex 
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(memory). This has been outlined in section “Homeo-
stasis, pain, emotions and rewards”. Term “emotivation” 
has been introduced for this class of  phenomena in sec-
tion “The emoti(onal-moti)vational system”. Further 
concepts have been added in section “The attention as-
sessment controller (AAC)”. A crucial point here is that 
emotional and motivational signals can be emitted by 
different sources, but that all these signals, which repre-
sent any kind of  purpose, are compatible in general, so 
that they can be compared and evaluated in concurrence 
to each other. This (brain-) universal aspect is the reason 
why “emotivation” has been introduced as abstract term 
for all kinds of  purposeful signals.
• Assessment, as explained in the ACC section above. 
Each content in the associative memory is enriched with 
emotivational value patterns, i.e. patterns that represent 
autonomic states, pain, emotions or rewards. This takes 
primarily place via associations between informational 
patterns and emotivational values in the association cor-
tex. Furthermore, the weights at all excitatory and in-
hibitory synapses in the whole brain can also be seen as 
values, referring to informational patterns which circu-
late through the nerve cords and synapses as excitations 
and which are transmitted and processed on the basis 
of  values by this way. Value information which can be a 
basis for evaluation and filter processes has got an inher-
ent ingredient of  memorised information by these two 
mechanisms.
• Attention control and decision making, as explained 
in the AAC section above. This refers mainly to the val-
ue-guided decision making chain, leading from emoti-
vational signals that are emitted by the emotional-mo-
tivational system over value-guided goal decision making in 
the prefrontal cortex and motor decision making in the an-
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terior cingulate cortex to sensorimotor procedures that 
are consequently stimulated in motor cortex and senso-
ry cortex. This comprises also value-guided associative 
processes in the prefrontal cortex and the declarative 
memory system in the sense of  preparation processes, 
which do not always have to lead to a motor decision. 
And this refers also to the affective decision making 
chain through the basal ganglia over the anterior cingu-
late cortex to the sensorimotor control system; this is 
not attributed as value-guided, but the involved pattern 
transformation and decision making maps are based on 
synapses, and are thus in the broader sense also matter 
of  evaluation.
The concept “suitability probability evaluation”, as to be 
explained here, focuses on the direct attention control and 
decision making processes. This includes the value-guided 
decision making chain and the associative preparation pro-
cesses in the prefrontal cortex and the declarative memory, 
while it excludes the affective goal decision making chain 
and values that are coded in synapses. However, the latter 
things are also matter of  regulation and optimisation, but in 
a more indirect way via the former.
The crucial principle and common denominator for at-
tention control and decision making is balancing of  the 
brain processes for the sake of  the individual and the spe-
cies in the process of  evolutionary competition. This is quiet 
similar to other control loops in nature and technology, and 
it takes place as weighting of  actual values in comparison to 
set values. The set values are the needs which prevail cur-
rently or which are in standby (e.g. bodily integrity is always 
a standby need, sexual arousal can be). The actual values are 
the values that are achieved by the current activity process 
for the body or by the current preparation process for the re-
sulting associations. Regulation is necessary when the results 
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do not meet the demanded need satisfaction, so that the 
emotivational set value signals rise or turn negative instead 
of  decreasing or turning positive – in the sense of  aesthetic 
experience – as demanded.
A specialty of  the brain control processes, compared to 
simple control loops, is, that multiple set values and poten-
tial (standby) set values are involved at the same time. The 
consequence is that this is not only a control loop for one 
parameter and set value, but many set values concur typically 
to one another. That’s why brain control must have two stag-
es – goal decision and solution pattern decision.
Bot stages are evaluations between concurrent patterns 
with value component. Making a decision for a goal means 
evaluation of  the importance of  all involved goals and find 
out which has currently the largest significance for the organ-
ism. The direct emotivational value signals of  the involved 
needs are compared to each other in this case. A simple for-
mula can be that the strongest need, which causes the largest 
emotivation, will win.
The winning goal from the first stage provides the set 
value for the next stage – the motor decision or the search 
for an adequate associative pattern. The actual value is now 
provided by the solution pattern, which is currently excited 
– either in the sensorimotor control system for the case of  
a motor decision or in the associative/ declarative areas for 
the case of  preparative reflection. Regulation means in these 
cases that the current solution pattern is continuously com-
pared with other candidate patterns and that a better pattern 
is immediately selected if  its value becomes the most prom-
ising in the current situation, in relation to the demanded set 
value.
It must be clear that external and internal information 
is always the other crucial factor for the pattern search 
and (pre-) selection processes – it would be useless to se-
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lect patterns which promise great values but by matching 
to completely different physical or informational contexts; 
the informational part of  the lookup and selection process 
or pre-selection process works via external and internal per-
ception (sight, hearing, touch, kinaesthetic sense etc.); for 
the associative/ preparative processes this might be linguistic 
processing due to hearing or vision, or it might only be the 
former train of  thought, which recommends itself  to being 
completed. But value comparison is always the most decisive 
final part in the decision chain, because it represents the pur-
pose which is behind all these processes.
However, the goal decisions as well as the solution pat-
tern decisions are processed via synaptic multilayer networks 
or decision making maps, respectively – what this means, 
is described in section “Excitation, inhibition, pattern trans-
formation and circuits” in chapter “Neuro basics” and in 
Glimcher 2014 and references therein. The crucial and fi-
nal part of  these decisions involves always the emotivational 
values in a universal way. The result is that always the goal 
is selected, which may represent the biggest advantage for 
the individual in the current situation, and that the solution 
pattern is selected, which meets the current context at the 
best and which is accompanied by the best assessment value 
in relation to the demanded emotivational value.
The general criterion for this kind of  pattern selection 
processes is always to find the patterns with the best suit-
ability in relation to current needs and context. The sense 
is, that the goal must be suitable for improve the state of  
the individual, and the solution patterns must be well-suited 
for achieve or approach the goal. That’s why it might not 
be wrong to entitle this principle as suitability probability 
processing, leading to the concept “suitability probability 
processor” (SPP) for the brain and for this part of  the book.
In this connection, suitability probability means not that 
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this is based on accurate data collection and mathematical 
statistics, but it means rather that it is “only” a kind of  suita-
bility probability estimation system.
The efficacy of  this system should nevertheless not be 
underestimated, because it is target of  constant optimisation 
and it is field-tested by the successful development of  mam-
mals and humans. The results might not always be very exact 
in the mathematical sense, but a great advantage should be 
that they are always totally suitable and up-to-date, because 
it is ensured that all important aspects and gained optimi-
sations are definitely involved with no latency. This is a big 
pro in comparison to mathematical statistics which are often 
made available by effortful studies and often applied to con-
texts later on, which have been changed in between (note: 
this disadvantage might be settled in contemporary big-data 
solutions, which are increasingly able to integrate gain and 
application of  data).
It is a central thesis of  the SPP model that nothing hap-
pens in the brain and nothing is stored in the memory with-
out regard to purposes, emotivational values and needs. But 
what about the steady perception of  the environment? Per-
ception seems often occur in general, without direct purpose 
and motivation. An individual is typically able to observe his 
environment and to record what happens around him, de-
spite the fact that not all events are relevant for him. How 
might this be consistent to the thesis that nothing happens 
in the brain without purpose and value?
First, observation, although if  widely comprehensive, is 
always a filtered process; a lot of  irrelevant signals are put 
aside as noise and others are prioritised as important enough 
for recording. Second, there are many potential purposes 
and needs making constant observation sensible. Examples 
are the need for safety – causing the aspiration to detect ir-
regularities as early as possible –, any ambitions for target 
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oriented action – requiring constant orientation –, or kinds 
of  play instinct or artistic ambition – with unbiased marvel 
at everything. Third, if  the goal of  current activity is classi-
fied as profoundly important, perception works consequent-
ly in a highly focussed way. The thesis is here that excitation 
patterns do not leave traces in the nervous system without 
purpose and without a dedicated need, even if  it seems so on 
superficial consideration.
A difficulty is that there are many different types of  emo-
tional or motivational signals. There are at least the four 
general types – autonomic signals, pain sensation, emotional 
patterns and signals representing rewards – which have to be 
divided into a larger amount of  more concrete types, as e.g. 
hunger, thirst, pressure pain, headache, any kind of  feeling 
or even the desire for any concrete reward. This leads to a 
certain necessity for differentiation. See also section “Ho-
meostasis, pain, emotions and rewards” in chapter “Neuro 
basics” and section “The emoti(onal-moti)vational system” 
above.
But there is also the insight that decision making on the 
one hand, so the attention part in the AAC concept, and 
assessment, so the assessment part in the AAC concept, are 
both working in a unified way, independent from the con-
crete goal and action strategy in each case. And these pro-
cesses are well-suited for manage combined evaluations and 
decisions in a universal way, independent from the types of  
the involved emotions or motivations. Pain can be balanced 
in relation to hunger, and pain and hunger can be balanced in 
relation to a reward, as e.g. a mountain peak. This outstand-
ing universal capability of  the cerebral control system can 
only become identifiable by adequate levels of  abstraction 
and generalisation. That’s why describing the interface to 
the autonomic system, pain sensation, emotional processing 
and the reward system as generalised interface to an abstract 
72
“emotivational system”, as done in section “The emoti(on-
al-moti)vational system”, is adequate, when focusing on the 
general characteristics of  the nervous system.
Following this path, it is only consistent to combine emo-
tional-motivational to the special term “emotivational”, as 
well as emotion and motivation to the term “emotivation”. 
Furthermore, “emotivational value” might be a sensible term 
for the currency which is paid in the brain in general and 
which makes the universal comparison of  any purpose-relat-
ed component of  excitation patterns possible.
It can be the talk of  an emotivational pattern which is 
generated by the emotional-motivational system, when a de-
ficiency occurs in the autonomic regulation system or when 
a pain is perceived. For the content of  the declarative memo-
ry, this leads consistently to the universal naming as “associ-
ative-emotivational patterns”; this refers to all kinds of  brain 
areas that are involved into the associative processes, con-
trolled by the associative/ cognitive control circuit through 
the basal ganglia, and proclaims that the universal contents 
in these areas can always be entitled as associative-emotiva-
tional patterns, in the sense that these are informational as-
sociative patterns that are coloured by emotional experiences 
or emotivational values, respectively.
Needs and library of  associative-emotiva-
tional patterns
For the further differentiation, though on the path of  
generalisation, it is necessary to bring term “need” more into 
focus. What are needs and why is this concept important 
here? Term “need” is just another, but rather more psycho-
logical term to specify and classify signals that are elicited 
by the emotional-motivational system. A need arises when 
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a pain, autonomic deficiency or urge for a reward occurs 
which cannot immediately be satisfied. But it is a typical sit-
uation in daily life that a specific need occurs not segregated. 
It is rather normal that multiple needs concur to one anoth-
er. The situation gets more complex when considering that 
there are, besides active needs, always also any number of  
standby needs that can potentially become active due to the 
further developments. This can be, for example, a need for 
inviolacy, which represents risks on the way to the demanded 
food that may satisfy a hunger need.
The result is that multiple needs, that are either active or 
potentially active, concur typically to each other. And it is 
exactly the decision for a goal, which is either processed as 
affective decision via the basal ganglia or as value-guided de-
cision via the prefrontal cortex (or in coordinated manner 
by both instances), as described above in relation to the con-
trol levels (3), (4) and (5), which resolves this conflict. The 
constant work of  this hybrid decision making apparatus, or 
of  the attention part of  the attention assessment controller, 
consists of  constant balancing between needs that concur to 
each other in the particular context. Thus, the decision for a 
“goal”, as described in some scientific papers, is at the same 
time the selection of  a need that is allowed to turn into the 
prevailing need. This is the same process, but only described 
with different words.
The advantage of  term “need” is that it opens another 
perspective of  the goal decision making or attention control 
process, which refers more to the psychological dimension 
of  the matter rather than only to neurophysiological pro-
cesses. In the light of  this perspective, emotivations repre-
sent also needful states and need satisfaction experiences 
rather than only excitation patterns and value components 
in decision making processes.
On a very abstract level, needs can be divided into basic 
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needs and higher needs. The relationship between needs and 
emotivations can be explained in different ways for both cat-
egories.
Let us start with basic needs. The initial purposeful com-
ponent which takes effect in the nervous system is homeo-
static regulation, i.e. the necessity to guarantee that certain 
biochemical preconditions for being able to survive are not 
violated. Besides this there are also sensations of  pain and 
other alarms signalling that the body is in a bad state, which 
has to be avoided for the same purpose. This is the primary 
material for basic needs from which the human cannot es-
cape (see also the explanations in the sections above).
For homeostasis and for the interfaces to the vegetative/ 
autonomic nervous system, representing bodily states, it is 
known that this is bound into the emotional-motivational 
circuits via the hypothalamus area, and pain sensation is typ-
ically involved via the so-called thalamus. This is the way in 
which changes of  bodily states or pain are incorporated into 
the equation, providing an aim for the neural processes and 
leading to a basic kind of  emotivational colouring of  the 
patterns which are circulating in the emotional-motivation-
al system and adjacent networks. So it can be assumed that 
direct need satisfaction activity via control levels (3) and (4) 
always generates combined excitation patterns which involve 
sensorimotor parts, associative parts and basic emotivational 
parts. And it can be assumed that these excitation patterns 
can potentially be experienced (if  occurring consciously), and 
that they might be stored in the cerebral cortex as memory 
content. An important conclusion should be that associative 
patterns, comprising microrepresentations of  sensorimotor 
patterns, always include also the experience of  emotivational 
gradients as intrinsic component, at least if  acquired by need 
satisfaction activity for basic needs.
This is not different for higher needs or	 “artificial	
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needs”. How higher/ artificial needs can evolve as needs – 
in terms of  becoming a goal or an emotivational stimulus 
– will be explained in the next section below. But a pre-stage 
is provided by pattern combination. Each type of  percep-
tion and activity, as well as the processes of  situational and 
creative preparation, as described in section “The control 
levels of  the nervous system” above, always result in new 
combinations of  associative patterns which evolve in the 
brain, and which are potentially experienced (if  occurring 
consciously) and are potentially stored in the memory. When 
considering that the primary basis for each type of  more 
complex activity and preparation process is always provided 
by basic experiences with basic emotivational components, 
as described in the paragraph above, the conclusion must be 
that emotivational components are also always included in 
complex pattern combinations.
The result is that the brain is an engine which is able to 
process, store, recall and combine associative-emotivational 
patterns, including associative microrepresentations of  sen-
sorimotor-emotivational patterns. That emotivations are al-
ways involved in the processes can be regarded as a general 
principle. The emotivational components might be stronger 
or weaker, but there are no associative patterns without emo-
tivational components, just as there is no perception with-
out associative or sensorimotor activity. Thus, the long-term 
memory can be seen as a huge library of  associative-emoti-
vational patterns, which is constantly fed and managed by 
action and thinking.
Higher needs
It is clear so far, that the brain works primarily on the basis 
of  basic needs and that lots of  need satisfaction incidents 
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are stored in the memory. Continuous recombination pro-
cesses, which occur in the preparation mode of  the attention 
assessment controller (AAC), result furthermore in steadily 
growing combinations of  associative-emotivational patterns 
in the pattern library, namely in the declarative memory. 
These composite patterns include complex combinations of  
emotivational colourings. But how can higher needs evolve 
from this? 
The thesis here is that the neural patterns, which are stored 
in the memory, have another important function – they are 
also the blueprints for further needs, to be developed ad-
ditionally. Higher needs might be produced via two stages 
– firstly by growing as combined associative-emotivational 
patterns in the memory and then, later on, by some of  the 
results becoming prevailing needs for a while.
There might be three mechanisms to create higher needs 
and evaluation levels from the basic processes and the result-
ing emotivational value patterns:
• emotivational dependency chains,
• emotivational stimulus modulation and
• artificial needs.
Let us continue with explanations of  these concepts.
Emotivational dependency chains
Emotivational dependency chains can only explain how 
complex emotivations can develop in the long-term mem-
ory, along with the combination process of  associative pat-
terns, and how they can be involved in the evaluation and 
decision making processes. But they cannot explain how a 
higher need can evolve as an emotivational stimulus. This 
is rather a matter for the other two mechanisms described 
below.
For higher needs, it might always be possible to describe 
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a dependency chain from basic needs and emotivations. 
Self-actualisation or art could, among other things, be moti-
vated by appreciation, leading to social needs, better oppor-
tunities for safety, and fulfilment of  basic needs. Realising 
this chain of  dependencies via the mixture of  involved emo-
tivational components, right down to the purest parts, in a 
complex pattern, might be part of  the truth. The evaluation 
process might be able to calculate all these components in 
the equation very quickly.
More and more complex dependency chains might devel-
op, along with the combination of  associative-emotivational 
patterns, from basic behaviours to more and more sophisti-
cated attitudes.
Emotivational stimulus modulation
Homeostatic regulation and the sensation of  pain might 
never really be totally quiet. So it could be that weak basic de-
ficiencies are at least always signalled from the hypothalamus 
or other sources to the basal ganglia and the attention assess-
ment controller. Therefore it could be a regular mechanism, 
that these signals are exploited to modulate a remembered 
emotivational component to these, and in this way turn the 
latter into an emotivational stimulus, also dominating for a 
while in relation to the underlying basic need.
Any kind of  remembered combination of  emotivations, 
stored in the memory in the past, can turn into an emoti-
vational stimulus through this mechanism. This is true for 
basic emotivations, special emotions or feelings and also for 
any kind of  complex emotivations developed by a pattern 
combination in the past. The recall of  a memorised basic 
need satisfaction experience as an emotivational stimulus 
might be carried out in correlation with a real needful state 
of  the body, matching its pattern at least partially, but not 
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necessarily having to.
Stimulus modulation could be a way in which emotivation-
al dependency chains or any other complex pattern combi-
nations can turn into an emotivational stimulus. The idea be-
hind this is that any good memory, which may have occurred 
in the past, can at any time later on become a demand, and 
that a weak basic deficiency is adopted to apply the pursuit to 
another idea. That a memory can become a stimulus again is 
only natural because it is just a remembered need satisfaction 
incident or a combination of  such incidents.
Higher/	artificial/	virtual	needs
The idea of  artificial or virtual needs is that a general pur-
suit of  good feelings results from basic experiences, and that 
this is maintained and developed in any direction. The basic 
experience that one can come into difficult situations and 
states, or that pure deficiencies can happen, causes a general 
ambition to oppose this kind of  occurrence. And this is a 
reason why the more complex emotivations, which arise in 
relation to the more complex informational contents of  the 
brain, can also result in the development of  higher or artifi-
cial needs.
Complex emotivations and artificial needs can to a great 
extent be disconnected from the rationale of  pure states of  
deficiency. A world of  composite emotivations and higher 
needs is developed, which becomes more or less independ-
ent from the gradients of  pure states of  deficiency from 
which it originated. This world of  feelings and ambitions 
can grow in any direction and it can become broadly inde-
pendent from the basic states. A remaining restriction might 
be that from time to time it is validated at least partially in 
being able to deliver results which can help to manage real 
life (that is, basic needs).
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The world of  composite emotivations and higher needs 
might, among other things, develop with the help of  the 
mesolimbic dopamine system (the reward system). This 
mechanism works in a way so that complex emotivations 
(good memories) can become stimuli, bound into the evalu-
ation processes of  the AAC circuits, just as this occurs with 
signals from homeostatic regulation (it is not by chance that 
the mesolimbic dopamine system is an integrative part of  
the BG/ AAC system). The result is that evaluation process-
es, which occur in relation to higher or artificial needs, can 
take effect via the same basic mechanisms as occur in rela-
tion to basic deficiencies. This kind of  generalised working 
principle makes it possible that the capabilities of  the brain 
can be optimised in an integrated manner for all kinds of  
needs. The mechanism of  how self-regulation takes control 
over behaviour, thinking and memory is always the same.
The thesis is that artificial needs always apply to complex 
or composite emotivations. So it is possible for value sys-
tems to be established which are far above basic rationales. 
Of  course, these are initially caused by basic needs in terms 
of  having the same roots, but they are completely decoupled 
from this by emotivational abstraction. So it can be possible 
to develop needs and emotions which are associated with 
a beautiful-looking garden, a work of  art, a motorcycle, a 
family celebration etc. Cultural achievements are the visible 
phenomena for the worlds of  composite emotivations and 
artificial needs that are developing in the minds of  the peo-
ple.
Artificial needs are not necessarily assigned to sufficient 
behaviours, elation and great cultural achievements. Coun-
terproductive behaviours or deplorable developments can 
also result from this ability, such as, for example, addictions 
or inhuman attitudes.
In the contemporary world, it should be the rule that mo-
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tivations are driven by remembered needs and especially by 
complex compilations of  needs, dependency chains or arti-
ficial needs; that they are driven by real pain should be the 
exception, at least for normal life under good conditions.
It is also important to mention that memories not only 
represent positive incidents and stories of  success, but also 
failures and frustrations. Just as inhibition is part of  the truth 
at the synapse level, so are negative experiences of  any kind 
part of  the truth at the sensorimotor-emotivational and as-
sociative-emotivational levels. The road to successful behav-
iours is always paved with numerous unsuccessful attempts. 
These are also stored in the pool of  experiences. And they 
are important as differential anti-patterns in the evaluation 
process, signalling both the potential impact and the behav-
ioural variants to be avoided, as far as possible. They are 
essential to always obtain an internal stress field between 
suitable and unsuitable answers to complex situations, repre-
senting the real impact of  the matter in a broadly sufficient 
manner, since it is better to be able to fight this out internally 
prior to always generating bad experiences again and again. 
So it is an important aspect of  the evaluation process that 
the stress field between positive and negative experiences is 
aligned to the prevailing pursuits.
The world of  artificial needs, which can be cultivated by 
humans to an extent which has never be seen before, should 
be seen as the most beneficial feature, which makes humanity 
the most successful species on earth. The ability to develop 
intensive social communication and cooperation is the other 
precondition for the profound success of  the humanity, as a 
matter of  course, at which both advantages are to be seen as 
closely intertwined.
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Needs and suitability probability evalua-
tion
Above it has been described of  how evaluation and decision 
making processes take place on the basis of  emotivational 
excitation patterns. This is very abstract, and another sight 
to this matter can be to break this type of  processes down to 
different types of  needs.
The question is: how occur evaluation and decision mak-
ing processes in relation to different needs? This question 
can be asked in relation to a basic or a higher need, as well 
as in relation to activity, accompanied by situational prepara-
tion, or in relation to creative preparation.
The following variables are always involved by the evalu-
ation processes that are ongoing in the attention assessment 
controller:
(a) Basic needs: The state of  the body with all its parame-
ters, e.g. biochemical conditions or states of  pain, incor-
porated via the hypothalamus or other basic emotiva-
tional interfaces.
(b) Higher needs, evolving in a seemingly detached way 
from basic needs, and preferably if  basic needs do not 
prevail.
(c) The environmental context, incorporated by perception 
and sensation.
(d) Real activity, controlled by the sensory and motor cortex 
and going on with the help of  lower regions of  the nerv-
ous system as, for example, the basal ganglia, the cere-
bellum etc. (control level three), by being supported by 
an appropriate thread of  situational preparation (control 
level four).
(e) Some threads of  creative preparation and linguistic sim-
ulation (control level five).
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Each of  these variables can become quiet for a certain 
time – (c) and (d) by sleep, (a) if  all basic needs are fulfilled 
and no pain prevails, (b) if  basic needs are active, (e) if  cur-
rent activity requires full attention. But all these variables are 
typically in the equation.
Let us now try to find some answers.
(a,c,d) How is the pattern search ongoing in relation 
to a basic need and real activity, along with situational 
preparation?
Let’s start with the motor decision topic. A basic need has 
been selected as goal, the current emotivational stimulus is 
provided by this prevailing basic need. It is emitted via the 
interface of  the hypothalamus to the basal ganglia and the 
attention assessment controller. The emotivational set value 
is a positive (satisfactory) gradient for this need.
The current context is the physical environment of  the 
person. The informational aim is to carry out real action in 
a successful manner, due to the qualified perception of  the 
environmental conditions.
The objective is to obtain patterns from the library which 
are able to meet the informational aim, and the emotivational 
set value, at the same time. This is a difficult task, since each 
situation regarding both the informational and the emotiva-
tional part should be more or less different to the situations 
managed in the past. No pattern will match exactly.
Situational preparation is carried out to play through the 
options available. It should start from the perceptions and 
actions which are currently ongoing with the help of  habit-
ual and voluntary components. Preparation means that the 
sensorimotor activity procedures (procedural) are accompa-
nied by corresponding processes in the associative parts of  
the cortex (declarative). This means that associations are ac-
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tivated, which include microrepresentations of  the ongoing 
sensorimotor-emotivational sequences and which involve 
also adjacent or similar associative patterns. The weights of  
these excitations are typically slightly varied, what might lead 
to a play through different alternative abilities for continue 
the interaction process and finally to a motor decision influ-
ence for the activity sequence, which is executed really.
But what are the right or best alternatives in the sense 
of  evolutionary competition? Answering this question is the 
task of  emotivational evaluation and decision making. The 
emotivational components of  the patterns, examined by the 
preparation process, are evaluated in relation to the emoti-
vational set value. This should lead to the pattern with the 
highest probability of  satisfying the prevailing need in rela-
tion to the current environmental situation. Another aspect 
is that patterns are classified as to be avoided which repre-
sent negative experiences in relation to a similar situation, 
signalled by negative emotivations. This is especially impor-
tant if  a kind of  trial-and-error strategy becomes necessary, 
caused by a lack of  positive patterns.
So it is a filter process, which is constantly ongoing in 
our brain in a highly efficient manner and which is a great 
solution under the circumstances of  ever-changing environ-
mental conditions. Emotivational evaluation and decision 
making provides the ability to always find the pattern which 
is most probably able to solve the situation, comprising inner 
and outer conditions. This works independently of  wheth-
er the resulting suitability probability, measured in absolute 
terms, is really high or still very low – it works in a compar-
ative way, by simply selecting the best pattern available in a 
quick and efficient manner, or at least by avoiding patterns, 
representing unsuitable reactions, in a reliable manner (see 
also Singer 2004). That is why we can speak about the brain 
as a suitability probability processor, at which this means 
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suitability probability estimation rather than exact statistical 
calculation, as already stated above.
But the examined case is quite simple, providing an expla-
nation of  the basic principle. However, the reality is much 
more complicated. A variety of  demands and needs must al-
ways be considered which might conflict with each another.
Now it is time to consider the goal decision topic addi-
tionally. Let us take an example with two needs – thirst and 
avoiding pain. Let us assume a person who is actually driven 
by the former need, thirst. And the way to the water seems 
to be not far away – a creek with clear water is seen in a val-
ley, just a few hundred metres ahead. But there are different 
options: a direct way, but leading over a cliff, and other ways, 
which are longer and less clear-cut. The thirst assessment 
will certainly vote for the short way. But ignoring the risks 
of  the cliff  is not really a good option, and taking this fact 
into account makes it clear that thinking that the evaluation 
process is driven by a single need, or only the need which is 
currently prevailing, must be insufficient. Instead the pro-
cess incorporates multiple needs, including, certainly, all the 
needs that are currently active, but besides this, also those 
which can potentially become active and which might be 
called standby needs.
What happens in the evaluation and decision making pro-
cess is that all types of  emotivational colours are included in 
the equation. All the involved components are able to cause 
feelings reproducing the actual need-state-change gradients 
incorporated during the creation of  the patterns (during the 
primary experience). That is why all human needs which 
could be affected by the selected patterns are implicitly eval-
uated and calculated concurrently with each other.
The thirsty person might primarily evaluate the direct way, 
but by taking into account the fact that climbing down the 
cliff  includes certain risks of  serious injury, i.e. by anticipat-
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ing the risked pain. This includes the goal decision making 
instances in the basal ganglia and frontal cortex, which com-
pare emotivational values of  the safety need and thirst to one 
another. The goal decision making system and the motor 
decision making system may cooperate in this case, leading 
to the result that a detour to the water is selected. This might 
be more complicated than the direct way over the cliff, but 
both needs are involved and satisfied in the end, the safety 
need for integrity of  the body and the thirst.
At least two further possibilities should be examined if  
this kind of  useful anticipation (preparation) is missed and 
the direct way over the cliff  is chosen, despite the risks. 
Switching the prevailing impetus from thirst to the objec-
tive to avoid pain could become imperative when the per-
son finds himself  in difficulties in the abyss which has to be 
climbed down. Thirst will become a secondary issue for a 
while and might reoccur when the difficulties with the cliff  
are overcome.
The third possibility to be mentioned, as is clear so far, is 
that there is a really bad experience with the cliff, and there 
is an injury.
Negative experiences will become especially important if  
there is no solution which is more or less obvious. This can 
happen, if  thirst meets a situation where no creek is seen a 
few hundred metres ahead and where no other source of  
water is visible. The patterns that represent positive values 
are scarce goods in this case, the positive signals are rela-
tively weak, and explorative strategies will become necessary, 
leading to inventive search processes and behaviours. But 
the library always provides a rich set of  anti-patterns, issuing 
negative emotivational signals revealing possible responses 
which have to be avoided. So they are a great support for 
the decision making processes and the further search for the 
desired good.
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Therefore it can be concluded that this is a mechanism by 
which the brain is able to meet any situation with great effec-
tiveness, scaling up from those where well trained, optimised 
behaviours are available, to scenarios referring to a vast lack 
of  positive suitable responses.
(b,e) How does the evaluation process work in relation 
to higher needs and creative preparation?
The principles are the same as in relation to basic needs, real 
activity and situational preparation.
The differences are:
• That associative-emotivational patterns are searched in 
the associative part of  the cortex and in the declarative 
part of  the memory system, respectively, rather than 
sensorimotor-emotivational patterns in the procedural 
sensorimotor part of  the cortex. In this case, the latter 
are only represented as microrepresentations in specific 
areas of  the association cortex. This point is also already 
true for the situational preparation processes, which are 
mentioned in the descriptions for case (a,c,d) above.
• That a higher need is always based on more or less com-
plex combinations of  pure needs and basic experiences.
• That a higher need is never caused as a pure signal of  
pain, but rather as an artificial/ virtual need or depend-
ency chain need, becoming a prevailing need by emotiva-
tional stimulus modulation or via the reward system, or 
any other sophisticated mechanism.
• That the pattern search and evaluation process is more 
or less decoupled from the real context and activity of  
the person.
A real activity program should be ongoing in parallel, 
maintained by threads of  situational preparation as de-
scribed above; this could be walking or keeping a sitting 
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position on an office chair. But there are still resources for 
the ability to also concentrate on creative preparation, to a 
certain extent. The aim could be, for example, to solve a 
problem or to get an idea of  how a project could be brought 
a step forward, which occurs in relation to a higher demand.
The associative-emotivational patterns demanded should 
not necessarily refer to the environmental context in this 
case, but to the context of  the problem to be solved, or the 
project which is targeted. So this process can evolve in rela-
tion to any context – even far away in time or space, fictional, 
scientific, religious, in obscurity, or anything else. And it can 
occur quickly or over a long period or it can flare up again 
and again. So there is seemingly no restriction or limitation 
in general. The actual restriction lies in the demand or moti-
vation which is behind the pattern evaluation process. And it 
is typically necessary to ensure that real activity is involved in 
the end, for example by using a pen or a computer to write 
down the results, or by scheduling a meeting in order to have 
discussions about the matter. Real activity and communica-
tion might also become necessary due to the finding that 
new neural patterns should be established in the library or in 
the long-term memory, respectively, in terms of  knowledge 
acquisition (associative-declarative) or training (sensorimo-
tor-procedural).
Suitability probability evaluation and evo-
lution
As a summary we can state that suitability probability com-
putation is constantly ongoing in the brain as a competition 
between neural patterns in relation to real activity or any dis-
tant contexts in terms of  time, space or closeness to reality.
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The constantly ongoing evaluation processes have differ-
ent results:
• Goal decisions: constant competition and balancing be-
tween different needs, which are represented by char-
acteristic emotivational patterns with different strengths 
and gradients, but which are compatible in general so 
that they can be compared to each other.
• Solution pattern decisions: evaluation, filtering and se-
lection of  patterns which are sufficient in relation to the 
external context and to the goals from the point above, 
in terms of  prevailing needs. There are two major types 
of  processes and corresponding types of  solution pat-
terns: situational evaluation and motor decision making 
processes, demanding sensorimotor-emotivational solu-
tion patterns (in the sense of  external interaction), on 
the one hand, and creative associative evaluation and 
decision making processes, demanding associative-emo-
tivational solution patterns (in the sense of  internal re-
flection), on the other hand.
• Creation of  new pattern combinations via multiple pro-
cesses or threads of  preparation and activity control, oc-
curring simultaneously or in parallel under control of  
the AAC, and by emergence resulting from the ability to 
mix or combine excitation patterns between the differ-
ent threads.
• Inscription of  some of  the patterns as experiences into 
the episodic and long-term memory (declarative and 
procedural), resulting in constant maintenance and en-
richment of  the libraries of  sensorimotor-emotivational 
and associative-emotivational patterns. This includes to 
a great extent also patterns representing perception in-
cidents, since situational control processes include con-
stant perception over all senses.
• Some of  the patterns available in the library can be re-
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called to be made again as positive experiences, in this 
way becoming prevailing artificial needs.
• Negative experiences are the other side of  the same 
coin, important as anti-patterns, representing dangers 
and risks in the internal evaluation process, and support-
ing exploratory trial-and-error strategies if  a lack of  pos-
itive patterns occurs in any situation.
The actual purpose of  all these processes is the general 
ability of  the individual to regulate his affairs in a sufficient 
manner according to the demands of  the evolution. This is 
primarily incorporated by real closed control loops, as ho-
meostasis and other basic mechanisms, but it leads to much 
more complex processes of  reproducing internal images of  
the external world and exploiting this to apply sufficient be-
haviours. It is about the continuation of  the evolution by 
different means, supplementing the competition of  species 
in physical and physiological spheres, increasingly, also, by 
competition between neural patterns.
The general suitability probability of  these processes de-
pends on the following factors:
• The complexity of  the interconnections in the nervous 
system. The more types of  perceptions that can be in-
volved in a coherent pattern, the better the chances that 
a suitable picture of  real life is reproduced internally. “In 
palpation there is first the shaping of  the hand for grasp-
ing an object, and secondly the moving of  the hand over 
the surface of  the object in an active exploration. In this 
way cutaneous sensing leads to feature detection that 
matches the visual feature detection in the inferotempo-
ral lobe” (see Popper and Eccles 2006, 260, Chapter E2: 
“Conscious Perception”, section 9.: “Cutaneous Per-
ception (Somaesthesis)”, sub-section 9.3.: “Secondary 
and Tertiary Sensory Areas”). The attempt to name the 
object and to vocalise this develops another dimension. 
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“Particular importance is attached to Brodmann’s areas 
39 and 40, which came very late in evolution, being bare-
ly recognizable in nonhuman primates. These are the ar-
eas specifically concerned in cross-modal associations, 
that is associations from one sensory input, say touch, 
to another, say vision […]. It is postulated that language 
comes when you have the association between objects 
that you feel and objects that you see, and which you 
then name. […]. Language provides the means of  rep-
resenting objects abstractly and for manipulating them 
hypothetically in one’s mind.” (see Popper and Eccles 
2006, 295f.). Incorporating human speech into the sys-
tem of  interconnections has two aspects in this regard – 
it is another ability of  the brain to develop interconnec-
tion complexity and it opens the social dimension – see 
the point after the next point for details.
• The above factor should be seen as an informational 
quality. Another important factor is the emotivational 
aspect. The better the internal stress fields, provided by 
the emotivational components of  the patterns, are able 
to meet real life conditions and the impact of  human 
activity, the better the chances to cope with the demands 
of  evolutionary competition.
• The complexity of  social interconnections. The ability 
to express and communicate perceptions and to main-
tain cooperative activity opens the way to a dimension 
of  the general suitability probability which distinguishes 
humans from mammals, to a great extent. It is not nec-
essary to explain the great potential of  this dimension 
here since it is obvious when you see society’s achieve-
ments. Communication involves both the informational 
and emotivational components of  neural patterns. The 
social aspect, in particular, also provides a great dimen-
sion to enrich the neural pattern library with suitable 
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content, becoming more and more important due to sci-
entific-technical progress and globalisation.
The two types of  consciousness
A question which is always especially interesting, is: “What 
is consciousness?” There are lots of  answers from different 
points of  view in philosophy, neuro sciences, social sciences 
and other fields. The SPP model tries to contribute another 
perspective.
The answer has two aspects: There are two types of  con-
sciousness – informational consciousness (informational 
aspect) and emotivational consciousness (emotivational 
aspect). Both refer to the same procedures – the associa-
tive-emotivational patterns processed currently in the brain 
- but to different aspects of  this. Consciousness is simply a 
question of  quantity in relation to both aspects.
The evaluation processes, which are constantly continuing 
in the nervous system, involve many areas of  the cerebrum. 
Consciousness is the ability to notice these processes in 
terms of  inner experience. But large parts of  the processes 
are too weak or too volatile to be noticed. A pattern only 
becomes conscious if  a certain quantity is reached for the 
product of  time and significance.
For the same sequence of  excitation patterns the ques-
tion of  whether it exceeds the threshold to consciousness is 
answered independently for the informational and emotiva-
tional aspect. Both aspects can become conscious, or one of  
these, or neither.
Large parts of  the processes of  evaluation and assess-
ment that are constantly ongoing in our brain have to be 
attributed to the latter case – it is always ongoing in a com-
pletely unconscious manner. Only in some exceptional cases, 
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Table 1 – Cases in relation to informational and emotivational con-
sciousness
c – case
ic – informational consciousness
ec – emotivational consciousness
c ic ec phrases, description
1 No No Subconscious mode, subconscious mind.
This is the actual innate demand of  the 
brain. The majority of  responses are pro-
duced with high efficiency in this mode.
2 Yes No Sober or academic mode, sober/ unemo-
tional way of  thinking.
The informational part is processed with 
a certain significance, but emotivations 
are mainly involved as unconscious filter 
mechanisms, rather than as significant per-
ceptions. This may be accompanied by a 
remaining abstract gut feeling, representing 
the fact that emotivations are involved be-
hind the scenes.
3 No Yes Emotional mode, emotionality.
The emotivations are overwhelming and 
it is difficult to uncover the actual causes, 
reasons and interdependencies in rational 
manner.
4 Yes Yes Committed mode, committed way of  
thinking.
Reason is unified with feeling to a certain 
extent. The balance between both parts can 
vary over a large range.
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if  suitable responses to a situation or problem cannot be 
produced quickly and efficiently, then consciousness arises. 
So it is actually a general immanent pursuit of  the brain to 
solve the demand for suitable patterns as quickly and as in-
conspicuously as possible. Consciousness is only the capaci-
ty to head towards residual problems which cannot be solved 
as discretely as is actually demanded.
Based on the thesis that this happens independently for 
the informational and emotivational part, four cases can oc-
cur, as described in table 1.
The common understanding of  emotions (not emotivations in 
this case) might correlate with the latter two cases to a great 
extent; rationality is preferably assigned to case 2 and myster-
ies, magic and psychoanalysis to the subconscious (case 1). 
But this differentiation is apparently unsubstantiated. Emo-
tions and rationality, as well as unconscious and conscious, 
are rather just aspects of  the same great achievement of  our 
nervous system (see also Singer 2004), called the suitability 
probability processor in this book. This engine is able to exploit 
the four aspects with the greatest adaptability ever imagina-
ble – ranging from fast responses, near to the physiological 
limitations, to extremely slow thinking and problem solving, 
and from well-trained behaviours to the complete lack of  
positive patterns (see also Singer 2004, Kahneman 2012 and 
section “Kahneman, Daniel: Thinking, Fast and Slow” in 
chapter “Psychology” in Part 2).
Conscious experiences
The question of  consciousness is also discussed as an “ex-
planatory gap” between subjective experiences and their ob-
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jective neural basis. In this regard, Block (2009), and refer-
ences therein, wrote (1113):
“Phenomenal consciousness is ‘what it is like’ to have an 
experience (Nagel, 1974). Any discussion of  the physi-
cal basis of  phenomenal consciousness (henceforth just 
consciousness) has to acknowledge the ’explanatory gap’ 
(Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983): nothing that we now know, 
indeed nothing that we have been able to hypothesize 
or even fantasize, gives us an understanding of  why the 
neural basis of  the experience of  green that I now have 
when I look at my screen saver is the neural basis of  
that experience as opposed to another experience or no 
experience at all. Nagel puts the point in terms of  the 
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity: the ex-
perience of  green is a subjective state, but brain states 
are objective, and we do not understand how a subjective 
state could be an objective state or even how a subjective 
state could be based in an objective state. The problem 
of  closing the explanatory gap (the “Hard Problem” as 
Chalmers, 1996, calls it) has four important aspects: (1) 
we do not see a hint of  a solution; (2) we have no good 
argument that there is no solution that another kind of  
being could grasp or that we may be able to grasp at a 
later date (but see McGinn, 1991); so (3) the explana-
tory gap is not intrinsic to consciousness; and (4) most 
importantly for current purposes, recognizing the first 
three points requires no special theory of  consciousness. 
All scientifically oriented accounts should agree that 
consciousness is in some sense based in the brain; once 
this fact is accepted, the problem arises of  why the brain 
basis of  this experience is the basis of  this one rather 
than another one or none, and it becomes obvious that 
nothing now known gives a hint of  an explanation.”
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But, according to the SPP model, as described in this book, 
there is no explanatory gap.
But before an answer can be provided of  how the explana-
tory gap can be seen as closed, it is necessary to explain that 
the question of  phenomenal consciousness, as it is described 
above, has at least two aspects, which must be distinguished 
consistently. An “experience of  green”, to take the exam-
ple from above, can be regarded in the differential sense, in 
terms of  how green can be distinguished from other colours 
and shades of  green, and in the literal sense, in terms of  why 
this is expressed in a specific way, e.g. by the term “green”. A 
“‘what is it like’” answer can only be given in the differential 
sense, but not in the literal sense.
The literal sense would better fit a question like “Why am 
I used to describe this experience of  green that I am able to 
precisely distinguish from the experience of  red, as ‘green’?” 
The answer is, it is why this is a practice or a convention, 
but not why it is determined in any way. The experience of  
green could also be described by the term “verde” (Italian, 
Spanish) or “grün” (German) or “jokuta” (fictitious). So 
each kind of  experience can be associated with any linguistic 
construct in our neural networks – this is arbitrary, it is never 
determined in any way and there is an infinite creative leeway 
provided in this regard.
It can be concluded that the explanatory gap cannot be 
meant in the literal sense, because if  this were the case, it 
would be a nonsense problem. This is also valid for any oth-
er forms of  expression, not only language, as well as for any 
other cross-modal interconnections. The nervous system 
works in differential manner, and specific descriptions and 
linguistic expressions are only attached when it is attempted 
to communicate the phenomena. But how it is described and 
which words are used occurs always by chance rather than 
96
in a determined way. Natural laws can explain why language 
is used, but never which words are associated with which 
phenomena.
Concentrating on the differential sense of  the explanatory 
gap, which is the only sense that is not nonsense, it can be 
stated that there is no longer an explanatory gap along with 
the SPP model. Let us summarise the concept of  conscious-
ness and follow this up by closing the (differential aspect of  
the) explanatory gap.
According to the SPP model, consciousness (of  an organism 
or any other system) is based on the following achievements:
(a) The organism is equipped with any kind of  self-regula-
tion which brings a purpose or a relevance component 
into physiological and neural processes. This aspect is 
represented by emotivational value information in large 
parts of  the neural processes and excitation patterns.
(b) Any kind of  complex information processing ability is 
developed in terms of  cross-modal associative-emotiva-
tional patterns and informational resolution ability ac-
cording to the SPP model, or in terms of  integration 
and the differentiation of  information according to the 
integrated information theory of  consciousness (IIT; 
Tononi 2012).
The fact that self-regulation is existent and emotivation-
al value information is incorporated (a) leads to the de-
mand that alternative patterns are always evaluated in the 
light of  a purpose. This is the actual reason why there 
is a “difference that makes a difference” (Tononi 2012, 
294, originally Bateson 1972).
(c) Preparation processes, according to control levels four 
and five of  the SPP model, arise to the extent that they 
are able to occupy a major part of  the neural processes 
97
concurrent with activity control demands (control level 
three) for significant time periods, with significant inten-
sity. They are able to prevail in a decisive part of  the neu-
ral information processing engine as constantly ongoing 
processes.
The fact that self-regulation is always incorporated in the 
form of  emotivational value information (a, b) has the 
consequence that information processing is perceived 
as relevant for the organism itself. The longer lasting or 
more intensive parts of  the preparative evaluation pro-
cesses are what is perceived as conscious experiences (or 
as qualia, according to Tononi 2012).
So consciousness is information enlightened by emo-
tivational evaluation.
How can the explanatory gap be closed?
For the ability to understand the relationship between the 
physical or objective aspect – nervous system, brain, syn-
apses, networks of  neural links, neural excitation patterns 
– and subjective informational processes – such as experi-
ence, mental states, decision-making, thinking etc. – it can 
be assumed that this is like a relationship between medium 
and content, or between medium and information, that is 
projected on its behalf. This is just as a CD is a medium for 
storing and playing music, the lens of  a camera is a medi-
um for obtaining a picture from a view, or the mirrors of  a 
DLP projector are a medium for projecting a picture on a 
wall. The medium is made of  matter in all these cases, but 
the processed information can neither be reduced to it, nor 
can it be resolved in the medium. One has to go to the fo-
cal plane(s) to understand what happens – e.g. the acoustic 
waves in the air, the film or sensor in the camera or the pro-
jection wall which is illuminated by the projector.
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The focal planes of  the nervous system can be described 
as follows: These are the environment, the body and the 
self-regulatory evaluation process. The environment is in-
volved as a source of  boundary conditions and as a target of  
activity. The body is involved as a source of  basic needs and 
a target of  self-regulation. The third focal plane occurs at the 
interface between the environment and the organism, which 
is provided by the evaluation process and the emotivational 
components of  the neural patterns, or the filter processes 
of  the attention assessment controller, respectively. So let us 
call this the evaluative focal plane. Brain processes would be 
completely indifferent in relation to any information, or the 
brain would not exist at all if  this kind of  evaluative focal 
plane were not available as a client.
Turning to the question “What is experience?”, it is impor-
tant to consider that the neural processes, as discussed here, 
are always ongoing in an unconscious and a conscious man-
ner – see also the descriptions in the section on “The two 
types of  consciousness” above. The more simple and basic 
part typically occurs as unconscious, which should also be 
seen as the original part, established primarily in phyloge-
netic history.
Consciousness/ awareness, if  it occurs, might particularly be 
devoted to the following boundary conditions (see also Sing-
er 2004)1:
• Sensation of  pain in terms of  an alarm, forcing the brain 
to focus on an urgent matter for a while.
• Long-term solution processes, occurring because of  
1 In particular the descriptions in section “Conscious and 
unconscious processes” (“Bewußte und unbewußte Prozes-
se”).
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critical states and risks which cannot be solved immedi-
ately due to the lack of  positive patterns, or because of  
problems which develop in a gradual manner in relation 
to solution approaches which are highly equivalent, or 
because of  artificial needs which develop concurrently 
with one another.
• Subject matters that can be communicated in the context 
of  problem solution and risk management at a social lev-
el.
These boundary conditions, particularly in relation to the 
latter two aspects, can only lead to consciousness
• if  the information which has to be differentiated and in-
tegrated exceeds a certain level of  complexity, according 
to Tononi 2012, and
• if  the variety of  evaluative requirements, as a specific 
kind of  information, also exceeds a certain level of  com-
plexity and
• if  the solution process exceeds a certain time threshold.
In this sense, conscious experiences are the conscious 
part of  the processes occurring on the evaluative focal 
plane, notably the part which can be made a matter of  com-
munication (of  any kind). That Nagel has an experience of  
green when he looks at his screen saver is just a direct projec-
tion to his attention assessment controller. “The neural basis 
of  the experience of  green that I now have when I look at 
my screen saver is the neural basis of  that experience as op-
posed to another experience or no experience at all” (Block 
2009, 1113) because the “difference that makes a difference” 
(Tononi 2012, 294, originally Bateson 1972) is provided by 
the evaluative demands which are incorporated into the neu-
ral processes by the attention assessment controller, which in 
this case means that Nagel is able to recognise whether his 
computer is in idle mode or not. Why? Because it is relevant 
for his demand to use the computer as a tool … which is 
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relevant for his work … which is relevant for his life.
Much better examples might be provided by beautiful 
flowers or the magnificent plumage of  birds, where small 
shades of  colour can have great relevance. This leads from 
the pollination of  plants by insects and the courtship of  ani-
mals to graphic designers, who use computers for their work 
for the advertising industry (for example), and who will need 
16 million colours rather than two, which might be sufficient 
for Nagel in the case above. This has further to do with the 
assumption that there is a general pursuit of  aesthetics – 
more details see below (at the end of  this section).
As a summary, we can assert that experiences and subjec-
tive states are identical with the suitability probability evalu-
ation processes that occur on the evaluative focal plane. The 
sensory organs and perception networks of  the nervous 
system are developed in such a way that they present the in-
formation to this focal plane in a differentiated and integrat-
ed manner, which is optimised for the purpose of  suitable 
evaluation, filtering and decision making under a number of  
different circumstances.
But it is important to note that the brain is definitely not 
a target tracking system or a self-regulation system in a nar-
rower sense. This follows from the following facts:
• The development of  artificial or higher needs of  any 
type plays a crucial role, as explained in the book over 
several sections. They can develop in any direction and 
do not necessarily have to follow an (easily) determina-
ble purpose.
• Preparation, especially of  the creative type, is a re-
markable achievement of  the human brain, resulting 
in unlimited capabilities for context exploration and a 
recombination of  associative-emotivational patterns, as 
explained in the section “Needs and suitability proba-
bility evaluation” for cases (b,e). See also the descrip-
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tions around concept “integrative encoding” in chapter 
“Emotion, motivation and memory” in Part 2.
These achievements make the brain a medium for creativ-
ity, and the evaluative focal plane supports direct and hypo-
thetical projection “in relation to any context – even far away 
in time or space, fictional, scientific, religious, in obscurity, or 
anything else” (see the section “Needs and suitability prob-
ability evaluation” above). This can lead to results which do 
not occur on the other focal planes – the environment, the 
body –, either not at the same time or not at all. This is also 
a strong indication for not talking here about a reductionist 
approach.
Above it was asserted that there might be a general pur-
suit of  aesthetics. What was meant by this statement? The 
brain does not only follow narrow evolutionary purposes. A 
crucial point is rather that the brain processes, although if  
controlled via multifarious emotivational patterns and con-
current needs, as described above, tend to follow a general 
principle, which can be attributed as “aesthetics” (note: this 
is only one of  many abilities to name this). It is clear that 
the ultimate principle of  brain control is provided by the 
evolutionary forces which are incorporated via basic needs. 
But it would not be sufficient to stay on this perception, at 
least not for humans. With the development of  higher/ ar-
tificial needs, which are directed towards rewards and posi-
tive experiences rather than avoidance and defence of  pain 
and frustration, the brain tends more to become a producer 
of  elations and aesthetic experiences than a stupid fighter 
against deprivation. This topic is outlined in more detail be-
low in section “Dynamics of  the need hierarchy”.
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Individual and social consciousness
Let us recapitalise consciousness of  the individual.
In the section “Conscious experiences” above, conscious-
ness was described as information enlightened by emotiva-
tional evaluation. It was explained that information from 
the environment and from the body is projected towards an 
evaluative focal plane in the cortex, which is a central part of  
the attention assessment controller (AAC), and that pattern 
evaluation and selection processes occur in an unconscious 
and conscious manner on this focal plane; the conscious part 
of  these processes is what can be called conscious experi-
ence or qualia, respectively.
One crucial point is that a purposeful component is in-
corporated into the equation via homeostasis or basic needs, 
and higher or artificial needs. What happens in the AAC is 
that the informational parts of  the experiences, also called 
sensorimotor patterns and associative patterns, are projected 
towards emotivational value components. Experience occurs 
exactly at the interface between the (informational) sensori-
motor and associative components of  the patterns on the 
one hand and the emotivational components of  the same 
patterns on the other hand.
This is true for current real-time excitation patterns, oc-
curring constantly in the brain in any form, as well as for 
representations of  these patterns in the memory. The pro-
jection of  information towards emotivation occurs primarily 
in the attention control or decision making processes, re-
spectively, which are controlled by the AAC in activity and 
preparation mode, and which control behaviour and think-
ing in the sense of  control levels three to five.
So far to the current real-time excitations. But projection 
of  information towards emotivation performs also via the 
detour over memory content. The assessment of  informa-
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tion by emotivational values is the major principle of  mem-
orizing processes in the brain. The result is memorised in-
formation with value component, which can be involved in 
further decision making processes at any time later on, and 
which is selected in the sense of  solution patterns for any 
type of  problems, which have to be solved by the brain and 
its owner. By this way, memories and their ability for being 
evaluated and reinstated are the most valuable resource for 
the primary attention control and decision making processes.
A question, which arises here, is: Conscious experience 
seems actually and primarily (on a naive view) to be a kind 
of  perception process, as e.g. “the experience of  green” 
– where is this aspect represented by the explanations of  
consciousness from above? Perception is always involved as 
informational filter for the pre-selection of  memorised asso-
ciative patterns and of  sensorimotor patterns (or microrep-
resentations of  the latter). Thus, perception is processed as 
search specification for potential solution patterns – either 
in the sense of  sensorimotor activity or in the sense of  as-
sociative preparation. Perception patterns are always gained 
by action – e.g. vision occurs via skeletomotor control – and 
they are always processed for the purpose of  action or for 
the preparation of  action. And all these processes are con-
trolled by emotivational evaluation in the end. Hence, the 
answer is: Perception is never processed per se, but rather 
always in the context of  action or potential action, and, to 
complete the story, action itself  is never processed per se, 
but rather always in the context of  purposes, so of  emotiva-
tions and needs.
That perception, e.g. of  a colour like green, may occur 
independently – with no intended action and with no pur-
pose –, is most likely a rather naive view. Perception is always 
embedded into a purposeful background – reaching from 
perception as active target oriented process with motor con-
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trol (sensorimotor) over impulsive reactions or gain of  pre-
paratory associations in the context of  prevailing needs to 
the constant evaluation of  the environment in relation to 
potential or standby needs, which are always lurking behind 
the scenes.
However, the excitations which flow through the brain in 
the sense of  perception, recall of  memories, goal decision 
and solution pattern selection (activity or associative), are the 
processes which turn potentially into conscious experiences. 
These excitations have this potential because purpose is in-
volved as emotivational component, so as current set values 
or needs, respectively, in concurrence to each other and as 
specification for assessment values of  memorised solution 
patterns that have to be selected. These excitations occur 
preferably and to the greatest extent quick and efficient in 
unconscious manner, but they may always also turn into con-
scious state if  deficiencies, complications or conflicts occur 
that cannot be solved as quick and efficient as usual. In this 
sense, consciousness is just a kind of  quantification of  sub-
conscious processes, and unconscious processes are the raw 
material for consciousness, leading to the consequence that 
both parts are a unity with gliding transition between two 
major states. In this sense, consciousness is information enlightened 
by emotivational evaluation, as already stated in the last section 
above.
The purposeful component, which is provided by the pur-
suit to be successful in the process of  evolutionary competi-
tion, is the only reason why experiences can occur and why 
they are able to reflect external phenomena with a certain 
precision. This is the only reason why there are ongoing in-
formational transformation processes, which are a matter of  
constant optimisation, in the sense that patterns are resolved 
as being suitable on the focal planes in the different projec-
tion spaces. There would only be informational chaos if  no 
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optimisation had been ordered by evolutionary pressure for 
adaptation.
Three basic projection spaces are involved in these pro-
cesses, with an explicit focal plane for each projection space, 
where the patterns involved can be resolved in a differenti-
ated, integrated and exclusive manner, according to Tononi 
2012. These are the following:
Table 2 – Projection spaces of  the individual
Projection space Focal plane
Environment External reality; physical, chemical 
and biological processes in the envi-
ronment, occurring as a consequence 
of  natural laws
Body Internal reality; physiological process-
es in the body, occurring as a conse-
quence of  natural laws; includes the 
processes of  the autonomic nervous 
system
Brain Evaluative focal plane in the attention 
assessment controller
So far this has been a short summary of  how the conscious 
experience of  the individual can be explained, and what are 
the focal planes, on which informational patterns are basical-
ly resolvable. But how can this model be expanded into the 
social dimension?
This is simply done by involving a further projection space 
– the society:
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Table 3 – The social projection space
Projection space Focal plane
Society Social interaction and communication 
processes; social phenomena, occur-
ring as a consequence of  the laws of  
social interaction, communication and 
team dynamics.
Let us provisionally call this the “so-
cial focal plane”.
It should be mentioned that the projection space environ-
ment is used in a specific way to realise social interaction and 
communication processes. That is why social interaction and 
communication always corresponds to interaction with the 
environment, but with a specific sort of  addressee – fellow 
human beings.
This leads to a combined definition of  individual and so-
cial consciousness which is very simple and stringent at the 
same time:
• Individual consciousness is evaluation in the attention 
assessment controller in relation to the environment and 
the body.
• Social consciousness is based on this, but applies to mul-
tiple people, and additionally involves the social focal 
plane. So it is individual consciousness from above, but 
for many people and in combination with relations of  
the type attention assessment controller – social focal 
plane – attention assessment controller.
This also leads to the conclusion that the processes that 
are ongoing in the social projection space, and the patterns 
that are projected on the social focal plane are the external 
aspect of  social consciousness.
An interesting point in this connection is, that language, 
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including semantics, phonetics, speech perception and ar-
ticulation, is interconnected with the associative/ cognitive 
basal ganglia circuit rather than with the circuit for skelet-
omotor control – see also section “Basal ganglia (BG) and 
language” in chapter “Basal ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex” 
in Part 2; see also Chan, Ryan and Bever (2013).
This may have the following consequences:
• Language, communication and social consciousness can 
be managed independently from and in parallel to skelet-
omotor control, so that there are few conflicts between 
activity on the one hand and thinking, planning, com-
munication and social coordination of  conscious per-
ceptions and intentions on the other hand. Humans are 
well-optimised to manage action and communication at 
the same time in parallel.
• Language is closely bound to declarative memory, asso-
ciative evaluation, preparation and decision making pro-
cesses and thus to individual consciousness, so that it 
can function as direct line between conscious contents 
in the brains of  different people. It is likely that inter-
nal linguistic processing, but also information transfer 
between individuals via articulation and speech percep-
tion, works widely without noteworthy confusion with 
further activity control, as, e.g., walking or working with 
the hands.
• Internal associative and cognitive processes might be 
connected with linguistic semantics to a great extent. 
This means that individual thinking might often occur as 
a kind of  linguistic simulation with downregulated vig-
our and inhibited motor control. This means also that 
the threshold to turn into real communication (by talk-
ing or writing) is always very low, so that the intellects 
and feelings of  humans in a group are naturally as close-
ly related as ever possible.
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But communication and alignment of  conscious inten-
tions between individuals and so of  social consciousness is 
always difficult and occurs with limited precision. A broadly 
precise reflection of  informational patterns on the specific 
human focal planes, in the sense of  differentiation, integra-
tion and exclusion, according to Tononi 2012, can only be 
achieved in a provisional manner. There are reasons why 
conscious information processing and, also, conscious in-
formation transfer is always largely imperfect.
Informational patterns are only compatible with one an-
other as long as this is according to the same type of  pro-
jection space and focal plane. This means that informational 
patterns of  the environment are only compatible with infor-
mational patterns of  the environment and neuronal excita-
tion patterns are only compatible with neuronal excitation 
patterns, but that there is no compatibility between environ-
mental and neuronal informational patterns.
This means, further, that compatibility always needs a 
double transformation – from one projection space to an-
other and vice versa. This means that there is:
• a general incompatibility between patterns for the enti-
ties environment, body, cerebral cortex and social expression and
• a gradual incompatibility between specific informational 
patterns that are related to the same entity in a basically 
compatible manner, but caused by losses during a dou-
ble transformation.
That pattern transformation between environment and 
environment via cortical incarnations of  the patterns, or be-
tween cortex and cortex via social reflection, can occur in a 
highly precise manner is not self-evident. The usual laws of  
nature typically take effect in the opposite direction, yet as 
another form of  evolutionary pressure, by always undermin-
ing precise forms of  reflection. But the attention assessment 
controller, with its purposeful working mode, is able to with-
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stand the forces of  this kind of  pressure. As a specific occur-
rence of  the laws of  nature, it is the only instance which is 
able to require that a highly precise projection is enabled for 
the informational transformation processes. This is one of  
the most important optimisation tasks that have constantly 
to be managed by the brain.
But this aspiration is undermined by further limitations, 
besides the ones that have been mentioned above. Typical 
types of  losses are the following:
• Transmission errors: Erroneous transmission and trans-
formation of  codes or signals, e.g. in the sense of  a liter-
al misinterpretation of  spoken language. Possible errors 
of  addressing, e.g. the wrong person feels addressed.
• Semantic misinterpretations, e.g. due to differences in 
mental profiles or cultural conventions.
• Contextual losses during activity control or situational 
preparation. Each specific event is always embedded in 
a broad context – it is actually the state of  the environ-
ment around the event or of  the entire world, in this 
moment. The first problem is that only a limited selec-
tion of  contextual information can be transferred, to-
gether with the actual information pattern, which repre-
sents the event which is in focus. The second problem is 
that the context is changing while the information goes 
through a double transformation.
• Contextual losses during thinking or creative prepara-
tion. The contexts of  different informational patterns, 
which are combined by any kind of  creative preparation, 
are always incompatible, to a certain extent, because 
of  distances in the topical, spatial, temporal or realistic 
sense. An exact match of  the contexts is never provided 
and it is always an important task to be considered to 
evaluate the impact of  the contextual differences. But 
the success of  this pursuit depends on the amount and 
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sufficiency of  the contextual information which is avail-
able, along with the actual information pattern, and thus 
also on the general capability to deal with complexity 
(see also chapter “The 4DI model” below).
• Focusing to limited topics and details: The chances for 
high-precision information processing are higher, the 
more detailed the thinking and the larger the bandwidth 
of  the involved aspects. But the ability to manage impor-
tant information comprehensively is always more or less 
limited, dependent on boundary conditions and mental 
states (more details see in chapter “The 4DI model” and 
especially in section “The tunnel vision paradox”).
• Unconsciousness: There are also always subconscious 
procedures and information transfers, and large parts 
of  the natural laws are unknown, with the result that 
extensive parts of  the processes are always hidden. They 
are typically hidden to all the communication partners 
involved, but there should also be many cases where 
some aspects are hidden to some participants, and not 
to others.
A general conclusion should be that limited compatibility 
and precision, as well as misunderstanding, is the rule for 
conscious information processing at a social level, and that 
accurate high-precision communication is, rather, the excep-
tion, which, to cap it all, has to be eked out again and again 




A four-dimensional intelligence concept 
(4DI)
Explanations of  the brain lead, among other things, consist-
ently to the question: “What is intelligence?” Intelligence is 
traditionally associated with accurate information process-
ing, and thus with categories like cognitive capabilities, infor-
mational resolution ability and intelligence quotient (IQ). At 
the same time, intelligence is also associated with other con-
cepts, like emotional intelligence and multiple intelligences, 
but there is no integrated concept, which tries to combine all 
the aspects involved in a consistent concept.
In each case, it is typically (traditionally) assumed that 
there is a “dichotomy between passion and reason” (Des-
cartes) or a contrariness between cognitive capabilities and 
emotions, and that emotions cause cognitive biases and thus 
reduce intelligence in the cognitive sense. But there is also 
an ongoing discussion, which shows that this contrariness 
thesis is increasingly perceived as being challenged – see also 
section “Seesaw models and more advanced approaches” in 
chapter “Cognitive control and emotions” in Part 2.
However, the SPP model suggests (here) a rather integrat-
ed concept, which tries to combine all aspects involved in 
a consistent manner. The thesis of  a contrariness between 
emotion an intelligence is turned to the opposite – to the 
assumption that intelligence is rather based on the capabil-
ity to combine both aspects. According to the SPP model, 
intelligence is seen as referring to the complexity stress field 
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• “emotivational bandwidth” and
• “team intelligence”.
The former three represent an intelligence concept of  the 
individual, the latter makes social intelligence of  this.
According to these four dimensions and to the assump-
tion that contradictions and problems may always occur in 
the complexity stress field between these four dimensions, 
intelligence is here defined as follows:
Intelligence is the capability to manage complexity 
in	the	4D	tension	field.
How these four dimensions can be defined and how 4D in-
telligence (4DI) evolves in the stress field between them, will 
now be outlined.
(1) Informational precision 
(2) Informational bandwidth
This part of  the concept comprises all kinds of  information 
processing capabilities of  the brain. It refers to the abilities 
to interpret, combine and store complex information in a 
successful manner, and to generate reasonable behaviours 
and knowledge from this. This is the kind of  intelligence 
that is focused by classic intelligence tests. It correlates with 
the interconnection complexity of  the cerebral cortex and 
depends on this.
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Detached from the discourse on this matter, the bound-
ary conditions for this aspect of  human intelligence can be 
defined as follows:
• These two informational dimensions focus on all kinds 
of  perception and information processing capabilities 
of  the brain.
• The information does not have any meaning or conse-
quences for the states and conditions of  being.
• It includes neither motivational aspects nor emotions 
(besides, possibly, ambitions for playful testing; note: 
motivational and emotional aspects are rather assigned 
to dimension (3), as described below).
• It applies especially to game-like situations and to per-
formances which can be investigated by tests (e.g. intel-
ligence tests).
• Cognitive capabilities are included, but only in terms of  
information processing capabilities. Speech and commu-
nication are included, but only in terms of  information 
exchange and the acquisition of  knowledge at a social 
level. Purposeful and empathic aspects, which are also 
an inevitable part of  cognition and communication, will 
be regarded as excluded in this case (note: this is rather 
assigned to dimension (3), as described below).
• Multiple aspects, complex interdependencies and 
cross-modal associations are included, referring to the 
multifarious requirements that have to be managed in 
real life, to interdisciplinary approaches and to compre-
hensive knowledge, but only in the informational or in-
tellectual sense by excluding drastic experiences, traumas 
and emotivational aspects. This point refers specifically 
to dimension (2), informational bandwidth.
Dimension (1), informational precision, stands for: preci-
sion, sensitivity, IQ, accuracy, scientific correct results.
Dimension (2), informational bandwidth, stands for: 
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knowledge, amateurish and professional ambitions in any 
practical or theoretical fields, interdisciplinarity.
The two aspects or dimensions – (1) informational pre-
cision and (2) informational bandwidth – involve already an 
objective type of  contrariness and area of  conflict. This re-
sults from the general inability to resolve all aspects of  the 
world with infinite precision or to acquire total knowledge 
on the basis of  limited resources. Gnosis is always a compro-
mise with limitations. It can always only comprise a special 
aspect of  the world and this aspect can only be resolved with 
limited precision or resolution.
This is reasonable when taking a look to Google Maps, 
for instance. One can either see the globe as long shot, but 
only with limited resolution or one can zoom into a concrete 
region, seeing all the details with rivers, villages and towns, 
lakes, mountains and oceanic coasts. But it is never possible 
to combine this on a screen with a limited number of  pixels.
Of  course, a human can zoom into different areas of  the 
world and then again out of  it, returning to the long shot 
perspective. And then he can imagine that there are simi-
lar structures all over the world, consisting of  rivers, villages 
and towns, lakes, mountains and oceanic coasts of  different 
kinds, and he can make conclusions from this, based on ab-
stractions. But the results of  this combination might not be 
totally correct, because abstraction means fading out varia-
tions and exceptions, which might be present in a part of  
the world which has not been examined in detail. And the 
human cannot examine all areas in the world in detail, due 
to limited time, and even if  he could, his brain would not be 
able to capture all the details.
Of  course, the Google computers manage the totality of  
detailed information, which has been collected for Google 
Maps, but they are less well-equipped with cognition abili-
ties than humans (the former are actually not equipped with 
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any rudimentary piece of  cognition), and the Google maps 
are not as detailed as any other maps, like for instance some 
OSM maps. And even if  this is overcome at any time in the 
future by artificial intelligence and big data solutions – this 
would not solve the contradiction, because this is also always 
based on limited computation capacities and on the limita-
tion that only types of  data can be involved that have explic-
itly been collected for this purpose. However, there could be 
a potential to challenge humans by computers in these two 
dimensions.
It should be noted that contemporary concepts of  cogni-
tion and intelligence (in the informational sense) apply typ-
ically more to the informational precision dimension (1) in 
one-sided manner, rather than to the combination of  both 
dimension (1) and (2). Any tests, as e.g. IQ tests, focus usu-
ally on small problems and tasks, and it is checked, to which 
extent they can be solved accurately. This means distinctive 
focusing on small isolated aspects of  the world, and thus 
extreme underrepresentation of  dimension (2) informational 
bandwidth.
The result is that our understanding of  intelligence is 
widely aligned to accurate cognition abilities of  very small 
aspects of  the world, while real life is different – it challenges 
always by a broad variation of  aspects and by the necessity 
to draw combined conclusions in a more or less provisional 
manner.
This area of  conflict gets even more confusing when in-
volving the next two dimensions.
(3) Emotivational bandwidth
The next dimension arises when considering that life follows 
always purposes that are involved via homeostasis, sensation 
of  pain, emotions, motivations and any kinds of  needs or re-
116
wards. This is involved in the brain via emotivational signals 
and excitation patterns, which are the set values in the eval-
uation process of  the attention assessment controller and 
which are included as assessment values in stored memories, 
so that they can be involved as value-added solution patterns 
into the evaluation process at any time later on.
The consequence of  this dimension is that needs have to 
be managed, and deficiencies and crises have to be combat-
ed. Information processing can no longer follow any kind 
of  whim or indulge in playful testing or pure aesthetic enjoy-
ment. Rather it has to focus on awkward truths, introducing 
conflicts and stress fields arising between senses of  delight 
and elation, on the one hand, and fear and deprivation, on 
the other hand.
Dimension (3), emotivational bandwidth, stands for: pas-
sion, empathy, steadfastness, pertinacity, resistibility, vigour, 
mental power (also physical power), emphasis.
This dimension has a contradictory relationship to both 
dimension (1) and (2). High informational precision and 
good resolution ability (1) means among other things that 
the potential to solve problems and difficulties quickly and 
efficiently is extraordinary high. But it is clear that there are 
always lots of  remaining scenarios, where this approach does 
not work and where difficult situations turn into longer last-
ing events. And this is exactly the type of  scenarios where 
consciousness arises and real intelligence is needed to over-
come the issues. If  it went already this way, high resolution 
ability (1) is now rather more disadvantageous than bene-
ficial. This is true because hardship, once occurred, is felt 
the more painful the higher the resolution ability, and thus 
the higher the sensitivity of  the neural apparatus. The good 
abilities and rich solution pattern equipment may turn again 
into an advantage later on, when a solution is found with its 
behalf, but the stress fields which have to be suffered in be-
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tween, are the higher, the more complex the neural networks 
and the larger the neural sensitivity and resolution abilities.
The same is true for the informational bandwidth dimen-
sion (2). Large amounts of  information, extensive knowl-
edge and multifarious ambitions are a good basis for quick 
and efficient solutions as well as for the ability to find good 
final solutions due to longer lasting difficulties. But in the 
meantime, when a situation turns into a longer lasting prob-
lem and when the solution is stuck for any reason, they are 
more an impairment than an advantage. This is true, because 
the more information and knowledge is available in the pos-
itive sense, the larger also the information and knowledge 
about risks and dangers which may threaten in fail cases; and 
the latter painful aspect has more weight, when there is no 
way out for a certain time period.
Particularly in cases of  longer lasting problems, which 
cannot be solved immediately, it is the ability to plan and 
act with high grades of  consciousness, control and intelli-
gence, which is the decisive resource to overcome the dif-
ficult situations. This is the type of  situation where intelli-
gence belongs to as crucial resource. Even if  an individual is 
equipped with rich and well-suited associative-emotivational 
and sensorimotor-emotivational patterns, and if  he or she 
is able to meet all demands of  real life with bravery for a 
certain time period, it is guaranteed, due to the ever-chang-
ing environment, that new situations will come where new 
strategies must be learned. And this is exactly the time when 
real intelligence has to prove itself.
That’s why intelligence, at least of  the 4DI type, means the 
ability to suffer emotivational stress fields and to neverthe-
less bring good results in cognitive disciplines. It is the ability 
to deal with extraordinary high complexity in the area of  
conflict between informational resolution ability/ precision, 
informational bandwidth and emotivational bandwidth. But 
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it should be clear that difficult times or crises are charac-
terised by extraordinary high emotivational complexity or 
bandwidth, respectively, with the consequence that this must 
be compensated by downgrading the other two dimensions 
– informational precision and bandwidth –, and thus the de-
gree of  rationality.
The demands to manage complexity become much more 
difficult with the next dimension.
(4) Team intelligence
The fourth dimension is also achieved by humans, but is be-
yond the potential of  a single individual. This is the ability 
to get the results of  efforts in relation to dimensions 1-3 
implemented in social processes and achievements.
Team intelligence means that control functions that are 
managed in the brain of  an individual with the behalf  of  
his attention assessment controller on control levels three to 
five, are on social level synchronized between multiple peo-
ple, resulting in coordinated efforts for shared goals. This 
is linked with concepts like language, communication and 
social consciousness, which have been mentioned in the sec-
tions above.
The concept “team intelligence” has the following impacts 
among other things:
• Shared problem complexity: Cooperating in a group 
or in an exchange relationship means that a joint issue 
spectrum must be managed; each participant involves 
additional problems with individual shades, what results 
in a group-related problem complexity stress field in the 
3D space, which is much larger than this of  a single in-
dividual; term “3D space” refers to dimensions (1), (2) 
and (3) from above. The combined 3D tension field of  
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a group of  people might also be called 4D tension field 
or 4D stress field.
Example: Two neighbours decide to cooperate in caring 
their pets, a cat and a dog; this brings additional efforts 
for managing different kinds of  food, coping with ten-
sions between the two species and animal individuals 
and for organising cooperation.
• Shared potentials and mutual support: The partici-
pants can join their resources, skills and knowledge, so 
that the potentials of  the team are much greater than 
that of  one person alone. And they can support each 
other.
Example: One of  the two pets is ill (the cat); the two 
neighbours can join their knowledge in finding suitable 
therapies and measures; the dog owner may carry the 
two pets to a veterinarian consultancy; the cat owner en-
joys this support while he has to go to work.
• Roles and responsibilities: Individuals have often to 
take the responsibility for the whole team in certain as-
pects or for certain time periods; this means that a single 
person has partially to cope with amounts of  3D com-
plexity of  the team, thus of  4D complexity, which are 
much more demanding than his personal affairs.
Example: The dog owner has to intermediate between 
the acute pain of  the cat, the therapy proposals of  the 
veterinary and the potential intentions of  the cat owner, 
while he has also to take care of  his own dog at the same 
time.
• Social structuring of  life: Interactions of  multiple in-
dividuals may occur in highly dynamic manner (small 
talk, payment at a cash register) or with smaller or great-
er duration (consultation, family celebration, cultural 
event, any kind of  teamwork, a labour contract or any 
other kind of  contract). The team context ranges from 
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very small (two friends, a couple) via manageable sizes 
(family, work team) to extraordinary large or global (cor-
poration, institution, state, the global economic system). 
However, the mutual interactions and interdependencies 
are nowadays extremely rich provided, so that life takes 
widely place in well-structured manner, and each of  us 
has to deal with 4D complexity forces that are stretched 
into multifarious directions.
Example: Real life.
• Artificial	person: A group or team, in the sense of  an 
artificial person, can again be involved into interrelation-
ships like a natural person. In this case, the common 4D 
tension field and the 4D intelligence of  the artificial per-
son might enfold its power like the 3D tension field and 
3D intelligence of  a natural person.
Note: As already stated above (in relation to “shared 
problem complexity”), a 4D tension field is nothing else 
than a 3D tension field, but with the specialty that it is 
a set union or combination of  the 3D tension fields of  
multiple people.
Example: A man has a contract with a big insurance 
company; he can make great benefit out of  the com-
bined expertise of  the insurance company; this works 
well until the day he gets in trouble with them – then it 
is difficult for him to face their power in a legal dispute; 
this gets better when he is able to join a bellwether trial 
which is supported by the power of  a large number of  
complainers.
The result is that life is more characterised by occurrences 
of  team intelligence and 4D complexity than by any other 
phenomenon, or that all more concrete social phenomena 
can, on an abstract level, be interpreted as processes, which 
are ongoing in the 4D space.
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The assumption that there is “a ‘dichotomy between passion 
and reason’ (Descartes) or a contrariness between cognitive 
abilities and emotions, and that emotions cause cognitive 
biases and thus reduce intelligence in the cognitive sense” 
(see the second paragraph of  this section), which has been 
supported by traditional seesaw models, contains still some 
truth, also with the 4D intelligence model. But a crucial 
point is that the 4DI model is based on the thesis that cog-
nitive performances get their sense only via purposes that 
are incorporated from the emotional-motivational system. 
There would be no cognition without this component, be-
cause cognition without goal is only informational chaos. 
That’s why the 4DI model sees cognition and information 
processing as always, at the same time, driven and impaired 
by emotivation and passion, what might not be asserted by 
other models, particularly traditional models, with such defi-
niteness.
With the 4DI model, the greatest merit of  the brain lays in 
its ability to combine information processing with purpose 
and self-regulation. This means that there is no informa-
tion processing which is completely free from impairment 
by emotivation – only the degree of  the impairment scales 
from huge to very small. But this means also that vigour is 
always injected into the brain processes to an extent which 
can widely be adapted to the demands in each situation. Ex-
actly this ability should be the greatest accomplishment of  
human intelligence, not cognition alone.
Finally, the features of  human intelligence, as promoted 
by the SPP-4DI model, can be summarised as follows:
• Self-regulation support for the existence of  human indi-
vidual and species.
• Activity control, cognition and reason on the one hand, 
vigour, mental power, passion on the other hand, and the 
ability to adapt between both virtues over a wide range.
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• Fast unconscious suitability probability processing on 
the one hand and slow conscious suitability probability 
processing on the other hand, and the ability to adapt 
between both virtues over a wide range and to manage 
smooth handover and reciprocal interaction between 
both virtues (see also section “The two types of  con-
sciousness”, Singer 2004, Kahneman 2012 and section 
“Kahneman, Daniel: Thinking, Fast and Slow” in chap-
ter “Psychology” in Part 2).
• Development and usage of  effective and smooth be-
haviours and innovative problem solutions on the one 
hand, management of  major deficiencies, in terms of  
internal resources (neural patterns) and external (materi-
al) resources, on the other hand, and the ability to adapt 
between both demands over a wide range.
• Projection of  all important aspects of  the universe into 
an internal associative-emotivational pattern library, lead-
ing to an internal view of  the world with a certain grade 
of  coherence. Constant development and optimisation 
of  this world view and alignment of  problem solutions 
with this world view (see also section “The need for co-
herence” below).
• Integration of  all informational aspects of  the self-reg-
ulation process and of  memorised patterns into a co-
herent value system, which allows value-guided decision 
making and balancing between all aspects involved. The 
result is a universal assessment and evaluation system 
with potential inclusion of  all aspects of  the world.
• The ability to manage life via the detour over artificial 
needs, aesthetic evaluation and cultural accomplish-
ments rather than only by a constant combat against 
deficits (see also the next section below).
• Development, optimisation and strategic coordination 
of  all these features on social level, making social con-
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sciousness and team intelligence of  it.
The concepts “4D tension field” and “4D intelligence” 
might provide good opportunities to investigate the implica-
tions of  all these components of  intelligence on an abstract 
level in integrative manner.
The so called “artificial intelligence” (AI), as it is project-
ed nowadays, lacks nearly all features from above; it might 
only refer to some specialised kinds of  data collection, data 
transformation, pattern recognition, control and cognition, 
but which are implemented separately from one another and 
only combined by pieces of  conventional software.
The question of  whether a system can be attributed as 
intelligent depends on the fact that it can develop universal 
integrability and extensive adaptability. The human brain is 
such a system. The so called “artificial intelligence” can only 
exist by depending on the universal integrability and exten-
sive adaptability of  humans.
Dynamics of  the need hierarchy
Note: This headline has been adopted from Maslow 1987, 
17; more details see further down.
That needs are resulting from emotivational signals 
and patterns and that needs play an important role in the 
self-regulation processes, has been mentioned in several sec-
tions above. The concept “need” is just another term for all 
kinds of  patterns that are emitted by the emotional-motiva-
tional system in the brain and which have mostly been called 
“emotivation” in the sections above. Thus, a need is just an 
emotivational pattern which takes effect as (potential) goal in 
the decision making processes of  the attention assessment 
controller (AAC).
The intention is now to turn into a more detailed view 
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on “types of  emotional-motivational neural patterns” or 
“needs”, respectively, at which the latter term is significantly 
better suited for this aspiration than the former; this is the 
case for two reasons: term “needs” is smarter and it is a good 
connection between neurosciences and psychology.
Needs have already been categorised into basic needs and 
higher or artificial needs in the sections above. The former 
are emitted by the autonomic interface and by pain sensa-
tion, and their regulation occurs typically in the sense of  
remedying deficits. The latter are emitted and maintained 
by the mesolimbic dopamine system (reward system), and 
their regulation occurs typically in the sense of  receiving a 
reward, achieving a goal or making any good experience. 
There might be further mechanisms, which have been 
named “emotivational dependency chains” and “emotiva-
tional stimulus modulation” (see section “Higher needs”), 
which might represent connections between both major cat-
egories. Emotions and feelings in the range from anxiety and 
fear to delight and elation are – facilitated by the amygdala 
– involved in either case.
The need hierarchy specification in figure 2 and table 4 
zooms into a more detailed categorisation of  needs. It is 
based on Maslow 1987 and on several popular variants of  
the hierarchy of  needs, and it is here provided in a modi-
fied version. This categorisation, as well as any other attempt 
to bring this matter into a schematic order, can only lead 
to provisional results. But it is provided here because these 
more concrete examples might be a good basis for a better 
understanding of  the topic and also for a more concrete dis-
cussion of  some dynamic aspects.
The need levels 1 to 5 in table 4 may correspond with the 
major need categories, thus basic needs and higher/ artifi-
cial/ virtual needs, as follows:
• Level 1 should have to be attributed to the major cat-
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egory basic needs. Homeostasis and pain refer always to 
urgent necessities, and have typically to be solved imme-
diately in the sense of  remedying deficits.
• Level 2 refers already to living conditions and citizenship 
and so to the labour market, the residential market, the 
enforcement of  law and order and cultural conventions. 
This involves a certain room to manoeuvre, referring to 
the development of  artificial needs in several directions, 
but the resulting concrete needs should still be very close 
to basic needs. It is a kind of  basic artificial needs.
• Level 3 involves the social aspect of  life. This can be 
seen as strong interconnection with all need categories, 
which are involved on social level via communication, 
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Material basics for culture 
and self-actualization, 
material riches
Figure 2 – Pyramid of  needs
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Table 4 – Hierarchy of  needs with aesthetic and material aspects
B – Aesthetic aspect A – Material aspect
5 – Culture/self-actualization/growth
Need to constantly devel-
op  one’s capabilities and 
talents, need for knowledge 
and understanding, need to 
be able to go one’s own way 
in the social environment; 
need to  make a positive 
contribution to the welfare 
of  fellow human beings, the 
development of  human so-
ciety, environmental protec-
tion; religious and spiritual 
needs; need for culture and, 
perhaps, for enlightenment
Sufficient material basics 
for culture and self-actual-
ization, material riches
4 – Individual needs/esteem need
Esteem, reputation, pres-
tige, recognition (awards, 
praise), influence, personal 
and professional achieve-
ment, mental and physical 
strength, stable self-esteem
Material prosperity; finan-
cial means, tangible assets, 
fashion, consumption – for 
personal use and to symbol-
ise status and prestige
3 – Belongingness needs/social needs
Family, friends, partnership, 
love, intimacy, communica-
tion, social integration and 
cohesion, belonging to a 
community
Sufficient material basics to 
be able to maintain family 
ties, friendship, partnership 
and all other kinds of  social 
relationships and social in-
tegration
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B – Aesthetic aspect A – Material aspect
2 – Safety needs
Feeling of  safety and phys-
ical integrity; no fear and 
anxiety; legal certainty is 
guaranteed; need for struc-
ture
Safety, stability, law and or-
der; protection against dan-
ger; fixed minimum living 
wage; safer accommodation
1 – Physiological needs/homeostasis
Hunger, thirst; need to 
breathe, sleep, sexuality, ex-
ercise and activity; temper-
ature balance, homeostatic 
balance; no pain
Food, water, fresh air; suffi-
cient possibilities for sleep-
ing, sex, exercise and activ-
ity; beneficial surrounding 
temperature, sufficient 
preconditions for comply-
ing with homeostatic regu-
lation; physical integrity of  
the body
ness needs are, on their own, artificial needs, which may 
mostly also refer to artificial needs of  fellow human be-
ings at levels 2 to 5. But they can also involve basic needs 
which are suffered by people who need help.
• Levels 4 and 5 are clearly composed of  nothing else than 
artificial needs or growth needs, respectively.
These five levels or the levels of  any other hierarchical need 
model are not strictly divided. There should rather be lots of  
vertical relationships which might be caused by mechanisms 
like “emotivational dependency chains” and “emotivational 
stimulus modulation” or by other impacts. An appropriate 
phenomenon should be, that each need type from an original 
level gets corresponding representations on each level above.
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Examples for this phenomenon might be the following:
• The need for food and water is originally assigned to 
level 1. But it has incarnations on each level above. It 
might be cultivated as food hoarding on level 2 (safety), 
family meal on level 3 (social), working dinner on level 
4 (esteem, reputation) or gourmet experience on level 5. 
Or some of  these demands are sought in combination.
• The need for safety and stability is originally assigned to 
level 2. But it may have caused the need for stable social 
relationships – as e.g. long term friendship, family ties 
etc. – on need level 3, the need for a professional career 
and material property on need level 4 and the need for 
a coherent internal world view in order to face the chal-
lenges of  life on need level 5.
• Sexuality is originally assigned to level 1. But it could 
possibly also be assigned with the following phenomena 
at higher levels: marriage in relation to level 2 (safety) 
and 3 (social), beauty in relation to level 4 (esteem, rep-
utation) – either own beauty or beauty of  the spouse or 
both –, sexual pleasure and erotic adventure in relation 
to level 5 (aesthetics, self-actualisation), sexual morality 
of  religions in relation to level 5 (religion, spirituality) – 
as e.g. no sex before marriage, celibacy.
• Social relationships and needs (level 3) are always an im-
portant basis and motivation for the cultivation of  high-
er needs (level 4 with esteem and reputation, level 5 with 
culture and self-actualisation etc.).
• Esteem, reputation, influence (level 4) are closely con-
nected with cultural ambitions (level 5).
• That there are strong dependencies on the material side 
of  the hierarchy – from basic resources (level 1) over 
safety (level 2) and sufficient amounts of  money and 
property (levels 3 and 4) to wealth (level 5), is a matter 
of  course anyway.
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This type of  interrelationships between need levels might 
also be a mechanism which enriches higher need levels with 
emotivational phenomena like passion, empathy and power.
Now let’s turn to the “Dynamics of  the Need Hierarchy”, 
as described in Maslow 1987 at pages 15ff. According to 
Maslow, “the basic human needs are organized into a hi-
erarchy of  relative prepotency” (17). This means that ba-
sic needs, if  unsatisfied, dominate the organism. “For the 
human who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other 
interests exist but food. He or she dreams food, remembers 
food, thinks about food, emotes only about food, perceives 
only food, and wants only food.” (16f.) But this turns into 
another state of  the organism when hunger can be satisfied. 
“It is quite true that humans live by bread alone – when there 
is no bread. But what happens to their desires when there is 
plenty of  bread and when their bellies are chronically filled? 
[…] At once other (and higher) needs emerge and these, rather than 
physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when 
these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still higher) needs 
emerge, and so on.” (17) “The physiological needs, along 
with their partial goals, when chronically gratified cease to 
exist as active determinants or organizers of  behaviour. 
They now exist only in a potential fashion in the sense that 
they may emerge again to dominate the organism if  they are 
thwarted.” (18)
The consequence is that there is a steady interplay be-
tween lower needs and higher needs over all levels, at which 
lower needs tend to be prepotent, if  active, and higher needs 
develop only on the basis of  the satisfaction of  lower needs. 
This is a principle over all need levels. How concrete needs 
are specified, categorised and ordered into a hierarchy is a 
rather secondary topic. The more important message is that 
needs build on each other in a hierarchical interdependency 
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and that lower needs tend to occupy the ambitions of  the 
organism, if  active, while higher needs evolve and develop 
on more subtle levels in consequence of  the fact that lower 
needs are managed and satisfied successfully.
This fits very well to the fact that self-regulation occurs 
in the brain on the basis of  emotional-motivational signals 
and patterns, and to the theses that higher/ artificial/ virtual/ 
growth needs develop on the basis of  the reward system, 
emotivational dependency chains and emotivational stimulus mod-
ulation. The crucial point here is that the raw material for 
higher needs are pattern combinations that are constantly 
produced by the processes of  the attention assessment con-
troller (AAC), and which include always informational and 
emotivational components. Thus higher needs, which evolve 
from these pattern combinations, are always composed of  
fragments of  basic-need patterns or emotivational patterns, 
respectively. This results in emotivational patterns which are 
the more complex and subtle the higher the need level. In 
this sense, higher needs are only weak and ambiguous incar-
nations of  lower needs. Reversely it can be concluded that 
lower needs, which are the more clearly straightened orig-
inals, are, if  occurring again, always prepotent in relation to 
higher needs.
This is easily understandable, when thinking again of  the 
example of  a “chronically and extremely hungry person” 
from Maslow (1987): “Freedom, love, community feeling, 
respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as fripperies that 
are useless, since they fail to fill the stomach. Such a per-
son may fairly be said to live by bread alone.” The higher 
needs as mentioned above, as well as all kinds of  cultural 
ambitions, might not least be developed to make hunger – or 
other lower needs, as pain and safety – to rare events, but it 
is clear that the actual deficiencies have regularly priority if  
occurring again despite the precautionary efforts. This re-
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lationship occurs at each higher and more subtle need level 
again – scientific truth, e.g., which can be attributed to need 
level 5, is nowadays an important means for the ambition 
to manage the issues of  life in well organised manner, but it 
is pushed into the background if  social or financial trouble 
has to be managed (at levels 2 to 4) or even if  reputation is 
concerned (level 4).
The principle of  the relative prepotency of  lower needs 
in relation to higher needs corresponds also very well with 
the four-dimensional intelligence concept. This is outlined 
in section “Dynamics in the 3D tension field” below. But 
we will firstly discuss two further phenomena of  the need 
system – “social emotivational dependency chains” and “the 
need for coherence”, and we will clarify in what way concept 
“growth needs” is appropriate.
Social emotivational dependency chains
The concept “social emotivational dependency chains” is 
the social extension of  “emotivational dependency chains” 
as described in section “Higher needs”. It bases on the fol-
lowing mechanisms:
• The extraordinary ability of  the human to produce con-
trolled behaviours and attitudes via the attention assess-
ment controller might preferably be developed for re-
gardfulness towards the social environment and fellow 
human beings rather than towards the natural environ-
ment (more details see under “Considerations on the 
social reference of  impulse control” in chapter “Basal 
ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex” in Part 2). It can at least 
be assumed that social forces tend to have priority over 
natural forces, except for the basic need levels 1 and 2, 
which occur only exceptionally in a well-organised so-
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ciety. This high degree of  social determination is also 
the reason why the social need level is the lowest at the 
transition from deficiency needs to growth needs.
• The extraordinary communication abilities of  humans 
and the capability to develop social consciousness (more 
details see in section “Individual and social conscious-
ness” above). This includes namely also the emotivation-
al aspects of  life, so that emotions and feelings of  dif-
ferent people are connected and made interdependent 
on each other.
• And even the emotivational dependency chains (inside of  indi-
viduals) as already mentioned above.
These mechanisms lead to the peculiarity of  the human 
society to interrelate individual emotivational dependency 
chains in multifarious manner to one another, and to build a 
network of  social emotivational dependency chains by this 
way. It can be assumed that life in a well-developed society is 
determined by these dependency chains to a great extent, or 
that this is widely the basic mechanism of  how needs evolve 
in individuals that are integrated into the society.
Thus, social needs and social emotivational dependency chains 
can be seen as the basic need mechanisms for people who 
are well integrated in a well-developed cultural society. Real 
basic needs, so at level 1 and 2, occur only for exceptional 
cases, so for individuals who get sick or who are (partially) 
excluded from normal life for any reason, or for the case that 
the social or economic conditions get into difficulties.
However, the society as a whole will always have to man-
age also the need levels 1 and 2, what can only function if  
representatives suffer this type of  needs and share the corre-
sponding feelings. This occurs, for example, by the following 
ways: sickness and exclusion (as mentioned above), social, 
economic or political distortions (challenging the attribute 
“well-developed”), professional or voluntary confrontation 
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with basic needs (hard jobs, sports), adolescence (in terms 
of  structural development), confrontation with greater en-
vironmental changes and challenges, societies that are less 
well-developed or that get under pressure due to changed 
boundary conditions, serious crises, catastrophes and wars.
The humanity would lose its purposefulness and orienta-
tion if  these mechanisms are overcome, but this would cer-
tainly result in the next crisis, so that pronounced emotiva-
tional impacts are again injected into social mentality.
The need for coherence
A special need should be mentioned, which could be entitled 
by different names. We decide to call it “need for coherence”.
This need can be seen as a general demand, which covers 
all other needs and particularly the artificial or growth needs 
in an abstract manner. It arises from the experience of  ba-
sic needs – particularly the needs for safety, integrity of  the 
body and homeostasis – in combination with the experience 
that precaution can be managed in a good way via the detour 
over artificial needs, so that further basic experiences can be 
avoided to a great extent. This can only be successful if  the 
artificial needs are developed and cultivated in a systematic 
way. Thus, it is consistent that the need for safety and stabil-
ity from level 2 turns, among other things, into a distinctive 
representation on level 5, which requires that the complete 
system of  artificial needs and its actualisation follows any 
kind of  order, which is associated with guaranteed future. 
This is more or less inevitable, only the severity and specific-
ity might vary over great ranges between individuals.
Some more concrete incarnations of  this coherence need can 
be described as follows:
• This might be the actual essence behind all artificial 
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needs that are assigned to level 5 in table 4, as e.g. cul-
ture, self-actualisation, need to make a positive contribu-
tion to the welfare of  fellow human beings etc.
• Need for aesthetics, aesthetics principle or principle of  
differential aesthetics: The demand to experience aes-
thetic elations as experiences which represent the great-
est distance from deprivations.
• Library need: The demand to maintain the library of  as-
sociative-emotivational patterns and sensorimotor-emo-
tivational patterns in a way, so that it may always provide 
suitable solutions for any tasks or problems which can 
occur in present and future. How this appears depends 
widely on age, boundary conditions and mental charac-
teristics. This might be lived out as play instinct and in-
quisitiveness during childhood and adolescence – when 
the neural pattern library is like a dry sponge, which is 
greedy for absorb everything –, as need for professional 
or amateurish competencies and for a coherent world 
view during adulthood or as need for keep a remaining 
level of  control, as good as still possible, during the pro-
cess of  deceasing.
• Believe, religion and irrationality: Humans must always 
deal with certain gaps in their competency matrix and 
world view. It is actually a fact that the plenty of  gaps 
is rather huge while the pieces of  expertise, skills and 
knowledge are very small, compared to what is possible 
in the world. This is a massive assault against the need 
for coherence, making coherence impossible on a real-
istic way. But the strategy of  the human brain is to treat 
these gaps by tailored harmonisation filters, which make 
them as small and harmless as ever tolerable. Humans 
are great masters in making such types of  harmonisation 
filters, and the results are all kinds of  believes, religions, 
irrational attitudes and biases. In this sense, the ability 
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to endure the challenges of  life and keep optimistic and 
act with verve at the same time depends more on the 
ability to ignore real risks and contain threats by obscure 
believes and pieces of  irrationality, than on knowledge, 
skills and competencies in the positive sense. This fits 
also to the finding or thesis that emotivational bandwidth 
and thus irrationality plays a crucial role in human intel-
ligence (see the 4DI concept).
The coherence need, as it is described here, can be seen 
as an abstract general goal or as the neural fulfilment prin-
ciple, which is the actual truth behind each more concrete 
demands and efforts of  humans. It is the ultimate driver of  
culture and affluence.
See also Singer 2002: Under the headline “Attachment 
problem” (“Bindungsproblem”), he discusses of  how the 
“self ” (“ich”) might be constituted, and he postulates that 
coherent interpretation of  the multifarious sensational sig-
nals must occur anywhere in the brain. This refers more to 
consciousness and the search for the “self ”, but has also a 
link to the need for coherence as it is proposed here.
Artificial	needs	versus	growth	needs
Artificial needs can be attributed to the human or Homo 
sapiens as a basic feature from the beginning. This might 
also apply to animals, as e.g. mammals, even if  with limited 
extent. All species with a reward system in their brain should 
be able to develop artificial or virtual needs, so needs that 
are not genetically determined and that are not necessarily 
bound to body conditions. Pavlovian responses should al-
ready be simple pre-stages of  artificial needs.
But in what way can there be the talk of  growth needs? 
Artificial needs might have turned into growth needs dur-
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ing human history. This might have started as inquisitiveness 
or collection passion of  some people over many thousand 
years. But it encompassed the whole society at the latest 
since the 16th century. Since that time, the passion towards 
growth became the most significant social movement of  
our era. This occurred in the form of  the scientific tech-
nological revolution and economic growth (see also Harari 
2014, chapter 14 – “The discovery of  ignorance”). That’s 
why it seems nowadays obvious and hardly controvertible 
that growth needs are an important component in the hu-
man need system, which has large influence on individual 
and society, at least as a modern tendency. But this is not 
an inherent ingredient of  human nature, like artificial needs.
It should be mentioned that mental growth must not nec-
essarily be bound to economic growth or increasing con-
sumption of  resources. Real mental growth might rather 
correlate with increasing independence from sensitive goods, 
so with de-growth in the material sense.
Dynamics	in	the	3D	tension	field
The four-dimensional intelligence concept, as introduced 
above, bases primarily on the 3D tension field between in-
formational precision (IP), informational bandwidth (IB) 
and emotivational bandwidth (EB). These three dimensions 
stand, at the same time, in a complementary and contradic-
tory relationship to each other. Intelligence of  the human 
kind can only occur, if  one is able to last the tension field 
between the three dimensions to a certain extent, so that 
a large range of  aspects, high informational precision and 
mental vigour can enrich one another.
But the fact that the three factors or dimensions oppose 
each other at the same time, means that the ability of  hu-
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mans, to deal with this complexity and to exploit the provid-
ed opportunities for their benefit, is also always limited. It 
is possible to deal with many details (IP) or aspects (IB) or 
with profound emotivational stress (EB), but it might nev-
er be possible to exploit all three dimensions at the same 
time to an extraordinary high degree. This is prevented by 
the fact, that the neural resources are always limited. This 
means more concrete, that the product IP * IB is restrict-
ed by memory capacity, and that the product information * 
emotivation, and thus memory * emotivation, is restricted by 
the limited ability to suffer pain.
A conclusion can be that the “mental capacity” of  a hu-
man (or animal) is defined as follows:
 MC = IP * IB * EB = constant (short term)
Further conclusions might be the following:
• It is basically possible to develop ones mental capacity 
(MC), but this occurs, if  at all, only long term. Examples 
can be: long-term development in brain memory capac-
ity and cognitive capabilities over generations, changes 
in frustration tolerance due to experiences and personal 
development.
• Short term adaptation is only possible in the sense, that 
one factor is regulated up or down more or less quickly 
and extremely, but only on the cost of  compensation in 
the remaining two dimensions. This is outlined in more 
detail further down.
Conclusions in relation to the fourth dimension, team in-
telligence:
• The formula and rules from above refer also to the 3D 
complexity tension field of  teams and to social con-
sciousness. This means that the mental capacity of  indi-
viduals refers inclusively to the team contexts in which 
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they are involved, and that teams have also a mental ca-
pacity, which takes effect in relation to the combined 3D 
tension fields of  all people involved.
• It can further be concluded, that the mental capacity, and 
so the 4D intelligence, of  individuals, is widely deter-
mined by their social relationships. This means that it 
depends significantly on the social relationships which 
occur by chance and on social dynamics, which devel-
op due to natural (social) laws, but also on the ability 
to manage the team dimension in a fortunate or target 
oriented manner.
If  one accepts the formula and rules from above, and the 
fact that mental capacity is limited, the question is now, what 
does this mean: dynamics in the 3D tension field or short term ad-
aptation? How are the three factors or dimensions intercon-
nected to each other, which scenarios may occur in the 3D 
space and what are the possible consequences?
This topic can be examined by starting from typical reac-
tions to pain, frustration or dangerous situations. If  an event 
of  such a kind occurs, the control processes in the brain are 
always intruded by additional emotivational signals, what in-
volves two components: (emotivational) information about 
the specific deficiency or threat, and a general increase in the 
emotivational load, which has to be dealt with. The inevitable 
consequence of  this is, that the negative event occupies the 
brain processes to a certain extent and brings them into the 
service of  the prevention of  disadvantageous consequences.
Applied to the MC formula from above, this means that 
an increase in the emotivational component EB must result 
in a decrease in one of  the informational components, so 
either in bandwidth (IB) or precision (IP) or both. In the 
most cases it is likely that this occurs primarily in the IB 
dimension. Examples are: driving a car very fast forces nar-
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row focusing on the road in front; pain or stress of  any type 
directs attention to the cause and pushes other aspects of  life 
into the background until relief  is achieved; a family conflict 
impairs other ambitions, as e.g. profession or development 
of  capabilities and talents; depression, in the sense of  mental 
capitulation, occurs as an ultimate consequence of  constant 
excessive demands on the mental capacity (MC).
A typical case of  focusing in the IB dimension is provid-
ed by the usual stress reactions, which include, among other 
things, dedicated attention on the cause (or the combatant) 
and states of  alert in the nervous system and in the physi-
ological systems, comprising activation of  the sympathetic 
branch of  the autonomic nervous system, hormone release 
(adrenal, cortisol), increased heart rate, blood pressure and 
blood flow etc. This is can also be accompanied by inten-
sified perception of  the incidents, which are now in the fo-
cus (increased informational precision/ IP). But the decrease 
in the informational bandwidth dimension should be much 
more significant (the world around is more or less complete-
ly ignored), so that the rise in the emotivational dimension 
(EB) is compensated by focusing in the informational band-
width dimension (IB), and the mental capacity limitation 
(MC) is not exceeded in the end.
Although if  focusing in the IB dimension is a typical kind 
of  reaction on rising emotivational load, adaptation can also 
occur in the resolution/ precision dimension (IP). But it is 
likely that this is a secondary strategy, which occurs rather 
more long term, due to natural mechanisms. An example 
of  a short-term adaptation in the IP dimension might be 
the reaction to extreme stress or psychological shocks, which 
may primarily refer to adaptation in the IB dimension, as de-
scribed above, but which can also result in lowered pain sen-
sation or unconsciousness in the end, what refers to the IP 
dimension. Some examples for long-term compensation in 
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the IP dimension might be the following: decreased cognitive 
capacity as long-term consequence of  depression; unfortu-
nate development of  cognitive and intellectual capacities due 
to childhood in a family climate, which is characterised by 
larger levels of  distress. These types of  adaptations seem 
deplorable, but it should be clear that they are absolutely ap-
propriate under these circumstances.

















The following examples may refer to affected informa-
tional capacities in general, involving both dimension IB and 
IP: flight into drugs or dissociative psychological phenome-
na due to critical levels of  distress.
Summarising, one can conclude that new difficulties oc-
cur typically as rise of  pain, frustration or stress in the EB 
dimension, and that the brain adapts short term usually in 
the IB dimension, so by fading out information which is of  
lesser importance in this situation – see figure 3. This leads 
to the effect that the efforts of  the whole system – so of  
brain, central nervous system, autonomic nervous system, 
neuroendocrine system and the physiological processes of  
the body – are concentrated on the remediation of  the cause, 
what will hopefully result in recovery of  the original balance 
in the end. This can be seen as the most crucial and prima-
ry prototype of  the compensation mechanisms in the 3D 
space. However, reality should be full of  variants of  such 
kind of  adaptation scenarios.
This prototypic compensation mechanism is also consist-
ent to the “Dynamics of  the need hierarchy” as described in 
the appropriate section above. Assuming that an individual 
is in a balanced state in any moment – so indulging in activ-
ity on a higher need level (self-actualisation or maintaining 
reputation) –, an event at a lower need level – as e.g. social 
stress or a threat for safety or health – means always that the 
lower need, which has been raised now, prevails for a while 
and that the higher ambitions are suppressed. The organ-
ism is only able to return to the better balanced state and 
to the higher-level ambitions, when the stress or the threat 
could be managed to a sufficient extent and when the low-
er need could be brought to being vanished again by this 
way (see figure 3). This kind of  dynamics in the need system 
meets exactly the compensation mechanism according to 
the MC formula. Higher need levels refer always to infor-
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mational contexts which are the more complex the higher 
the need level and the more sophisticated the ambition, and 
lower needs are always the more unequivocal and urging the 
closer the demand to the basic fundamentals of  life. That’s 
why the statement that a “lower need prevails for a while” 
(need system) is absolutely consistent to the statement that 
a “rise in the emotivational dimension (EB) is compensated 
by focusing in the informational bandwidth dimension (IB)” 
(4DI/ MC).
The result is that the MC formula and the thesis that the 
mental capacity (MC) is short-term constant is nothing else 
than another possibility to describe what is already known 
as being determined by the dynamics of  the need hierarchy.
So far to the primary short-term adaptation mechanism. 
That adaptation can mean much more, so also adaptation 
in the IP dimension, long-term change of  the balances be-
tween the three components or development of  the mental 
capacity (MC), is clear so far and has partially already been 
mentioned above. This is a field for further investigation, 
which may promise interesting insights into psychological 
phenomena.
However, let’s now continue with the question: How do 
the 3D tension field and the mental capacity limitation take 
effect under circumstances that are widely characterised by 
artificial or growth needs and beneficial developments?
3D	tensions	in	the	affluent	society
So far about stress reactions due to rises in emotivational 
load. But it is time to mention also the other side of  this 
class of  phenomena – the boundary conditions for the de-
velopment of  excellent cognitive capabilities as well as for all 
kinds of  achievements in profession, art and culture, which 
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take nowadays place. The extraordinary fortunate develop-
ments of  our age in some parts of  the world, namely in the 
more happy parts of  the western culture, are certainly based 
on the ability to contain emotivational load and to manage 
remaining occurrences of  this kind thoroughly. In the con-
temporary western culture, and particularly in professional 
contexts, it is an absolute must, to keep lower needs, defi-
ciencies and stronger emotivational stress factors under con-
trol. This is the inevitable precondition for active participa-
tion in the contemporary society. Only people who are able 
to have the emotivational aspect of  life under control and 
who are able optimise constantly their skills in intellectual, 
technical, artistic or sportive fields, are able to make bene-
fit of  the society, and only people who are well-integrated 
into the society, so that all needs can be managed sufficiently, 
namely the lower needs, are able to contain emotivational 
challenges to the right extent, so that skill optimisation is not 
impaired too much – this is a mutual conditionality in terms 
of  the question, if  one is well-integrated into the society and 
can keep on-line with the multifarious progressive develop-
ments. This is like a demand for coherence on social level, or 
a great competition in competence, affluence and happiness, 
which results every day in great achievements.
But there are also many shady sides of  this great compe-
tition or of  this social demand for coherence. Negative con-
sequences can be described in relation to several fields, so 
for cultural, ecological, economic, political, (socio-) psycho-
logical, neural, physiological or other layers of  reality. This is 
a huge topic, but which cannot be faced here in its entirety. 
So we will keep track of  the neural and socio-psychological 
aspects of  life and turn to the most crucial drawback of  the 
social demand for coherence.
A crucial disadvantage or drawback of  the great competi-
tion is, that it tends to challenge people and also teams who 
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cannot keep pace with the progressive developments, to an 
extraordinary extent; in this connection, term team is meant 
in the sense of  social classes, ethnics, nations, states, regions, 
families, working groups, companies, institutions or any oth-
er groups of  people (team means any “social entity”). That 
these people or teams are challenged means that they are con-
fronted in their living environment with significantly higher 
degrees of  emotivational load than tolerable, so that their 
chances to close the gaps in the informational disciplines, as 
IP * IB, cognition, intellectual and professional competen-
cies etc., are rather little. It is part of  the normal social dy-
namics that some people and groups are better integrated in 
one moment and others suboptimal, with the consequence 
that the latter have significantly more complexity stress and 
possibly also less benefit. But normal dynamics means that 
there are chances, in terms of  a certain grade of  integra-
tion and equal footing, and that there is a certain probability 
that the circumstances may develop and the balances may 
change. The talk can be of  a “challenge to an extraordinary 
extent” if  the balances in the mental parameters, so between 
IP, IB and EB, of  an individual or of  a team in relation to 
other individuals or teams, namely the representatives of  the 
great competition, is too large, so that they have little chances to 
come in cooperation with them on a par. The consequence 
is that they may either live in a niche, not much affected by 
other people and groups with significantly different mental 
profiles, so that they can be happy in their living environ-
ment (see the north sentinel islanders), or that they are con-
fronted with other, very different facets of  the global cul-
ture, with the result that additional complexity stress arises 
due to the large discrepancies in the mental parameters. An 
extraordinary challenge is provided by the fact that the ten-
sion fields between the different cultures make convergence 
and cooperation the more difficult the larger the gaps in 
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mental boundary conditions, when cooperation attempts are 
started. Examples: development politics, which fails again 
and again in many cases; the support and encouragement 
of  children from disadvantaged or poor backgrounds is also 
often a bigger challenge.
However, one can ask: why is there still larger emotiva-
tional load in our world? We, the global humanity, are ac-
tually very rich equipped with skills, competencies, material 
resources and money. We have nowadays (actually, seem-
ingly) much more than we need. Could this not lead to the 
result that basic needs, deprivation, frustration, shortages 
widely vanish and that we indulge in the development of  
growth needs and happiness? There are many reasons why 
this does not occur to a sustainable extent – this can again 
be explained in relation to several fields, so for cultural, eco-
logical, economic, political, (socio-) psychological, neural, 
physiological or other layers of  reality, and we will again 
keep track of  the neural and socio-psychological aspects of  
life. This means that we will now collect explanations, why 
emotivational load has still so much influence, seen from the 
perspective of  the SPP-4DI model.
The importance of  the emotivational dimension is still 
high or might never vanish because of  the following reasons:
• The nearly antagonistic inconsistency in mental profiles 
between the affluent (western) society and extraordinarily 
challenged people and teams, as described above, is one 
source of  emotivational load and additional 3D/ 4D 
complexity, which will stay for a while, and which needs 
greater attention.
• Each society, even the best, is constantly confronted 
with erosion processes. Social dynamics and natural 
processes lead always to deplorable and difficult fates, 
loss of  solutions, structures and competencies as well 
as additional problems and rising tensions in the society 
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(between different mental profiles etc.). There are always 
new challenges to be faced, and the primary mechanism 
occurs in the nervous system – it is frustration and com-
plexity stress due to new problems, which drive humans 
firstly crazy and then, hopefully, to the development of  
inventive solution approaches.
• Higher needs are based to a certain extent on negative 
experiences, dependency chains on lower needs (see also 
section “Higher needs” above) and on level specific rep-
resentations of  lower needs on higher need levels (see 
section “Dynamics in the need hierarchy” above). The 
result is that lower needs are always involved at each 
higher need level again, bringing passion, empathy, pow-
er and purpose into these need levels, but potentially also 
adverse effects, like conflict, ruthlessness, violence and 
war.
• Life is characterised by birth, childhood, adolescence, 
illness and death to a certain extent. All these phases are a 
constant source of  deficiencies and difficult experiences. 
But a positive aspect of  this is, that negative experiences 
are the raw material for new skills in two regards: they 
provide or enforce motivations to overcome the issues, 
and they are helpful as anti-patterns during exploration 
and training. Rich amounts of  negative experiences are 
not less valuable than positive skills.
• The social sphere has great importance in society and in 
the system of  needs, and the processes in this sphere are 
usually to a larger extent based on emotions than on in-
formational communication. The social need level 3 may 
temporarily take the role of  the most challenging need 
level under affluent circumstances, while there are few 
reasons for the deprivation at the lower need levels 1 and 
2. But social dynamics can also result in extraordinary 
large amounts of  emotivational load, not least because 
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of  dependency chains on lower needs, such as e.g. the 
need for living wage and accommodation (level 2) and 
sexuality (level 1). Examples: dismissal due to a conflict 
in the working group, divorce/ separation from partner; 
both types of  events are loaded with serious emotional 
impacts.
• The implications of  the phenomena “Emotivational am-
plification adaptation” and “Fading consciousness in af-
fluent contexts” as described in the appropriate sections 
below. These mechanisms result regularly again in high-
er amounts of  emotivational load, although if  stronger 
emotions, deficiency needs and larger levels of  stress 
could actually have been managed in consistent manner 
on the basis of  rich competencies and resources.
• In abstract terms: reality cannot be lost; one will always 
be grounded again by additional difficulties if  floating in 
higher spheres for a while. It can be possible to skip this 
rule for certain parts of  the material/ external aspect of  
the need system – by extraordinary riches –, but for the 
aesthetic side, the brain processes, healthiness and social 
relationships it might not.
The tension fields and dynamics in the 3D/ 4D space are 
primarily caused by difficult circumstances, deficiencies and 
shortages as well as by appropriate mechanisms in brain 
processes, as pain, homeostatic imbalance, emotion, frustra-
tion and all kinds of  basic needs or deficiency needs. So it 
is no wonder that they work well under these circumstances, 
according to the findings from the sections above. But the 
message of  the explanations in this section is, that exactly 
these mechanisms take also effect under circumstances of  
pronounced competencies, affluence and happiness, not 
least because there is no other set of  motivation mechanisms 
available in the brain processor. The tensions and stress lev-
els can still be very high. Under better circumstances, the 
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only difference is that the tensions occur more in relation 
to sophisticated artificial or growth needs, which are main-
tained with the behalf  of  the reward system, than in relation 
to the more stringent deficiency needs.
The tunnel vision paradox
A consequence of  the “Dynamics in the 3D tension field” 
and the “Primary compensation mechanism in the 3D 
space” (see figure 3) is also a phenomenon that can be called 
“tunnel vision paradox”. The primary or crucial compensa-
tion mechanism in the 3D space is provided by the typical 
reaction to incidents of  pain, frustration or stress. Due to 
such kind of  incident, it is an involuntary mechanism that 
the brain processes focus on important patterns and fade 
out other information – see the IB curve in figure 3. The 
self-regulation system, which is implemented in the brain 
and adjacent systems (autonomic nervous system, endocrine 
system, body), works then typically in a regulatory way which 
leads again to the reduction of  the pain or of  the emotiva-
tional stress level (EB), with the demanded result, that the 
former informational scope can be re-established (IB).
But that the issues can be solved in this form, is not, like 
the primary compensation mechanism, an obligatory modus op-
erandi. Particularly in connection with the larger complexi-
ty and proceeding sophistication in this day and age, it can 
also happen that no simple or direct solution is known, so 
that detours are necessary to come to a satisfying result. This 
means that additional information must be acquired, skills 
must be learned or that further analysis, research and devel-
opment must be done for the ability to approach a solution.
The consequence is, that one must look around for in-
formation and suggestions which could help to solve the 
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problem. But this contradicts the fact that lowered informa-
tional bandwidth is an inevitable consequence of  pain and 
increasing problem stress. This dilemma is exactly what can 
be called “tunnel vision paradox”: the capability to overcome 
focusing and tunnel vision is the crucial key to find a solution, 
but the problem stress, which has to be solved, causes and 
intensifies these phenomena at the same time, so that the 
solution process is hindered in highly effective manner by 
the corresponding problem. The curves in figure 4 show this 
dilemma – the actual desire is to get the emotivational load 
decreased (dotted line at the EB curve) with the result that 
the degree of  informational focusing can be relaxed (dotted 
line at the IB curve). But this does not work in many cases, 
so that it is required to defocus despite the perceived pain 
(dashed line at the IB curve) for the ability to achieve a solu-
tion.
A very simple example is provided by a specific free-climb-
ing skill – the capability to use the legs to relieve the hands. 
On a naive perception, free climbing is a series of  pull-ups, 
to be performed by the muscle power of  arms, hands and 
fingers. But this view is widely wrong, and the real truth be-
hind free climbing comprises much more. One point is the 
right usage of  legs and feet.
During a climb, it is a typical scenario that the power re-
sources fade away and falling down becomes imminent. This 
is always more or less scary, and it is a normal reflex that 
one looks for the next grip above which is hopefully rough 
enough, so that it can be hold with the remaining finger 
force reserves. But it is a typical challenge that this is does 
not work easily in some cases – there might be structures, 
but they are too small or too slippery for being entered with 
pure finger and arm power. In some cases, the solution is, to 
place a foot on the next small edge, what results in a gravi-
ty compensation effect for body and hand, so that the next 
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small crimp can now sufficiently be hold with the remaining 
finger power.
Even if  this is theoretically already clear, what it is often 
not the case – the crucial challenge is always provided by 
the tension fields in the brain. Simply grasping upwards is a 
natural reflex in an overhanging climbing wall, which works 



















in many cases properly, but not when the climbing route gets 
more difficult. The normal result is increasing struggle and 
fear and, at the same time, fading power reserves. There is 
no easy way out of  this situation – due to the tunnel vision 
paradox. There is rather an urge to strengthen the mental 
focus, letting no other choice than grasping upwards with 
more power than before. But this is a terrific standoff  in 
some cases, which leads to no other result than losing the last 
power reserves and falling in the end.
The error is that the eyes have not been turned down-
wards or that it was not possible to remember the wall struc-
ture which has been visited some seconds before, when the 
last climbing move had been done. That’s why the small foot 
hold has not been discovered, which could bring salvation. 
But even if  this edge is detected, it is not obvious, that it will 
help. The climber needs also enough coolness or experience 
for being able to develop the required imagination – that it 
could be helpful to enter this edge with the foot before the 
next grasp attempt. This is a learning process, which is nat-
urally blocked by panic-like fears or even by the tunnel vision 
paradox, respectively.
But it is part of  the human fate that he has to overcome 
such kinds of  mental standoffs. For the free climber, this 
means, that he might try this wall again and again, until the 
required climbing move could be developed and executed 
successfully. And it might be typical for the tunnel vision par-
adox that it is not overcome by facing directly towards the 
problem, but rather via detours, which are more or less com-
plicated. In the case of  the free climber, this means that the 
training equipment is sufficient, including rope and harness 
etc., that the bolts in the climbing wall are safe, that he has 
a good rope team, and that he may think about the solution 
in intervals, particularly when he is not directly under pres-
sure, so that the antagonistic tunnel-vision blocking is tem-
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porarily released. Thus, switching between different contexts 
might be the best way to come to solutions and to realise the 
dashed line at the IB curve in figure 4, and consequently also 
the dotted line at the EB curve.
The tunnel vision paradox works like an antagonistic incon-
sistency, in the sense that most of  our problems block always 
at the same time their solution. And the capability to over-
come this antagonism again and again is the most important 
skill in this day and age. But this is never easy, it is rather al-
ways a process which is more or less complicated and which 
may often need days, years, generations or ages and major 
efforts, until a real good solution can be achieved in the end. 
And some problems will never be solved, or tend always to 
escalate again. There are always endless concrete explana-
tions why problems cannot be solved. But the tunnel vision 
paradox should be an abstract explanation, which is in each 
case part of  the truth. So it might also provide suggestions 
which could be helpful in general, what could be a topic for 
another chapter or for another book.
Emotivational	amplification	adaptation
Even if  all lower needs (at levels 1-3) can be contained and 
excluded to a great extent, emotivational dynamics may take 
effect with high amplitude. There is no motivation and no 
aim without certain differences between goals and current 
achievements. This is the crucial mechanism for brain ac-
tivity; brain processes would cease and completely vanish if  
there are no differences between desires and current states. 
Thus, it is inevitable that remaining deficits in growth am-
bitions, even if  they are very small, are amplified until they 
are large enough to provide strong motivations. Vice versa, 
sophisticated differences are naturally fading, when stronger 
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impacts occur again in the brain processes. This is a basic 
neural regulation mechanism which might also be described 
as “trend towards subtlety”. Term “subtlety” means in this 
case, that very subtle or sophisticated differences – as e.g. a 
foot position on the dance floor, small shades of  cloth col-
ours or special formulations in a letter – are made extraordi-
nary important matters, which can involve significant emo-
tivational incidents in the brain processes. This is necessary 
because self-regulation would be undermined and the evo-
lutionary determination would be lost in affluent contexts 
otherwise, but what is not possible due to human nature. A 
kind of  emotivational amplification adaptation occurs in our 
brain, which is able to make major incidents of  small sophis-
ticated details that are actually nonsense, seen from a more 
existential point of  view. This mechanism works precisely 
over the projection of  emotivational signals to the informa-
tional complexity which is applied along with the sophisti-
cated matters and by taking them extraordinary serious by 
this way.
The perception of  emotivational load occurs not per se 
or in an absolute or fixed manner, but it enfolds rather to-
wards informational complexity. A simple example with a 
basic need: The same degree of  thirst, in absolute terms, 
might be perceived with different strength in the following 
scenarios: scenario 1: The next grocery store is seen at the 
end of  the road, the purse is filled; scenario 2: the purse 
is empty; the addresses of  the next cash point and grocery 
store are known, but the locations can only be reached via 
a complex route (note: the grocery store is known to only 
accept cash in both scenarios). Even under the assumption 
that the time to get the thirst quenched is equal for both 
scenarios, scenario 2 might be perceived as much more pain-
ful because of  the informational complexity and the higher 
degree of  uncertainty, which has to be managed. Thus, the 
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degree of  the perceived emotivation is implicitly the higher 
the more informational aspects and details are involved at 
the same time. Another example with a social need (need 
level 3), but which may also involve lower need levels via de-
pendency chains, as e.g. the need for accommodation (level 
2) and sexuality (level 1): The marital life of  a woman and a 
man is impaired by a domestic quarrel, but both people have 
to go to work; scenario 3: the productivity of  the man, who 
is working as mathematician, is significantly impaired be-
cause he can hardly concentrate on a complex topic, which 
involves many issues and stakeholders, and which requires 
an inventive solution by a smart algorithm; scenario 4: the 
women’s productivity is not affected much – she makes a 
routine job for a facility cleaning service.
The thesis that emotivational load enfolds towards or 
is amplified by informational complexity is also consistent 
to the mental capacity formula (MC) and to the adaptation 
mechanisms which have been described in the section above. 
Focusing and fading out of  too much aspects in the IB di-
mension, or also of  too much details in the IP dimension, 
is not least an immediate and inevitable reaction, because of  
the rule that information takes effect as amplifier of  emo-
tivational pain. While the mental capacity is seen as fully 
exploited in scenario 2 from above or as overloaded in sce-
nario 3, it might have remaining shares for thinking about 
additional issues in scenarios 1 and 4. The consequence is 
that emotivational forces can take effect with similar vigour, 
if  either driven by strong primary emotivational signals in 
combination with simple information or by weak primary 
emotivational signals in combination with high information-
al complexity. That’s why in affluent contexts life gets ex-
traordinary complex and motivations are still very high.
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Fading	consciousness	in	affluent	contexts
Consciousness has been explained as information enlightened by 
emotivational evaluation. This is seen as based on projection 
between information that is perceived from an “external” 
focal plane, which is mainly provided by the environment (but 
see also the hints below), on the one hand, and emotiva-
tions that are elicited from an internal focal plane, which is 
provided by the organism and its physiological regulation 
processes (by the body), on the other hand. This projection 
occurs at the evaluative focal plane in the brain, namely in the so 
called attention assessment controller (AAC). A special point 
in this connection is that some systems, so somatosensory 
perception, elicit both information (… about movement of  
limbs and body) and emotivation (pain); consequences are 
that different outcomes from this system are incorporated at 
the evaluative focal plane from both the informational and 
the emotivational side and that information comes not only 
from the environment (external), but also from the body (in-
ternal; but it is indeed information about interactions with 
the environment in terms of  another sense). Another special 
point is that present informational-emotivational patterns 
are continuously stored in the memory, with the effect that 
both components are later involved again in the processes at 
the evaluative focal plane, so that consciousness has always 
to do with memories. Another special point is that evalua-
tion occurs in conscious and unconscious manner separately 
for each of  the two components – information and emoti-
vation; consciousness is usually only attributed to the con-
scious part of  the processes, but while the unconscious part 
must be seen as the raw material for this, so that it can also 
be seen as involved.
Social consciousness has been explained as individual 
consciousness, but occurring for many people, mediated via 
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the so called social focal plane, which is provided by the social 
interaction and communication processes.
So far a short summary about what consciousness might 
be. More details see above in sections “Conscious experienc-
es”, “The two types of  consciousness” and “Individual and 
social consciousness”.
However, an important message of  this is that conscious-
ness occurs as combination between information and emoti-
vation. That’s why the degree of  consciousness is the larger 
the higher the quantity of  both components.
Another aspect of  consciousness is the relationship be-
tween deficiency needs and artificial/ growth needs or the 
relationship between the different need levels (1-5). It has 
been outlined above that the development of  artificial needs 
or growth needs is a typical strategy of  the human to manage 
his affairs under the conditions of  evolutionary competition 
of  species in sustainable manner. But at the same time it is 
clear that artificial needs, so the needs at levels 3-5, do not 
end in themselves – they are rather only a more or less com-
plicated detour to ensure that more basic needs are satisfied 
in sustainable manner. Of  course, the neural pattern library 
contents and the brain processes of  the human, including 
experiences, memories, skills, evaluation processes and con-
trol processes, can be characterised as the more comprehen-
sive the better they are developed in relation to distinctive 
artificial needs (and thus cultural aspects). But the other side 
of  the coin is that the higher-order brain processes and brain 
contents are founded on basic experiences and skills which 
occur in relation to more fundamental needs – this is always 
the starting point, raw material and final purpose of  high-
er-order ambitions. This is also supported by the findings 
from above that higher needs may develop to a great extent 
on the basis of  emotivational dependency chains and emotivational 
stimulus modulation (see section “Higher needs”) and that low-
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er needs get often representations on higher need levels (see 
section “Dynamics of  the need hierarchy”).
The relationship between the different need levels cor-
responds with the relationship between information and 
emotivation insofar as that information, particularly infor-
mational complexity, is naturally associated with higher need 
levels – in intellectual, artistic, economic and cultural spheres 
–, and that emotivation refers to the existential side of  life, 
and thus to prevailing basic needs, forcing emotivations, fo-
cusing and the necessity to reduce informational complexity.
So it should be clear that a certain balance between infor-
mation and emotivation, as well as between deficiency needs 
and artificial needs should be the basis of  spirited brain pro-
cesses and of  consciousness.
That consciousness is not very high without a certain de-
gree of  intellectuality or neural-informational complexity, is 
rather totally clear. Nobody might deny that the intelligence 
and consciousness of  humans is greater than the intelligence 
and consciousness of  primates who have few intellectual/ ar-
tistic/ economical/ cultural ambitions and who develop few 
artificial needs. This view requires no defence.
But what about the contrary aspect? What happens if  
informational complexity is provided in rich amounts and 
emotivation tends to fade? Under affluent conditions, it is a 
natural general ambition to get away from deficiencies and 
from the world of  existential experiences. And many of  us 
are successful in managing this ambition. But what is the 
consequence of  this type of  success?
The thesis is here that this leads again to fading conscious-
ness, and consequently also of  intelligence!
If  the world of  artificial and growth needs prospers like a 
wonderful orchid and basic needs are only known in terms 
of  their representations at the highest levels, so as aesthetic 
experiences and narratives, but not in terms of  real threats, 
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for a long time, the result should be that the higher-order 
ambitions make themselves independent from the existential 
side of  life. This leads to loss of  reality and to a nonsense 
culture, which is decoupled from our evolutionary ground. 
This is a special kind of  unconsciousness, which is caused by 
emotivational randomness rather than by a lack of  informa-
tional complexity.
Fortunately, this is only a tendency, and there are many 
mechanisms which bring us back down to earth. There are 
always also existentially challenged people and teams in the 
world – in the sense of  social classes, ethnics, nations, states, 
regions, families, working groups, companies, institutions 
etc. –, who have bigger problems and need support, there 
are erosion processes, birth, childhood, adolescence, illness, 
death and social disasters which ensure that emotivational 
load never ends, and it is clear that temporary loss of  reality 
results always in additional problems and thus in reinforce-
ment of  the emotivational factor as ultimate principle (see 
also section “3D tensions in the affluent society”). So it is 
clear that there are enough forces to let us not lose our evo-
lutionary ground.
But this happens not only by chance and by the back-
down-to-earth mechanisms from above. Many of  us are 
obviously able to perceive fading consciousness, caused by 
greater intellectual and material affluence or by far-fetched 
skills and too much comfort, as threat against sensible rea-
son. That’s why they search for more fundamental challeng-
es.
Examples of  this might be the following:
• Carriers – even of  very talented people – turn often 
from sophisticated scientific topics to more pragmatic 
professional fields.
• Challenges with physical or even existential component 
are getting increasingly popular, such as climbing, flying, 
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diving or any other types of  sport.
• Many people seek fulfilment in charitable ambitions, with 
the result that they establish connections from relatively 
affluent contexts to more difficult living conditions.
So it is always ensured in any form, either by natural laws 
or by active ambitions, that consciousness and sensible rea-
son is not fading too much. But it is important to understand 
this aspect and to know that arbitrariness, whateverism, dec-
adence and loss of  control due to fading consciousness due 
to loss of  emotivational fundamentals might be a typical so-
cietal problem in this day and age.
About the integrative ingredient of  4DI
Intelligence of  the 4DI type could also be named “integra-
tive 4D intelligence” (I4DI). There are several reasons for 
this.
First, intelligence is based on integrative encoding in the 
declarative association areas of  the brain, so in the long-term 
memory: “Integrative encoding proposes that when a new 
event shares a common feature, or features, with an exist-
ing memory trace, the common features elicit memory re-
instatement through hippocampal pattern completion. New 
experiences would then not only be encoded in the context 
of  presently available information in the external world, but 
would also be bound to reactivated representations of  prior 
related memories.” See in Davachi and Preston 2014, 544, 
and section “Integrative encoding of  memories over time” 
in chapter “Emotion, motivation and memory” in Part 2. 
This includes also sensorimotor patterns from the procedur-
al memory, which are integrated in the declarative memory 
in the form of  microrepresentations, as well as emotivational 
patterns, which are integrated as coherent value ingredient 
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in key areas of  the declarative part of  the memory system. 
See also section “Integrative encoding of  procedural, emo-
tional-motivational, sensory-perceptual and internal thought 
components” in chapter “Emotion, motivation and memo-
ry” in Part 2.
Second, consciousness is based on the capability to pro-
duce maxima of  integrated information and to differ this 
information from other integrated information. Conscious 
experiences occur only if  an information processing system 
achieves a certain degree of  complexity in this regard. See 
also section “Tononi, G.: The integrated information theory 
of  consciousness” in chapter “Consciousness” in Part 2.
Third, it is a central principle of  the 4DI concept, and 
hence of  the brain, that complexity is faced in the tension 
field between informational bandwidth, informational pre-
cision and emotivational bandwidth, and that this challenge 
is managed successfully. This is nothing else than a great in-
tegration capability in an ever-changing environment with 
multifarious aspects (however, naturally by considering the 
own stakes and the stakes of  the species as major motiva-
tions).
Fourth, involves dimension (4) – team intelligence – social 
integration with no limit.
161
Toe-holds for other disciplines
Might a general model of  the brain, as, e.g., the SPP model 
or the SPP-4DI model, provide special neuroscientific toe-
holds for other disciplines, like psychology, social sciences 
or politics?
Yes, both the SPP model and the SPP-4DI model might 
provide special toeholds, which could be helpful for interpret 
psychological, social or political phenomena from neurosci-
entific perspectives. The four disciplines can be brought in a 
closer relationship than before, albeit only on a hypothetical 
basis. (Note: the political science is also seen as part of  the 
social science, so it could be more correct to refer to three 
disciplines rather than to four.)
Examples are the following:
• The concepts “two types of  consciousness” and “4DI” 
provide a better (hypothetical) explanation of  the inter-
dependency between rationality and emotionality than 
ever available before.
• The interdependency between the emotivational factor 
(EB) and the informational factors (IP, IB) in the neural 
control system, and the mental capacity formula (MC = 
IP * IB * EB = constant) might be a key to many psy-
chological phenomena. This might be valid for normal 
reactions to pain and fear, mental diseases – like trau-
mata, depression, burnout, dissociative phenomena –, 
as well as for the usual dealing with daily challenges – 
like exam situations, problem solution processes, project 
management, crisis management, political processes etc.
• Humans are much better adaptable to ever-changing en-
vironments than animals. But there is a remaining level 
of  clumsiness, and new solution approaches are often 
only adopted after deeper crises and via complicated de-
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tours rather than on a pure analytical or rational way. The 
“tunnel vision paradox” can basically explain why, but 
further investigation of  this matter should be necessary 
to come to a certain understanding of  the appropriate 
mechanisms.
• The SPP-4DI concept can be a good theory which ex-
plains the way of  life and the development of  the global 
human society. Good local and global politics, and espe-
cially a beneficial dynamic between both aspects, is just 
a complexity issue, and the 4DI concept can be a good 
starting point for investigate of  how humans, as social 
beings, might be able to deal with growing complexity 
and with crisis situations. The 4DI concept might also 
explain why crises occur again and again, and how this 
aspect of  life could be managed in a better way.
• The yin and yang between informational complexity, 
sensitivity and carefulness, and thus IP * IB, on the one 
hand and kinds of  mental strength, power and crude-
ness, and thus EB, on the other hand might provide bet-
ter explanations of  the balances between political move-
ments than any other theories. This might also explain 
of  how times of  affluence and crisis or times of  peace 
and war alternate in cyclic manner.
• The capability of  the human to stop inappropriate ac-
tivities and habitual behaviours immediately and search 
for alternatives, which is also called “impulse control” 
or “preparation mode” or “control level 4/5”, has de-
veloped by the evolution more in relation to the societal 
context rather than in relation to the natural environ-
ment; the natural environment was traditionally the gen-
eral opponent, which was to be combated, tackled and 
exploited on the basis of  social cohesion. This might 
among other things explain why the contemporary soci-
ety, as a whole, remains on the path of  resource-intensive 
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growth, although there are strong indications that this 
will lead into the ruin of  the natural environment. The 
principle is simple: social integrity and thus continued 
progress on the way once chosen matters, integrity of  
the natural environment is less important. This approach 
was actually not wrong, since the natural environment 
was originally able to take care for its own matters. But 
this era has changed into the opposite, and human intel-
ligence, which is based on the impulse control capability, 
is maladapted to this new balance of  power.
• That the discrepancies between western cultures and 
“the African way of  life” are difficult to solve, may not 
least be caused by major differences in the mental 4DI 
parameters on sociocultural level. Intelligence might not 
be higher or lower under different circumstances, but it 
works in different ways. That there are still many poor 
people in affluent countries might have a similar cause. 
See also section “3D tensions in the affluent society”.
A crucial question might be: How deals the brain with 
complex real-life challenges in this day and age? The SPP-
4DI model can provide suitable hints to come to an answer:
The brain is able to internalise a world model. This oc-
curs particularly in the associative-emotivational part of  the 
brain, so in the declarative memory, but accompanied by 
further optimisations in all other parts of  the brain, namely 
also in the sensorimotor-emotivational part, so in the pro-
cedural memory. These neural solution pattern libraries are 
constantly optimised and exploited in real-life situations for 
the sake of  the individual and the species.
It is clear that the sufficiency and suitability of  this system 
must always be limited for several reasons. But the most cru-
cial limitation is not the interconnection complexity which 
can be achieved in general – the brain should be a scalable 
organ, which may significantly grow over generations –, the 
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thesis is rather that the most crucial limitation is provided by 
the limited ability to suffer pain and dissatisfaction. This is 
kind of  a vicious circle: Pain and dissatisfaction take at the 
same time effect as goal providers and also as signals that 
are counterproductive for interconnection complexity. Con-
versely, opens decreasing pain not only the way to internalise 
higher environmental complexity, but at the same time also 
to lose its relevance and sufficiency gradually. This kind of  
loss of  reality leads reliably again – via crises (or even wars) 
– to increasing pain and dissatisfaction, and consequently to 
the down-regulation of  interconnection complexity. The ca-
pability to overcome this vicious circle step by step correlates 
with the ability to manage real-life challenges increasingly in 
controlled manner by the development of  mental capacity 
(MC) in the sense of  the 4DI model (see also section “Dy-
namics in the 3D tension field”).
Another important question is also: What is the actual 
strength of  the human and particularly of  his central control 
apparatus which is provided by the brain?
It is not skills or cognition or the ability to develop scien-
tific knowledge! It is rather the capability to develop systems 
of  artificial needs in a way so that this releases success and 
joy during the behavioural detours which lead also to the ful-
filment of  all other more stringent demands in the end. Skills 
and knowledge are just executive components, which could 
not be missed, of  course, but their development is driven 
by the primary capability from above. And the development 
of  tools and the exploitation of  material resources are just 
tertiary aspects of  this primary duality.
Part 2 – Excursions to the 




This part summarises some insights and conclusions from 
external references. It is a loose collection of  discussions 
about several aspects of  the brain. There is no systematic 
or purpose behind these descriptions other than providing 
pre-compiled findings for Part 1 of  the book. All sections 
in Part 2 are involved into the concepts from Part 1, what is 
always highlighted there by references to the corresponding 
sections in Part 2.
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Basal ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex
Introduction into the BG matter
The subcortical area which is called basal ganglia plays an 
important role in the brain. It represents affective decision 
making (in the ventral striatum) and is involved in processes 
like motor control, control of  associative/ cognitive process-
es and emotion control, only to name the most important 
functions. It is interconnected, among other things, with the 
motor cortex, somatosensory nerve cords, posterior parietal 
cortex – representing multisensory integration –, with the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and other prefrontal regions 
– representing executive functions, cognitive and associative 
processes, working memory, abstract reasoning, planning 
and value-guided decision making; see also section “Deci-
sion making in the frontal cortex” –, and it is, respectively, 
part of  or integrated with the limbic system – representing 
homeostasis, emotions, reward system, goals, motivations.
According to Gazzanega and Mangun 2014 and articles 
and references therein, there are indications that the basal 
ganglia provide the following performance features in col-
laboration with adjacent and interconnected areas:
• Affective decision making, closely integrated with val-
ue-guided decision making in the prefrontal cortex (see 
section “Decision making in BG and frontal cortex” ff.).
• Control of  motor sequences and stimulus-response as-
sociations; parallel management and mediation of  sever-
al brain functions via distinct control circuits, comprising 
at least “skeletomotor, oculomotor, frontal associative, 
and limbic functions” (see section “The four parallel cir-
cuits through the basal ganglia (BG)”).
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• Impulse control/ response inhibition for “potentially in-
terfering or inappropriate actions”, suppression or facili-
tation of  movements, reinforcement driven learning (see 
section “The motor circuit”).
• Regulation of  movement vigour, in terms of  movement 
speed, amplitude or force (see section “The motor vigor 
hypothesis”).
• Control and modulation of  language (see section “Basal 
ganglia (BG) and language”).
The four parallel circuits through the basal 
ganglia (BG)
Four “anatomically and functionally distinct parallel circuits” 
are described in Turner and Pasquereau 2014 as follows:
“The basal ganglia (BG) is composed of  several heavily 
interconnected nuclei at the base of  the cerebrum. A series 
of  anatomically distinct parallel circuits through the BG re-
ceive afferent projections from and project back to cortical 
regions that mediate skeletomotor, oculomotor, frontal asso-
ciative, and limbic functions.” (435)
“Anatomically segregated parallel circuits through the BG 
subserve skeletomotor, oculomotor, associative, and limbic 
functions. All circuits obey a common internal organization. 
[…] BG-receiving subregions of  thalamus project back to 
a subset of  the cortical areas that project into each circuit.” 
(436)
These four circuits or loops, respectively, are intercon-
nected as follows:
• the skeletomotor circuit with the motor cortex, con-
trolling sensorimotor functions,
• the oculomotor circuit with the frontal eye cortex, con-
trolling eye movements,
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• the associative cortex with the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, representing cognitive functions and
• the limbic circuit with the anterior cingulate cortex, rep-
resenting emotions.
It is asserted that there are further loop circuits that in-
clude temporal and parietal cortical areas as well as thalamic 
nuclei.
All these circuits are not to be seen as strictly segregated, 
they are rather integrated by some kinds of  “projection”, 
“communication”, “convergence” and “funneling”. Path-
ways are mentioned, for example, which support projections 
from limbic regions to nonlimbic frontal cortical areas or to 
motor cortices.
(See Turner and Pasquereau 2014 and references therein.)
The motor circuit
Turner and Pasquereau 2014 focus primarily on the motor 
circuit, starting with headline “Organization and physiology 
of  the motor circuit” (437ff.). They emphasise some special 
roles of  this circuit under headline “Functions of  the basal 
ganglia using the motor circuit as a model” (443ff.):
“(1) the suppression or facilitation of  movements”,
“(2) reinforcement-driven learning, especially of  habits 
or skills” and
“(3) the regulation of  movement vigor”.
Functions (1) and (2) mean “that the BG motor circuit 
contributes to movement selection or initiation” and “that 
the motor circuit is involved in retaining or executing well-
learned motor skills like motor sequences or stimulus-re-
sponse associations”. (445)
More sophisticated findings on skill learning, described at 
pages 443f. and 445, suggest that it is in fact an important 
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function of  the motor circuit to suppress inappropriate ac-
tions and develop more suitable actions, but that well learned 
actions and habits work usually better without the interven-
tions of  this basal ganglia circuit.
Based on several studies, Turner and Pasquereau (2014) 
come to the following conclusion:
“Thus, multiple lines of  evidence indicate that the BG 
promotes new skill learning, but that other parts of  the 
brain (cortex in particular) take over the storage and pro-
duction of  well-practiced skills. The unique neuro-mod-
ulatory milieu of  the striatum provides an ideal substrate 
for rapid reinforcement-driven plasticity, but cortex is 
better suited for long-term retention and execution.” 
(445)
(See Turner and Pasquereau 2014 and references there-
in.)
Notes: BG means basal ganglia; the striatum is the region 
in the BG which represents affective and value-guided 
decision making (see also below in section “Decision 
making in BG and frontal cortex”).
Further descriptions in Turner and Pasquereau 2014 sup-
port the finding that a role of  the basal ganglia is to act as 
intervention switch, which inhibits inappropriate responses 
or actions, rather than to support well-trained skills and be-
haviours; that inappropriate responses can be stopped very 
quickly and perfectly seems to be an extraordinary impor-
tant feature, so that a special “hyperdirect pathway” has been 
developed for this purpose by the Evolution; this role of  
the basal ganglia might be particularly important in social 
contexts while, for well-trained skills and behaviours, the in-
tervention function of  the basal ganglia is identified more 
as a disturbing than an adjuvant factor. Among other things, 
Turner and Pasquereau come to the conclusion that the “the 
cortico-STN-GPi pathway may play a key role in societally 
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important impulse control disorders, such as those associat-
ed with compulsive gambling and substance abuse”.
(See Turner and Pasquereau 2014 and references there-
in, particularly the descriptions at page 442 under headline 
“IMPULSE CONTROL DISORDERS AND THE COR-
TICOSUBTHALAMIC NUCLEUS ‘HYPERDIRECT’ 
PATHWAY” and at page 440f. under headline “Clinical con-
ditions associated with basal ganglia dysfunction”.)
Notes: STN means subthalamic nucleus; GPi means in-
ternal globus pallidus; both regions are seen as part of  the 
basal ganglia.
Motor vigor hypothesis
According to the so called “motor vigor hypothesis” (Turner 
and Pasquereau 2014, 445), function (3) “the regulation of  
movement vigor” (see above) means that “the motor circuit 
regulates a form of  implicit ‘motor motivation’ that influenc-
es how vigorously individual actions are performed”, what 
includes “movement speed, amplitude, or force” (Turner 
and Pasquereau 2014, 445).
An open question is asked as follows: “It remains to be 
determined if  the vigor idea applies equally to all functional 
circuits of  the BG (i.e., that each BG functional circuit links 
motivation to its own form of  action) or if  it is rather a spe-
cific function of  the BG skeletomotor circuit.” (445)
(See Turner and Pasquereau 2014 and references therein.)
Note: BG means basal ganglia.
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Decision making in BG and frontal cortex
The brain is equipped with a decision making system or a 
“decision making apparatus”, comprising functions like 
“affective (impulsive) decision making” and “value-guided 
decision making”. Taking into account the descriptions in 
Gazzanega/Mangun 2014, this system can be attributed to 
two specific regions in the brain:
• the basal ganglia, particularly the ventral striatum and
• the prefrontal cortex, particularly the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC) and the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex (mOFC).
The (ventral) striatum is typically connected with “affec-
tive decision making” and the prefrontal cortex with “val-
ue-guided decision making”. But latest studies suggest that 
both types of  decision making are supported by both re-
gions in close cooperation.
The integrated mode of  operation in both regions will be 
highlighted below (at the end of  this section), before the role 
of  the prefrontal cortex is described in more detail under 
“Decision making in the frontal cortex”.
General findings on the topic “decision making” are de-
scribed in Gazzanega and Mangun 2014 in the following 
chapters:
• 3 “Cognitive Control and Affective Decision Making in 
Childhood and Adolescence” (Crone 2014, 23ff.)
• 59 “The Emerging Standard Model of  the Human Deci-
sion-Making Apparatus” (Glimcher 2014, 683ff.)
• 91 “Neuroeconomics” (Huettel 2014, 1063ff.)
The decision making system is often tested with behaviours 
in relation to potential rewards, as, e.g., described by Crone 
2014 and references therein under headline “The neurocog-
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nitive development of  affective decision making” (26f.) at 
page 27:
“SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM CONSE-
QUENCES The way individuals weigh short- versus 
long-term consequences is often examined in delay 
discounting tasks where the choice for an immediate 
reward (e.g., 1 euro now) and a delayed reward (e.g., 2 
euros later) is presented with variable delays. Individu-
als tend to prefer the immediate reward more when the 
delay for the larger reward is longer. In a delay discount-
ing task, preference for a delayed reward was associated 
with activation in the lateral prefrontal cortex, whereas 
preference for an immediate reward was associated with 
activation in the ventral striatum in both adolescents and 
adults”.
Note: The (ventral) striatum is a part of  the basal gan-
glia.
But this kind of  clear division of  functions between affec-
tive (impulsive) decision making in the ventral striatum and 
value-guided decision making in the prefrontal cortex is 
questioned by Huettel 2014 and references therein at pages 
1065f.:
“TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING Everyday decisions 
often involve a consideration of  future consequences. 
When deciding to save for retirement, people forego 
smaller rewards now in order to obtain larger rewards at 
a later date. […] An early and very influential study […] 
posited that intertemporal decisions arise from the com-
petition between two competing neural systems: a rel-
atively impulsive system involving value-related regions 
(e.g., ventral striatum and OFC) and a relatively patient 
system involving control-related regions (e.g., dlPFC). 
[…] There is a growing consensus, accordingly, that the 
brain contains a core system for processing value – not 
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two interacting systems – but that factors like the exer-
tion of  self-control can shape processing in that value 
system.”
Abbreviations: OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; dlPFC = dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex.
That decision making occurs in a highly integrated system, 
which is composed of  the striatum (in the basal ganglia) and 
parts of  the prefrontal cortex, is also supported by Glimcher 
2014 and references therein at page 686:
“THE VALUATION CIRCUIT […] one way to begin 
to understand valuation circuits was through the study 
of  dopamine. At the same time […] a second line of  in-
quiry with regard to value also got underway: the search 
for functional MRI (fMRI) signals that correlated with 
the subjective values of  goods, actions, and events ex-
pressed in various ways by human subjects […] Both of  
these approaches converged on two particular brain ar-
eas: the striatum and a portion of  the medial prefrontal 
cortex. Activity in these two areas was found to consist-
ently predict people’s preferences – and preferences of  
literally all kinds. If  someone was a steep temporal discount-
er, she preferred small immediate rewards to waiting for 
larger rewards, and activity in these areas in response to 
delayed rewards was steeply ‘discounted’ […] If  some-
one placed a higher value on food rewards than on mon-
etary rewards, then so did these areas in that person […] 
If  someone was inclined to co-operate in a trust game, 
then activity in these areas was higher for offers that re-
quired cooperation”.
Abbreviations: MRI: magnetic resonance imaging.
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Decision making in the frontal cortex
The prefrontal cortex is connected with executive functions, 
cognitive and associative processes, working memory, ab-
stract reasoning, planning and value-guided decision mak-
ing. The following descriptions will concentrate on the topic 
“value-guided decision making”, since this might be a key 
function for all other performance features which are linked 
with this region.
This topic is addressed in Rushworth et al. 2014 and ref-
erences therein. The abstract of  this article reveals already 
much:
“Actions are chosen on the basis of  expectations about 
the benefits they will yield. Areas in the brain’s frontal 
lobes are important for making decisions about which 
choice it is best to take. In functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging experiments, the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex exhibits signals related to the values of  potential 
choices, and the activity pattern is consistent with the 
emergence of  a decision. Ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex lesions disrupt value-guided decision making. An-
other frontal lobe area, the anterior cingulate cortex, is 
also important for value-guided decision making. There 
is some evidence suggesting that anterior cingulate cor-
tex is especially involved in the selection of  an action in 
the light of  the rewards that will follow and the effort 
that will be invested. More fundamentally, it may be con-
cerned with the computation and comparison of  values 
needed for decision making during foraging. During for-
aging, the key decision is whether to engage and pursue 
the default choice, or whether the foraging opportunities 
available elsewhere in the environment mean it is better 
to switch away from the current behavior and pursue 
other alternatives.”
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The following findings are described in this article, among 
other things:
• “The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and adja-
cent medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) play a central 
role in choice selection.” (501) (vmPFC: ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex; mOFC: medial orbitofrontal cortex)
• Important parameters are “reward magnitude (size)” and 
“reward probability”. (505)
• The decision making procedure comprises two parts, 
“the selection of  a reward goal that becomes the focus 
of  behaviour” and ”Once the reward goal is selected, 
then a second type of  decision has to be made about 
which action should be made to obtain the reward goal.” 
(505)
• Decisions might have to be done in terms of  binary deci-
sions between two rewards (best option, second-best op-
tion), but it is more common that they occur as search/ 
engage decisions – e.g. about “whether to engage with a 
potential food option or whether to carryon searching 
for better opportunities elsewhere” (506). Reports about 
investigations on both types of  decisions are comprised 
in Rushworth et al. 2014.
That the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the 
adjacent medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) play a central 
role in choice selection is evident by some studies as, e.g. de-
scribed under headline “Disrupting vmPFC/ mOFC impairs 
value-guided decision making” at page 504:
“Macaques with vmPFC/ mOFC lesions were signifi-
cantly worse when the second-best option was close in 
value to the best option. In other words, vmPFC/ mOFC 
lesions made macaques worse at taking the most difficult 
value-guided decisions. Moreover, the disruptive impact 
on difficult decisions was specific to vmPFC/ mOFC 
lesions and did not occur after lesions in other frontal 
178
brain areas that contain neurons with reward-related ac-
tivity patterns, such as anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) or 
lateral orbital frontal cortex (lOFC)”.
But that the two regions vmPFC/ mOFC are only responsi-
ble for decisions about the selection of  a reward goal (also 
in terms of  attention) while decisions about the consequent 
actions are made in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), is 
explained under headline “Translating values into actions: 
Integration across frontal lobe systems” at page 505:
“When vmPFC/ mOFC makes a decision, it does not do 
so in the sense of  choosing a specific action, but instead 
the type of  decision that it makes is the selection of  a 
reward goal that becomes the focus of  behavior. This 
appears to be especially the case when there are multiple 
competing alternative choices and attention must be di-
rected while critical comparisons are made between the 
various options […] Once the reward goal is selected, 
then a second type of  decision has to be made about 
which action should be made to obtain the reward goal.”
“The ACC region that carried both chosen value and 
action direction signals is well placed to influence the 
motor system.”
“In summary, one way in which different frontal lobe ar-
eas might interact during decision making is for vmPFC/ 
mOFC and possibly adjacent OFC areas to make a 
choice between different possible reward goals and for 
ACC to decide between different possible actions.”
That not only binary decisions have to be made, but rather 
also “search/ engage” decisions, is highlighted under head-
line “Distinct mechanisms for decision making in ACC and 
vmPFC/ mOFC” at pages 506ff:
“It might be only on some occasions that a macaque 
foraging in the wild is given the opportunity to make the 
type of  choice that the vmPFC/ mOFC appears to make 
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– for example, a choice between an apple and an orange. 
Instead, what is more likely to happen is that the ma-
caque might first see an opportunity to pursue a course 
of  action that might lead to one piece of  fruit and only 
later perceive the opportunity to pursue another piece 
of  fruit by taking another course of  action. The critical 
choice for the foraging animal is, therefore, whether to 
engage with a potential food option or whether to carry-
on searching for better opportunities elsewhere.”
The assumption that decisions of  the search/ engage type 
are possibly processed in the ACC region rather than in the 
regions vmPFC/ mOFC is promoted under headline “Rein-
terpreting the role of  ACC” at page 508:
“The human ACC region that carries search/ engage sig-
nals for foraging is well placed to influence whether or 
not a successful action will be repeated or whether the 
value of  an alternative action will be explored.” (508)
Some important aspects are summarized under headline 
“Conclusion” at page 510f.:
“We have emphasized the different functional contri-
butions of  frontal lobe regions to value-guided deci-
sion making. We have emphasized a flexible vmPFC/ 
mOFC system that makes comparisons between choice 
values by focusing on the most relevant aspects of  value 
(for example, reward probability or reward magnitude). 
In some cases such a system may work in series with 
brain areas such as the ACC, which might select an ac-
tion compatible with the reward goal that is the focus of  
attention. In some situations, however, the ACC might 
operate in a quite independent manner to take simple 
stay-switch decisions on the basis of  different types of  
value information such as average search values and ef-
fort costs.”
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Basal ganglia (BG) and language
Chan, Ryan and Bever (2013) investigate the function of  the 
basal ganglia (BG) in language control and come to the fol-
lowing conclusion (292):
“In sum, our study clearly demonstrated that the BG 
work in conjunction with frontal cortical regions to sub-
serve a language-specific role in sequencing.”
Their approach is explained in the abstract (283) as follows:
“The basal ganglia (BG) have long been associated with 
cognitive control, and it is widely accepted that they also 
subserve an indirect, control role in language. Neverthe-
less, it cannot be completely ruled out that the BG may 
be involved in language in some domain-specific man-
ner. The present study aimed to investigate one type of  
cognitive control – sequencing, a function that has long 
been connected with the BG – and to test whether the 
BG could be specifically implicated in language. Partic-
ipants were required to rearrange materials sequentially 
based on linguistic (syntactic or conceptual) or non-lin-
guistic (order switching) rules, or to repeat a previously 
ordered sequence as a control task. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) data revealed a strongly active 
left-lateralized corticostriatal network, encompassing 
the anterior striatum, dorsolaterial and ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex and presupplementary motor area, while 
the participants were sequencing materials using linguis-
tic vs. non-linguistic rules. This functional network has 
an anatomical basis and is strikingly similar to the well-
known associative loop implicated in sensorimotor se-
quence learning. We concluded that the anterior striatum 
has extended its original sequencing role and worked 
in concert with frontal cortical regions to subserve the 
function of  linguistic sequencing in a domain-specific 
181
manner.”
The following further findings are reported in this article 
and references therein:
The basal ganglia (BG) do not play a direct role in language 
control (according to the dominant view). Instead they may 
have more an assisting role – they contribute in cognitive 
control, enhancing selected activities while supressing com-
peting ones, syntactic integration, language comprehension 
and switching between languages:
“To date, the dominant view holds that the BG do not 
play a direct role in language mainly because damage to 
these areas alone does not consistently produce classical 
aphasic symptoms […] and because the language deficits 
induced by BG damage can usually be traced to corti-
cal hypoperfusion […] Instead, the role of  the BG may 
be in cognitive control, assisting language function by 
generally enhancing selected activities while suppressing 
competing ones […] Indeed, monolingual studies have 
corroborated that the BG are involved in the controlled 
process of  syntactic integration […] and studies focus-
ing on bilingualism have also shown that the BG are in-
volved in second language comprehension and the con-
trol of  switching between languages” (284)
The role of  the corticostriatal loops is partially domain-gen-
eral, but partially also specific to the domain of  language 
(note: the striatum is a central part of  the basal ganglia):
“when subtracting out irrelevant common cognitive 
components and focusing on the linguistic sequencing 
process, we clearly found the BG involvement in a lan-
guage-specific manner […] a language-specific loop for 
sequencing is embedded in a domain-general sequencing 
(or more generally, cognitive control) system. The basic 
computation for cognitive control in general, or sequenc-
ing in particular, may be similar across domains, but in 
182
processing linguistic materials, some language-sensitive 
component(s) may be added to the basic computation 
and thus a domain-specific process is created” (290)
The involvement of  the basal ganglia in language control 
did most probably not develop as “new anatomical circuit 
de novo”, but rather by “recruiting a preexisting BG loop”, 
namely “the cognitive/ associative/ prefrontal loop”:
“a corticostriatal loop, connecting the fronto-mesial 
structures to the head of  the caudate nucleus, was im-
portant in the control (i.e. selection, inhibition and pro-
gramming) of  language and in modulating a large dis-
tributed network of  language in the brain, including a 
ventral semantic stream, a dorsal phonological stream, 
a speech perception pathway, and an articulatory loop. 
Furthermore, the anatomy of  this corticostriatal circuit 
is strikingly similar to that of  one of  the parallel BG 
loops in primates and humans – the cognitive/ associa-
tive/ prefrontal loop […] This loop has been shown to 
be implicated in cognitive functions, such as sensorimo-
tor sequence learning, attention, controlled retrieval and 
monitoring of  information within working memory […] 
Hence, our findings indicate that the linguistic sequenc-
ing process may be recruiting a preexisting BG loop, 
instead of  creating a new anatomical circuit de novo, 
which is in accordance with the principle of  preadapta-
tion that old structures can assume a new function dur-
ing evolution” (291)
Notes: term “fronto-mesial structures” refers to medial 
parts of  the frontal cortex; terms striatal and striatum re-
fer to a specific part of  the basal ganglia; caudate nucleus 
and putamen are sub structures of  the striatum.
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Summarizing conclusions
The executive control functions of  the brain and of  the cen-
tral nervous system can be attributed to the limbic system, 
basal ganglia, prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex.
That the limbic system represents emotions, moods, re-
ward system, goals, motivations, and that it is also involved 
in metabolic homeostasis, senses of  pain, neuroendocrine 
activity, autonomic functions and memory processes, is a 
matter of  course, so that these facts must not additionally be 
substantiated here.
The concrete roles of  the other parts of  the executive 
control system are less obvious. But the previous descrip-
tions and citations might have provided some insights into 
this matter, with the result that some interesting perfor-
mance features can be made visible.
The basal ganglia supports among other things parallel 
control of  different types of  brain processes by anatomical-
ly segregated functional circuits, but which are also heavily 
interconnected. This comprises at least the following types 
of  processes:
• skeletomotor control, in connection with the motor cor-
tex
• oculomotor control, in connection with the frontal eye 
cortex,
• associative processes, in connection with the prefrontal 
cortex, and
• limbic processes, in connection with the anterior cingu-
late cortex.
The result is, that the brain is able to regulate these types 
of  processes widely independently in parallel, but also with 
strong interdependencies.
This means among other things:
• Action can be done, controlled via the motor cortex 
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while associative/ cognitive/ memorizing processes are 
ongoing in parallel via the prefrontal cortex.
• Emotivational influences on both of  these processes can 
be regulated to a great extent.
Another important outcome of  the sections above refers 
to the evaluation and decision making processes which are 
ongoing in the brain. There is a decision making apparatus, 
which can be located in three cortical areas, the basal ganglia 
(ventral striatum), the medial frontal cortex (ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and the medial orbitofrontal cortex), and 
in the anterior cingulate cortex. This system makes, firstly, 
decisions on which (reward) goal the attention should be 
spent, and secondly, which are the suitable actions to pursue 
this goal.
This system is able to make decisions very quickly, in 
terms of  affective or impulsive decision making and also 
more slowly by evaluating the possible values, goals and ac-
tions thoroughly (value-guided decision making).
This system can make dual decisions – between two re-
ward goals –, and also engage/ search decisions – between 
an available reward and further search for another reward, 
but which may have a greater value, and it can involve several 
aspects into the evaluation process, such as reward probabili-
ty, reward magnitude, average search values and effort costs.
An implicit implication, but which is not mentioned in the 
studies and in the sections above, should be that the original 
foundation of  any value is provided by needs and that they 
are incorporated into the evaluation and decision process 
via the limbic system. Goals can only be caused by needs. 
Rewards are kinds of  needs, which might not always be as 
imperative as basic needs, but which can nevertheless only 
take effect via the limbic system, the mesolimbic dopamine 
system and the caused emotions. A perceived object cannot 
become a goal if  it not meets at least a small demand which 
185
is represented by a homeostatic, autonomic, painful, or do-
paminergic stimulation in the limbic system and the basal 
ganglia.
It should be considered that the cortical structures, func-
tions and processes, which are examined above, build also 
the system which provides humans with all kinds of  cogni-
tive, intellectual and artistic capabilities. It is the basis for all 
kinds of  learning as well as for all types of  decisions in daily 
life and about economic opportunities, political preferences 
and scientific hypotheses.
The examined articles make visible, that the decision mak-
ing system is typically researched with animals or humans in 
simple situations with few rewards. But what about humans 
in real-life scenarios? It is all but impossible to investigate sys-
tematically what happens in the brain in complex or stressful 
real-life situations – with conflicts between a multitude of  
rewards and impairments –, and to detect interdependencies 
between brain processes and sociocultural developments. So 
this might be an open field, which requires further research.
Language is bound into the control processes via the as-
sociative control circuit. It is assumed that this control cir-
cuit, which is also available in animals, has been adapted in 
humans in a way, so that it additionally supports language 
control. This occurs partially in a domain-general way, but 
partially also specific to the domain of  language.
Conclusions for the SPP-4DI model
The findings on the anatomically segregated parallel circuits 
in the basal ganglia (corticostriatal loops) and on the decision 
making apparatus are, together with the knowledge about 
the emotional-motivational system, highly consistent to the 
SPP model. They support the concepts attention assessment 
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controller (AAC), basal ganglia multiplexer (BG multiplexer), ac-
tivity mode and preparation mode. The concept BG multiplexer 
includes also the concepts impulse control, intervention mechanism 
and inhibitive intervention.
The reward goal selection part of  the decision making 
process, which is executed in the basal ganglia and the me-
dial frontal cortex, meets characteristic attention of  the so 
called attention assessment controller (AAC) from the 
SPP model. Note: Characteristic assessment of  the concept 
attention assessment controller fits more to the interplay between 
the emotional-motivational system and memory – more de-
tails see below in chapter “Emotion, motivation and mem-
ory”.
The finding that motor control on the one hand and asso-
ciative/ cognitive/ memorizing processes on the other hand 
can be controlled in parallel by segregated circuits in the ba-
sal ganglia, is highly consistent to what is called activity mode 
and preparation mode in the SPP model.
The activity mode refers clearly to real-time activity, 
“motor control” and the skeletomotor circuit. The prepa-
ration mode might comprise the associative processes (as-
sociative/ cognitive control circuit), memory recall processes 
and the value-guided processes of  the decision making appa-
ratus. More or less directly, this is also related to declarative 
memory, secondary and tertiary associative cortical areas, 
cross-modal associations and cognitive processes. Procedur-
al memory, which is actually to be attributed to the activity 
mode, is also present in the memory recall procedures, but 
only in the form of  microrepresentations in the declarative 
memory, so typically in the region which is called hippocam-
pus (see also chapter “Emotion, motivation and memory”).
An important part of  this system is language control. 
This comprises articulation, what can be attributed to the 
activity mode, if  done with significant vigour. But the main 
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part of  the linguistic circuitry, which comprises also speech 
perception, semantics, abstraction and associations to other 
modes and modules of  the cortex, is bound into the control 
processes via the associative/ cognitive loop of  the corticos-
triatal circuitry in terms of  the preparation mode. It is likely 
that articulation plays also a role in this case, but if, then in 
the form of  simulation, so largely non-vocal with inhibited 
vigour. That’s why language simulation might be a typical 
ingredient of  the preparation mode of  the brain.
Term basal ganglia multiplexer (BG multiplexer; in-
cluding the concepts impulse control, intervention mechanism, 
inhibitive intervention and intervention switch) refers to the inter-
play between the four anatomically and functionally distinct 
parallel basal ganglia circuits and to the dual decision mak-
ing system, which combines affective/ impulsive decision 
making via basal ganglia and value-guided decision making 
via frontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex in integrated 
manner. Impulse control occurs, when an activity procedure, 
which is controlled by the skeletomotor circuit, is stopped 
in favour of  further decision making via the cognitive/ asso-
ciative/ prefrontal circuit. Motivational or emotional signals 
from the limbic basal ganglia circuit may play a role in the 
switch behaviour, just as results of  perception and sensation 
processes.
The primary function of  this multiplexer is to act as inter-
vention switch for ongoing activity sequences that are getting 
inappropriate, but reinforcement, in terms of  the opposite 
of  intervention, completes the switch behaviour. The BG 
multiplexer works not only as on-off  switch or as an inter-
vene-reinforce switch, but rather as a modulation controller, 
which controls the vigour of  each small piece of  the activity 
sequences. That an activity sequence can be intervened total-
ly and very quickly (before a first external sign is produced) 
is only one of  the capabilities of  this brain feature.
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But the finding, which is actual important in relation to 
the SPP model, is, that the basal ganglia multiplexer supports 
the interplay between activity mode and preparation mode of  the 
brain processes. Both types of  processes occur constantly 
in parallel, controlled and synchronized by the basal ganglia 
circuits.
Consideration on the social reference of  
impulse control
The capability to avoid inappropriate behaviours and to 
search for more suitable or more convenient behaviours 
might primarily have been forced in social contexts, and the 
impulse control function, the BG multiplexer and the distinct 
control mechanisms of  the human brain processor might 
primarily have been developed for regardfulness towards 
the social environment rather than the natural environment. 
This is only consistent, when considering that survival of  the 
group in a hostile environment was the actual challenge in 
the history. Inconsiderate exploitation of  natural resources 
was typically no problem as long as this was connected with 
benefits for the group. This is as it were inscribed into our 
neural apparatus that nature is definitely able to defend its 
own interests, so that it can be affected with no regret.
But this might slightly turn into the opposite due to our 
massive impairment of  biodiversity, so that we have to learn 
how to perform impulse control also towards nature. 
Reminder: This means “that inappropriate responses can 
be stopped very quickly and perfectly […] a special ‘hyper-
direct pathway’ has been developed for this purpose by the 
Evolution” (see above under “The motor circuit”).
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Emotion, motivation and memory
Note: This chapter summarises basic knowledge from var-
ious popular sources (without known references) and from 
Popper and Eccles 2006 and Gazzanega and Mangun 2014.
Emotion and Motivation
Preliminary, it is difficult to find a comprehensive descrip-
tion about the neural mechanisms of  emotion and motiva-
tion in scientific papers. The so called limbic system, which 
was proposed for this topic in the past, is no longer referred 
much by contemporary scientific views. But it can neverthe-
less give an orientation about which areas and circuits are 
involved in this part of  the control processes.
There are four main systems which are involved in emo-
tional and motivational processes, but which are highly in-
tegrated. These are the autonomic interface, involving ho-
meostatic regulation, the sensory system (particularly pain 
sensation), emotional processing, and the reward system.
1) The autonomic interface integrates the nervous sys-
tem with the autonomic nervous system and the metabolic 
processes of  the body. The main interfaces for these pro-
cesses are a subcortical area which is called hypothalamus 
and the endocrine system, including a larger collection of  
glands, like pituitary gland, pineal gland, thyroid gland, ad-
renal gland, pancreas gland, ovaries gland, testes gland and 
others.
The core part of  the control processes which occur on the 
behalf  of  these interfaces is called homeostasis. This com-
prises, according to Maslow 1987, 15, and references therein, 
the regulation of  metabolic balances like “(1) the water con-
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tent of  the blood, (2) salt content, (3) sugar content, (4) pro-
tein content, (5) fat content, (6) calcium content, (7) oxygen 
content, (8) constant hydrogen-ion level (acid-base balance), 
and (9) constant temperature of  the blood […] minerals, the 
hormones, vitamins, and so on”. This is linked to feelings 
like hunger, thirst, cold, hot, sexual arousal etc. This includes 
also a control loop that is called hypothalamic-pituitary-adre-
nal (HPA) axis and which is connected with the regulation of  
stress levels in the nervous system and the metabolic system 
in consistent manner.
This includes also regulation of  the balance between sym-
pathetic and parasympathetic nervous system, which are two 
parts of  the autonomic nervous system. The former repre-
sents preparedness for action and the latter rest and diges-
tion, and the autonomic regulation processes include always 
regulation of  the balance between both aspects of  life, and 
thus between sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous sys-
tem.
2) The sensory system has two main aspects:
• Information: provide signals for sensorimotor control 
or for the informational aspect of  cognitive processes 
and decision making processes (see something, smell 
something or feel something which is not painful).
• Motivation: pain sensation.
Only the latter aspect is of  interest here. This refers pri-
marily to the sense of  touch and the somatosensory system, 
whose signals are typically bound into cortical processes via 
a subcortical area which is called thalamus. This comprises 
sensory signals representing, for example, touch, vibration, 
heat, (the somatosensory component of) balance and pain. 
However, only pain is of  interest here. This takes partially 
effect via explicit pain receptors in body and skin, and par-
tially via the normal receptors if  they are confronted with 
overmodulation, e.g. due to too much pressure or heat.
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Besides this there are signals of  pain which are produced 
by other senses, like vision (dazzling light), hearing (loud 
noise) or taste (bitter). But these are difficult cases – the 
transition between information and pain is widely adaptable, 
and domain specific investigation is needed for understand 
how these types of  perception patterns turn into pain and 
motivational stimuli.
3) Emotional processing is particularly attributed to a 
brain area which is called amygdala. This is associated with 
extraordinary excitation states that are caused by alarming 
environmental stimuli. This comprises fear and anxiety, but 
also pleasure and delight and a wide range of  other feelings, 
which occur due to interactions with the natural and social 
environment. The amygdala, and thus emotional processing, 
is closely linked to other areas and systems, like habenula, 
which represents the olfactory sense, the autonomic inter-
face or the reward system (see next paragraph).
4) The reward system is connected with concepts like 
mesolimbic dopamine system or mesocorticolimbic dopa-
mine system. It represents emotions and the pursuit of  any 
type of  good feelings or rewards, at which this is seen as an 
open system with no determination or restriction, what kind 
of  desires might occur with this behalf. The reward system is 
mainly represented by the following subcortical components: 
amygdala (representing emotions), septal nuclei, nucleus ac-
cumbens, ventral tegmental area and pathways to several 
substructures of  the basal ganglia (striatum, caudate nucleus, 
putamen, substantia nigra etc.). Neurotransmitters, which 
play an important role in this system, are dopamine, seroto-
nin, glutamate and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA).
These four parts of  the emotional-motivational system, 
mainly represented by the subcortical areas thalamus, habe-
nula, hypothalamus, amygdala, septal nuclei, nucleus accum-
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bens, ventral tegmental area and basal ganglia (as described 
above) are interconnected with several cortical areas, that are 
linked to memory, behaviour control and cognitive control. 
These are mainly the regions which are called entorhinal 
cortex, hippocampus, cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex. 
Most of  the pathways and loops of  this system are cross-
linked via the structures of  the basal ganglia. Thus, the basal 
ganglia is the crucial key component of  the emotional-moti-
vational system of  the brain. Each type of  emotion, motiva-
tion and need is conveyed via this intermediary device.
The entorhinal cortex and the hippocampus are key areas 
of  the memory system, particularly of  the declarative part. 
The entorhinal cortex is seen as hub to all other areas of  
the memory system. The hippocampus represents episod-
ic memory and spatial memory. More details see in section 
“The types of  memory”.
The cingulate cortex and the prefrontal cortex are, in con-
junction with the basal ganglia, the crucial parts of  the de-
cision making system. More details see in section “Decision 
making in BG and frontal cortex”.
The types of  memory
The brain, particularly the cortex, is first of  all a great memo-
ry system, which adapts continuously to the requirements of  
daily life. This is true for the plasticity of  basic or subcortical 
structures, cascades of  modules performing perception and 
processing of  sensory information, control systems as well 
as for the areas and functions that are explicitly attributed to 
kinds of  memory. Concentrating on the latter, one can start 
with the concepts of  procedural and declarative memory.
Procedural memory happens in the sensory cortex, the 
motor cortex, adjacent associative areas and further inter-
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mediary parts of  the brain. This includes all nerve cords and 
modules that are needed for the execution of  activity se-
quences. The cerebellum as great supporter of  motor coor-
dination and smooth movements should also be mentioned 
here.
This type of  memory is not, like declarative memory (see 
below), directly accessible by procedures of  remembering 
or conscious thinking and recombination. It can only be re-
called, modified and trained by activity. It is present in the 
declarative memory by microrepresentations that can be 
used as queues for trigger the appropriate procedural activity 
sequences when required (see below).
In contrast, declarative memory is the part which can 
explicitly be recalled and involved into all kinds of  conscious 
thought processes, recombination processes and associative 
processes. It is mainly located in the so called temporal lobe, 
the hippocampus, the entorhinal cortex, in secondary, ter-
tiary and unspecific associative areas as well as in the lan-
guage areas, which can also be characterised as associative to 
a great extent.
The associative areas are the actual locations of  (declar-
ative) long term memory. Important key mechanisms for 
this part of  the memory system are “Cross-modal associa-
tions” and “Integrative encoding …” – more details see in 
the appropriate sections below.
The key areas of  the declarative memory are the hip-
pocampus and the entorhinal cortex. The hippocampus 
stands for spatial memory (navigation), episodic memory 
and the intermediation between short term memory and 
long term memory (see also the sections about “Integrative 
encoding …”). It is known for the ability to keep episodic 
information for a couple of  weeks. After this period, the 
information is either transferred to the long term memo-
ry via repetitive excitation and integration into the system 
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of  enduring associative memories, or it is forgotten (more 
details see below under “Integrative encoding of  memories 
over time”). The hippocampus is also known for extraordi-
nary high plasticity – growth of  nerve cells and synapses can 
occur in this region with high intensity into old age.
The entorhinal cortex, which is also called limbic asso-
ciation cortex and which is located in the medial temporal 
lobe, is another significant area of  the memory system. It is 
associated with the following characteristics:
• It is the main interface between hippocampus and neo-
cortex.
• It is responsible for memory navigation.
• It functions, respectively, as multimodal association area 
or as a hub in a widespread network of  memory.
• It is a multimodal association area, supporting unspecif-
ic associations between various modules and association 
areas with more domain specific determination.
• It supports the perception of  time.
These key areas of  the declarative memory system, so hip-
pocampus and entorhinal cortex, are also the primary gate-
ways for incorporate value information from the emotion-
al-motivational system into memorised information. More 
details see in sections “Integrative encoding of  procedur-
al, emotional-motivational, sensory-perceptual and internal 
thought components” (below) and “Emotion and Motiva-
tion” (above).
Note: Further areas, as e.g. the perirhinal and parahip-
pocampal cortices may also be involved in the declarative 
and episodic part of  the memory system.
Short term memory does not exist in terms of  a static 
memory store with clear location. This concept refers rather 
to the attention-related processes that are constantly ongo-
ing in prefrontal-basal-ganglia-cortical loops and namely in 
the decision making system (see also Ranganath, Hasselmo 
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and Stern 2014 and Glimcher 2014). These processes circle 
always around few topics that are currently attracting atten-
tion due to preceding attentional and evaluative processes, to 
external stimuli, elicited via the perception system and due to 
prevailing needs, elicited via the emotional-motivational sys-
tem (see also the descriptions in chapter “Basal ganglia (BG) 
and frontal cortex” and in section “Emotion and Motiva-
tion”). This includes the immediate control of  current activ-
ities and also all processes of  value-guided decision making, 
association and cognition. The prefrontal-basal-ganglia-cor-
tical circuits, including the decision making circuits, are able 
to switch the attention short term between several tasks, 
what is partially (or traditionally) linked to the concept short 
term memory. The ability to re-encourage former excitation 
patterns directly in this system reaches to durations under 
one minute while recall after longer passivity is also possible, 
but only via processes of  episodic memory or (long term) 
associative memory.
The further descriptions in this chapter refer primarily to 
the processes and encodings in the declarative part of  the 
memory system.
Cross-modal associations
The specific role of  associative areas for memory and cog-
nition has already been emphasised in the classic publication 
from Popper and Eccles 2006 in “Chapter E2 Conscious 
Perception”, section “9. Cutaneous Perception (Somaesthe-
sis)”, subsection “9.3. Secondary and Tertiary Sensory Are-
as”, 260: “In palpation there is first the shaping of  the hand 
for grasping an object, and secondly the moving of  the hand 
over the surface of  the object in an active exploration. In this 
way cutaneous sensing leads to feature detection that match-
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es the visual feature detection in the inferotemporal lobe”. 
Incorporating language into the system of  interconnections 
has two aspects – it adds another ability of  the brain to de-
velop interconnection complexity and it opens the social 
dimension. Popper and Eccles 2006 write in “Chapter E4 
The Language Centres of  the Human Brain”, section “24 
Résumé”, 295f.: “Particular importance is attached to Brod-
mann’s areas 39 and 40, which came very late in evolution, 
being barely recognizable in nonhuman primates. These are 
the areas specifically concerned in cross-modal associations, 
that is associations from one sensory input, say touch, to 
another, say vision […]. It is postulated that language comes 
when you have the association between objects that you feel 
and objects that you see, and which you then name. […]. 
Language provides the means of  representing objects ab-
stractly and for manipulating them hypothetically in one’s 
mind.”
By this way, cross modal associations enable the brain to 
build an internal representation of  the world via perception, 
active exploration, storing the resulting experiences in sen-
sory and motor areas of  the cortex and by integrating these 
primary contents in associative areas. This includes listening, 
reading, speech, writing and appropriate language areas. The 
result is that the structure of  the world can be internalized 
to a great extent by internal synaptic representations, that 
this world view can be exploited for make attitudes and be-
haviours highly suitable and that this can be combined with 
social interconnectedness.
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Integrative encoding of  memories over 
time
The capability to exploit cross-modal associations gets an-
other dimension, when considering the temporal aspect and 
the fact that experiences and associations, once made, are 
complemented again and again by further experiences and 
associations. This dimension of  neural processes compris-
es that new experiences are integrated into the network of  
existing memories, that existing memories are strengthened 
again by this way and that novel inferences are produced. 
The cortical region, which is called hippocampus, plays a 
crucial role in these processes. This is described by Davachi 
and Preston 2014 and references therein under headline 
“Memory reinstatement during new encoding” (543f.):
“As highlighted in the previous section, memories for 
past events are often reinstated during new experiences. 
These findings emphasize that memory encoding and 
retrieval are not performed in isolation, but rather are 
interactive processes. Recent human neuroimaging re-
search indicates that new learning influences, and is influ-
enced by, reactivation of  existing memories. In one such 
study, participants learned overlapping (e.g., watch – sink 
and later watch – pipe) and nonoverlapping (e.g., peanut 
– moose) pairs of  pictures […] The findings revealed 
that the degree to which prior memories (e.g., memory 
for the watch – sink event) were reinstated during en-
coding of  new overlapping experiences (watch – pipe) 
was associated with greater retention of  the originally 
learned information when compared to memory for 
nonoverlapping information. Moreover, hippocampal 
engagement during encoding of  the overlapping pairs 
was related to both cortical memory reinstatement and 
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improved memory retention. These findings indicate 
that memory reinstatement during new encoding helps 
reduce forgetting of  past events. One possibility is that 
reduced forgetting was not just the result of  strengthen-
ing of  reactivated memories, but may also have result-
ed from a hippocampal-mediated integrative encoding 
mechanism, whereby newly encountered information is 
integrated with existing memories at the time of  learning 
[…].
According to this mechanism, the fundamental role 
of  the hippocampus in memory is not only to form re-
lationships among elements within an individual experi-
ence, but also to construct memory representations that 
link memory elements across discrete experiences. […] 
Integrative encoding proposes that when a new event 
shares a common feature, or features, with an existing 
memory trace, the common features elicit memory re-
instatement through hippocampal pattern completion. 
New experiences would then not only be encoded in 
the context of  presently available information in the 
external world, but would also be bound to reactivated 
representations of  prior related memories. Furthermore, 
this mechanism makes the fundamental prediction that 
by combining information across discrete events, hip-
pocampal memory representations would include infor-
mation that goes beyond direct experience. Accordingly, 
integrative encoding would not only support strengthen-
ing of  existing memories […], but would also support 
novel inferences about the relationships between memo-
ry elements that were experienced at different times and 
generalization of  knowledge to entirely new situations, a 
hallmark of  episodic memory.”
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Integrative encoding of  procedural, emo-
tional-motivational, sensory-perceptual 
and internal thought components
The hippocampus is particularly also known as supporter of  
connections to the procedural memory. Episodic memory 
means mainly, that perception events and sensorimotor ac-
tivity sequences are recorded and incorporated into a time-
line. In addition, it is possible to reinstate this information, 
include it into associative thought processes and exploit it 
for any further purpose. This comprises also that it must 
be possible to include procedural memory content in any 
form into these processes and to reactivate the appropriate 
activity sequences at any time again – in terms of  planning, 
usage/ execution, training/ optimisation or adaptation. This 
requirement is known as being implemented by microrep-
resentations of  memorized procedural sequences that can be 
included into the recordings in the episodic memory. These 
microrepresentations function as keys for the ability to re-
activate the referred procedural activity patterns at any time 
again (see also below under “Microrepresentations …”).
Another point is that also emotional-motivational value 
information is always integrated as coherent ingredient into 
the processes and encodings in the declarative memory. This 
occurs via the pathways between the emotional-motivation-
al system (details see in section “Emotion and Motivation”) 
and the key areas of  the declarative part of  the memory sys-
tem, which are the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex 
(see also above under “The types of  memory” and below 
under “Microrepresentations …”).
Sensory-perceptual experiences and internal 
thoughts occur, like activity sequences, primarily in appro-
priate domain specific cortical areas and they are involved 
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into episodic recordings and further memory processes via 
microrepresentations (see also below).
Microrepresentations of  sensory-perceptu-
al experiences, actions, internal thoughts, 
and emotions in the episodic memory
Davachi and Preston 2014, focusing on episodic memory in 
the medial temporal lobe (MTL), report about a “memory 
as reinstatement model” (MAR model), which is proposed 
as “a summary of  the common elements of  many existing 
models” (Davachi and Preston 2014 and references therein, 
539f.):
“During an experience, the MAR model proposes that 
the ongoing, dynamic representation of  that experience is 
represented in distributed cortical and subcortical patterns 
of  neural activation. These activation patterns are driven by 
sensory-perceptual (visual, auditory, somatosensory) expe-
rience, actions, internal thoughts, and emotions, to name a 
few. Thus, neural activation patterns at any one time point 
can be thought of  as representing the current episode and 
state of  the organism. Critically, it is thought that the distrib-
uted pattern of  cortical and subcortical firing filters into the 
MTL cortices and converges on the hippocampus, where a 
‘microrepresentation’ of  the current episode is created. […] 
What results from a successfully encoded experience is a hip-
pocampal neural pattern (HNP) and a corresponding corti-
cal neural pattern (CNP). Importantly, the HNP is thought 
to contain the critical connections between representations 
that allow the CNP to be accessed later and attributed to a 
particular event.
Importantly, episodic memory retrieval is thought to 
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involve cue processing that, if  successful, will lead to a re-
instatement of  the HNP. Retrieval cues (e.g., an external 
stimulus or internal thought) are thought to serve as ‘keys’ 
that unlock the HNP associated with a prior experience, a 
process referred to as hippocampal pattern completion. Pat-
tern completion refers to the idea that a complete pattern 
(a memory) can be reconstructed from only a subset of  the 
elements making up that pattern. Thus, successful retrieval is 
thought to involve reinstatement of  all or some of  the HNP 
established during encoding. Finally, reinstatement of  the 
HNP is then thought to be instrumental in reinstating the 
corresponding CNP, resulting in the concurrent reactivation 
of  disparate cortical regions that were initially active during 
the experience. Importantly, it is thought that this final stage 
of  cortical reinstatement underlies the subjective experience 
of  recollection and drives mnemonic decision making.”
Conclusions for the SPP-4DI model
The four parts of  the emotional-motivational system, which 
are described as autonomic interface, sensory system (par-
ticularly pain sensation), emotional processing and reward 
system (see section “Emotion and Motivation”), are the pro-
viders of  purpose for the brain. They ensure that the brain 
works at the service of  the creature, in which it is implement-
ed. This occurs partially in terms of  strict forces (homeosta-
sis, pain) and partially in terms of  pleasure and joy with large 
creative leeway (rescue from suffering, positive emotions, 
reward system). But both types of  mechanisms take effect 
in closely interconnected manner via a joint system of  cross-
links in the basal ganglia. This is consistent to the concepts 
attention assessment controller (AAC) and basal ganglia multiplexer 
(BG multiplexer; including the concepts impulse control, inter-
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vention mechanism and inhibitive intervention) which are proposed 
in the SPP model.
It can be assumed that the assessment part of  the atten-
tion assessment controller is bound into the memory system 
via the pathways from the emotional-motivational system to 
the memory system. Memory means storing information on 
the basis of  evaluation or rating – good results in excitation 
and bad results in inhibition – what is consistent to the term 
assessment.
It can further be assumed that the attention part, what 
is primarily meant in the sense of  selective attention or at-
tention to (German “Zuwendung”), occurs via the decision 
making system.
It is further proposed, that the assessment ratings are al-
ways established as an inherent value part of  memory – as 
degrees of  positive or negative emotional-motivational ex-
periences, encoded in the excitation effects and inhibition 
effects of  the involved synapses – and that these values are 
exploited by the decision making between concurrent candi-
date patterns in relation to pursued values.
This is consistent to the theses
• that the brain does not store any information without 
purpose and value and
• that it does not select any stored information without 
purpose and value.
That purposes and values can be multifarious – reaching 
from pure pleasure in learning to the fight against misery and 
distress – is another story.
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Cognitive control and emotions
Seesaw models and more advanced ap-
proaches
Ochsner (2014) reports about seesaw models of  cognitive 
control and emotion (see in Ochsner 2014 and references 
therein). He starts with descriptions of  the basic idea behind 
these seesaw models, which emphasise the contrariness be-
tween cognitive control and emotion:
“Historically, the idea that cognition and emotion seesaw 
back-and-forth with one another dated back at least to 
Descartes’s ideas about the dichotomy between passion 
and reason”. (719)
“Both, human and animal research have reliably asso-
ciated cognitive control and emotional responding with 
distinct but overlapping sets of  brain systems.” (720)
But in the end he comes to different conclusions with in-
sights into interdependencies between both components un-
der the following headline (726):
“Beyond the seesaw: An alternative account of  the relationship 
between cognitive control and emotion, and its implications for the-
ory and research
This chapter began with the compelling view that emo-
tion and cognitive control are often in opposition. As a 
shorthand, we referred to these theoretical accounts as 
seesaw models that posited the engagement of  cognitive 
control in the pursuit of  explicit or implicit regulatory 
goals as the effect of  diminishing neural and behavioral 
signatures of  affective response.
Using the glossy, popular version of  these models as 
a foil, we then reviewed four kinds of  evidence that cog-
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nitive control in affective processes can interact in ways 
not well accounted for by seesaw models […]. First, we 
saw that the use of  cognitive control to elaborate the 
affective meaning of  an event can generate emotion via 
the recruitment of  prefrontal control systems and the 
triggering of  activation in subcortical affect systems like 
the amygdala. Second, we saw that control regions could 
help select stimulus-appropriate words for describing 
and reporting on one’s current emotional state. Third, 
in regard to perceiving other people’s emotions, we saw 
that control regions may help resolve social cognitive 
conflicts between interpretations of  different kinds of  
cues that provide different kinds of  information about 
others’ emotions. Fourth and last, we saw that prefrontal 
control regions can be used to up-regulate emotion, and 
in so doing, up-regulate responses in subcortical affect 
systems like the amygdala.
If  these data either are inconsistent with or fall out-
side the intended explanatory realm of  seesaw models, 
then how should we conceive of  cognitive control – 
emotion interactions?”
“CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION AND THE MAK-
ING OF MEANING In their classic book, The Measure-
ment of  Meaning, Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum showed 
that approximately two-thirds of  the meaning we ascribe 
to things in the world arises from our valenced evalua-
tion of  those things as good or bad, positive or negative, 
pleasant or unpleasant (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 
1957). Fundamentally, this highlights that our affective 
responses form a core element of  what events, people, 
places, things, and so on mean to us. Indeed, the most 
profound and important experiences of  our daily lives 
wouldn’t mean as much if  they were bereft of  their emo-
tional potency.”
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In the following, Ochsner (2014) and references therein 
propose, as an alternative, a “constraint satisfaction model”, 
which is able to deal with the “cognitive control – emotion 
interactions” as a feature.
In the end, Ochsner (2014) comes to the following con-
clusions among other things (728):
“WHAT’S NEXT? While this model relies as much on 
metaphor as a seesaw model, it may provide a frame-
work for accounting for a broader range of  interactions 
between cognitive control and emotion. As such, it sug-
gests two directions for future research.
First, we might expand our experimental purview to 
study not just cases where cognitive control appears to 
down-regulate some type of  affective (or more generally, 
maladaptive) response, but to study the myriad other sit-
uations where we generate, introspect on, perceive, and 
regulate emotion in ourselves and others in ways that en-
hance, transform, integrate, and arbitrate between poten-
tial affective responses, interpretations, judgments, and 
so on. Second, it highlights just how far future research 
needs to go in providing increasingly specific descrip-
tions of  underlying neural mechanisms. As a field, we are 
increasingly moving beyond descriptions of  neural bases 
that specify only relative levels of  activation in different 
systems, a la seesaw models. Instead, more complicated 
path, mediation, and multivoxel pattern-based models 
are appearing that specify complex combinations of  sys-
tems and the way in which they interact.”
Finally, Ochsner (2014) characterises the aims for future re-
search as follows:
“understand the neural underpinnings of  self-regulatory 
success and failure” and “go where no researchers have 
gone before, exploring new ways in which cognitive con-
trol and emotion can interact.” (728)
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Conclusions for the SPP-4DI model
The 4DI model, which emerges from the SPP model as a 
consistent result, follows the intentions of  Ochsner (2014), 
but with the peculiarity that this takes place on a very abstract 
level. The 4DI model is based on the idea that reason, cog-
nition and pure informational intelligence on the one hand 
and emotion, vigour and passion on the other hand is indeed 
in a contradictory relationship, but that real intelligence (of  
the 4DI type) is provided by the ability to combine both 
components in successful manner. This is seen as the crucial 
tension field for the development of  human intelligence.
The SPP-4DI model, on its abstract level, can only de-
velop as a link to other disciplines, like psychology, social 
sciences, and so on, but it will not be able to enlighten neuro-
physiological details – this task can rather only be addressed 
by approaches like the constraint satisfaction model or other 
efforts in neuroscientific research.
It should be mentioned that the models SPP and 4DI are 
based on a concept of  emotion (or “emotivation”) that might 
be slightly different to the one that is adopted in Ochsner 
2014 and in other articles in Gazzanega and Mangun 2014.
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Consciousness
Block, Ned: Comparing the Major Theo-
ries of  Consciousness
Ned Block (2009) compares three theories of  consciousness:
• The higher order state approach, or higher order thought 
(HOT) approach.
• The global workspace account of  consciousness.
• The biological theory.
Block provides a discussion on how these theories try to 
explain consciousness and what are the remaining discrep-
ancies and open questions. The “explanatory gap” between 
phenomenal consciousness and its physical basis is made a 
central topic and incorporated as a crucial benchmark crite-
rion into the discussion.
How the explanatory gap is described in Block 2009 and 
how it is seen from the perspective of  the SPP model is 
already covered in the section “Conscious experiences” in 
Part 1.
Regarding the three above-mentioned theories, Block 
comes to the following results (among other things):
• According to the higher order state approach, (Block 
2009, 1114):
“The fact that the HOT theory cannot recognize the real 
explanatory gap makes it attractive to people who do 
not agree that there is an explanatory gap in the first 
place – the HOT theory is a kind of  “no consciousness” 
theory of  consciousness. But for those who accept an 
explanatory gap (at least for our current state of  neu-
roscientific knowledge), the fact that the HOT theory 
does not recognize one is a reason to reject the HOT 
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theory. The HOT theory is geared to the cognitive and 
representational aspect of  consciousness, but if  those 
aspects are not the whole story, the HOT theory will 
never be adequate to consciousness.”
• According to the global workspace account of  con-
sciousness, (Block 2009, 1114):
“This very short argument against the HOT approach 
also applies to the global workspace theory, albeit in a 
slightly different form. According to the global work-
space account, the answer to the question of  why the 
neural basis of  my experience of  red is the neural ba-
sis of  a conscious experience is simply that it is globally 
broadcast. But why is a globally broadcast representation 
conscious? This is indeed a puzzle for the global work-
space theory but it is not the explanatory gap because it 
presupposes the global workspace theory itself, whereas 
the explanatory gap (discussed previously) does not.”
• According to the biological theory, (Block 2009, 1114):
“The biological account, by contrast, fits the explanatory 
gap – indeed, I phrased the explanatory gap in terms 
of  the biological account, asking how we can possibly 
understand how consciousness could be a biological 
property. So the biological account is the only one of  
the three major theories to fully acknowledge the explan-
atory gap.”
How the biological theory may explain consciousness is pro-
posed by the example of  area MT+ in the visual cortex in 
Block 2009 and references therein, 1112f.:
“Visual area MT+ reacts to motion in the world, dif-
ferent cells reacting to different directions. Damage to 
MT+ can cause loss of  the capacity to experience this 
kind of  motion; MT+ is activated by the motion af-
tereffect; transcranial magnetic stimulation of  MT+ 
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disrupts these afterimages and also can cause motion 
‘phosphenes’ [...]. However, it is important to distinguish 
between two kinds of  MT+ activations, which I will call 
nonrepresentational activations and representational ac-
tivations. [...] However, if  activations of  MT+ are strong 
enough to be harnessed in subjects’ choices (at a mini-
mum in priming), then we have genuine representations. 
[...]
What makes such a representational content phe-
nomenally conscious? One suggestion is that active 
connections between cortical activations and the top of  
the brain stem constitute what Alkire, Haier, and Fallon 
(2000) call a ‘thalamic switch.’ There are two important 
sources of  evidence for this view. One is that the com-
mon feature of  many if  not all anesthetics appears to 
be that they disable these connections (Alkire & Miller, 
2005). Another is that the transition from the vegetative 
state to the minimally conscious state (Laureys, 2005) 
involves these connections. However, there is some ev-
idence that the ‘thalamic switch’ is an on switch rather 
than an off  switch (Alkire & Miller, 2005) and that cor-
ticothalamic connections are disabled as a result of  the 
large overall decrease in cortical metabolism (Velly et al., 
2007; Alkire, 2008; Tononi & Koch, 2008) – which itself  
may be caused in part by the deactivation of  other sub-
cortical structures (Schneider & Kochs, 2007). Although 
this area of  study is in flux, the important philosophical 
point is the three-way distinction between (1) a nonrep-
resentational activation of  MT+, (2) an activation of  
MT+ that is a genuine visual representation of  motion, 
and (3) an activation of  MT+ that is a key part of  a phe-
nomenally conscious representation of  motion.”
So it can be concluded that the biological theory may be 
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able to provide useful solution approaches on the matter of  
consciousness and the explanatory gap. Deeper analysis in 
this direction would certainly be recommended. This refers 
to further empirical research, but also to the formation and 
verification of  hypotheses and models. Whether there may 
be a correlation between the biological theory approaches 
and the SPP model still has to be investigated.
The integrated information theory of  intelligence/con-
sciousness (for more details see the next section) is classified 
by Block as a variation of  the global workspace account of  
consciousness, sharing the gaps and discrepancies to a cer-
tain extent.
Tononi, G.: The integrated information 
theory of  consciousness
The integrated information theory of  consciousness (IIT, 
Tononi 2012) tries to clarify how information is processed 
by the brain to obtain conscious experiences from it. It is 
based on certain axioms and postulates. “The information 
axiom asserts that every experience is specific - it is what it 
is by differing in its particular way from a large repertoire of  
alternatives. […] The integration postulate states that only 
information that is irreducible matters […] The exclusion 
postulate states that only maxima of  integrated information 
matter” (Tononi 2012, 290, Abstract). An important basic 
statement is: “Information can best be defined as a ‘differ-
ence that makes a difference’” (Tononi 2012, 294, referring 
to Bateson 1972). What IIT tries to achieve is described in 
the section “Conclusion”: “IIT attempts to provide a prin-
cipled approach for translating the seemingly ineffable qual-
itative properties of  phenomenology into the language of  
mathematics” (Tononi 2012, 318).
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IIT explains “Consciousness as integrated information” 
(Tononi 2012, 290). This means that a system which is able 
to integrate information – in terms of  maxima of  integrated 
information – to a certain extent and which is able to differ 
this information from other integrated information, is ca-
pable to produce phenomenal consciousness. This refers to 
any piece of  matter or to any information processing engine 
with a minimal level of  complexity, independent of  whether 
this system is a living organism or whether it is equipped 
with any type of  self-regulation or not.
Tononi focuses on pure information processing capabili-
ties in terms of  awareness, cognition or informational intelli-
gence. So IIT considers only the informational aspect of  the 
brain processes. It does not ask how aspects like behaviour, 
autonomic regulation, motivation, pain, emotion, empathy 
or passion are incorporated into the equation, what would 
certainly be necessary to complete the picture.
IIT emphasises that consciousness depends on the fact 
that information is integrated and that experiences are made 
which are different to alternatives. But the question is not 
asked of  why the integration of  information, obtained from 
different senses, and the comparison of  experiences to al-
ternatives, could be relevant at all. But there should be a 
reason why information is processed as explained by IIT. So 
consciousness will actually require an evaluative component. 
That information makes a difference is only possible if  there 
is a reason for making the difference, if  there is any purpose 
behind it or any kind of  (self-) regulation. Information is just 
chaos which does not matter if  there is no reason and no 
relevance, independent of  whether this could be integrated 
or not, and if  there might be alternatives or not.
That information makes a difference might correlate with 
the concepts of  homeostasis, basic and artificial needs and 
emotivational evaluation as explained by the SPP model.
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Evaluative information which is provoked by the auto-
nomic nervous system, the sensation of  pain or the mes-
olimbic dopamine system and incorporated into neural 
excitation patterns, could also be regarded as information. 
So one could assume that the evaluative parts of  the infor-
mation are seen as making the decisive difference between 
conscious and not conscious. But the IIT theory is either not 
proposed to be interpreted in this way, or the specific role of  
evaluative information is seen as a basic precondition, but 
one that is not explicitly mentioned in Tononi 2012.
But it should also be clear that the fact, that a (biological) 
system is equipped with self-regulation and purpose, does 
not implicitly make this system conscious. It is an impor-
tant lesson, not least from IIT, that self-regulation must be 
accompanied by a certain degree of  informational complex-
ity, in the sense of  integration and differentiation, to achieve 
conscious states.
Popper/Eccles: The Self  and Its Brain
Popper and Eccles (2006) provide a major comprehensive 
description of  the nervous system and of  the brain from 
the philosophical viewpoint (Popper) and from the neuro-
physiological and neurological viewpoint (Eccles). The book 
was first published in 1977, but it represents a great part of  
the state of  knowledge, which can today still be regarded as 
valid.
A good explanation of  what the conscious mind is is pro-
vided in particular in the Eccles part of  the book.
His model is built around the concept of  the “liaison are-
as”, recognisable by the following statement:
“The self-conscious mind is actively engaged in reading 
out from the multitude of  active centres at the highest 
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level of  brain activity, namely the liaison areas of  the 
dominant cerebral hemisphere. The self-conscious mind 
selects from these centres according to attention, and 
from moment to moment integrates its selection to give 
unity even to the most transient experiences.” (Popper/
Eccles 2006, 362)
But this becomes difficult in connection with the following 
statements in the Eccles section, which are questionable:
“But the question: where is the self-conscious mind 
located? is unanswerable in principle. This can be ap-
preciated when we consider some components of  the 
self-conscious mind. It makes no sense to ask where are 
located the feelings of  love or hate, or of  joy or fear, 
or of  such values as truth, goodness and beauty which 
apply to mental appraisals.” (Popper/Eccles 2006, 376)
The SPP model provides a different answer to this question:
The areas where experiences and feelings occur can be 
located – they are largely superimposable to the areas 
where perception is integrated with associative/ cogni-
tive processes and emotivational evaluation in the prepa-
ration mode of  the attention assessment controller.
Chalmers, David J.: The Character of  Con-
sciousness
(1)
Chalmers (2010) explains in the introduction:
“Consciousness is an extraordinary and multifaceted 
phenomenon whose character can be approached from 
many different directions. It has a phenomenological 
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and a neurobiological character. It has a metaphysical 
and an epistemological character. It has a perceptual and 
a cognitive character. It has a unified and a differentiated 
character. And it has many further sorts of  character.
We will not understand consciousness by studying its 
character on just one of  these dimensions.” (Chalmers 
2010, xi)
So Chalmers makes consciousness a major complicated is-
sue. But in fact it is not. According to the SPP model “con-
sciousness is” simply “information enlightened by emotiva-
tional evaluation”, based on achievements (a), (b) and (c), as 
explained in the section “Conscious experiences” in Part 1.
Chalmers’s examination of  the issue from different di-
rections offers a significant discussion of  the philosophical 
aspects of  the question of  consciousness. But they are not 
necessarily needed to explain what consciousness is and why 
it occurs, at least not from the analytical perspective of  the 
SPP model, which is preferentially based on neurobiological 
findings.
(2)
Important questions arising in relation to two different per-
spectives are discussed in Part II “The science of  conscious-
ness”, Chapter 2 “How can we construct a science of  con-
sciousness?” (Chalmers 2010, 37ff.):
“The task of  a science of  consciousness, as I see it, is 
to systematically integrate two key classes of  data into a 
scientific framework: third-person data, or data about be-
havior and brain processes, and first-person data, or data 
about subjective experience.” (Chalmers 2010, 37)
“Third-person data concern the behavior and the 
brain processes of  conscious systems. These behavio-
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ral and neurophysiological data provide the traditional 
material of  interest for cognitive psychology and cogni-
tive neuroscience. Where the science of  consciousness 
is concerned, some particularly relevant third-person 
data are those concerning perceptual discrimination and 
those involving verbal reports. Direct measurements of  
brain processes also play a crucial role in cognitive neu-
roscience, of  course.
First-person data concern the subjective experiences 
of  conscious systems. It is a datum for each of  us that 
such experiences exist: we can gather information about 
them both by attending to our own experiences and by 
monitoring subjective verbal reports about the experi-
ences of  others. These phenomenological data provide 
the distinctive subject for the science of  consciousness. 
Some central sorts of  first-person data include those 
having to do with the following:
• visual experiences (e.g., the experience of  color and 
depth)
• other perceptual experiences (e.g., auditory and tac-
tile experience)
• bodily experiences (e.g., pain and hunger)
• mental imagery (e.g., recalled visual images)
• emotional experience (e.g., happiness and anger)
• occurrent thought (e.g., the experience of  reflecting 
and deciding)
Both third-person data and first-person data need ex-
planation.” (Chalmers 2010, 38)
“The problems of  explaining third-person data as-
sociated with consciousness are among the ‘easy’ prob-
lems of  consciousness […]. The problems of  explaining 
first-person data is the hard problem.” (Chalmers 2010, 
38f.)
“The lesson is that as data, first-person data are ir-
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reducible to third-person data and vice versa. That is, 
third-person data alone provide an incomplete catalogue 
of  the data that need explaining: if  we explain only 
third-person data, we have not explained everything. 
Likewise, first-person data alone are incomplete. A satis-
factory science of  consciousness must admit both sorts 
of  data and must build an explanatory connection be-
tween them.” (Chalmers 2010, 39)
How can the SPP model be related to these two perspec-
tives?
The SPP model tries to explain how the decisive perfor-
mance features of  the nervous system and of  the brain are 
achieved. This is primarily done from a distant perspective 
which might correlate with third-person data according to 
the citations above. But the SPP model also tries to explain 
how first-person data like experiences, thinking and emo-
tions can evolve and how they are integrated. This can be 
seen as an explanatory connection between both sorts of  
data. What is not examined are the concrete phenomena in 
the world of  first-person data.
But it is clear that these phenomena cannot be seen as 
reducible to some functional principles of  the suitability 
probability processor (SPP). The SPP can rather be seen as a 
medium for the projection of  phenomena from the external 
environment and from the body into appropriate parts of  
the neural networks of  the brain. That the resulting associ-
ative-emotivational patterns can also be combined with any 
form of  hypothetical projection, which is completely decou-
pled from real interaction contexts and which can even be 
fictional or far away in space or time, has the consequence 
that there is no limitation for creative potential in relation 
to first-person data and appropriate experiences (see also 
sections “Needs and suitability probability evaluation” and 
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“Conscious experiences” in chapter “The SPP model” in 
Part 1).
(3)
What is seen as the key question and the really hard problem 
of  consciousness is explained in Chalmers 2010 in Part I 
“The problems of  consciousness”, Chapter 1 “Facing up to 
the problem of  consciousness” (5ff.):
“The really hard problem of  consciousness is the prob-
lem of  experience.
When we think and perceive, there is a whir of  infor-
mation processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. 
As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to 
be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is ex-
perience. When we see, for example, we experience visual 
sensations: the felt quality of  redness, the experience of  
dark and light, the quality of  depth in a visual field. Oth-
er experiences go along with perception in different mo-
dalities: the sound of  a clarinet, the smell of  mothballs. 
Then there are bodily sensations from pains to orgasms; 
mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt 
quality of  emotion; and the experience of  a stream of  
conscious thought. What unites all of  these states is that 
there is something it is like to be in them. All of  them are 
states of  experience.
It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of  
experience, but the question of  why it is that these sys-
tems are subjects of  experience is perplexing. Why is it 
that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and au-
ditory information processing, we have visual or audito-
ry experience: the quality of  deep blue, the sensation of  
middle C? How can we explain why there is something 
it is like to entertain a mental image or to experience an 
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emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from 
a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of  
why and how it so arises. Why should physical process-
ing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively 
unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.
If  any problem qualifies as the problem of  conscious-
ness, it is this one.” (Chalmers 2010, 5)
Chalmers continues by discussing some attempts to explain 
this key problem, leading, among other things, to the follow-
ing conclusions:
“To explain experience, we need a new approach. The 
usual explanatory methods of  cognitive science and 
neuroscience do not suffice. These methods have been 
developed precisely to explain the performance of  cog-
nitive functions, and they do a good job of  it. Still, as 
these methods stand, they are equipped to explain only 
the performance of  functions. When it comes to the 
hard problem, the standard approach has nothing to 
say.” (Chalmers 2010, 9)
“We have seen that there are systematic reasons why the 
usual methods of  cognitive science and neuroscience fail 
to account for conscious experience. These are simply 
the wrong sort of  methods. Nothing that they give to us 
can yield an explanation. To account for conscious expe-
rience, we need an extra ingredient in the explanation. This 
makes for a challenge to those who are serious about 
the hard problem of  consciousness: what is your extra 
ingredient, and why should that account for conscious 
experience?” (Chalmers 2010, under point 5. “The Extra 
Ingredient”, 13)
From the perspective of  the SPP model it is difficult to un-
derstand that there is a gap. The SPP model provides pro-
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posals of  how basic needs, higher needs and the library of  
associative-emotivational patterns and sensorimotor-emo-
tivational patterns are developing for the sake of  self-reg-
ulation, and of  how inner experiences and evaluation and 
assessment processes are constantly ongoing in the brain 
in this context. If  one follows these proposals, the conse-
quence is that the major brain processes are always inevitably 
connected to emotivationally coloured experiences. Emoti-
vational evaluation as a constantly ongoing inner experience 
is rather seen by the SPP model as one of  the most impor-
tant basic principles.
So the question of  the extra ingredient that might be needed 
to obtain explanations of  subject and experiences exists only 
outside of  the SPP model, while it is inside of  this model 
provided by the emotivational inbounds.
But it has to be considered that the SPP model maintains 
only a reduced view of  the full amount of  details. This is a 
sufficient method to explain some crucial interrelations on a 
hypothetical basis. But it cannot explain everything and the 
dilemmas which are described in Chalmers 2010 return im-
mediately when this specific model has to be put aside for 
further exploration.
(4)
A specific question is asked in Part II “The science of  con-
sciousness”, Chapter 2 “What is a neural correlate of  con-
sciousness?” (Chalmers 2010, 59ff.):
“The cornerstone of  recent work in the neuroscience of  
consciousness has been the search for the ‘neural corre-
late of  consciousness.’ This phrase is intended to refer 
to the neural system or systems primarily associated with 
conscious experience. The associated acronym is NCC. 
The hypothesis is that all of  us have an NCC inside our 
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head. The project is to find out what the NCC is. In re-
cent years there have been quite a few proposals about 
the identity of  the NCC.” (Chalmers 2010, 59)
Chalmers follows up with a discussion of  more detailed 
questions and proposals.
Along with the SPP model it is proposed that the NCC is 
provided by the neural correlate of  the preparation mode of  
the brain. These are the areas that can be attributed to the 
attention assessment controller (AAC) and to all areas that 
are potentially involved into the evaluation processes which 
are constantly ongoing on control levels (4) and (5) of  the 
central nervous system.
Bieri, Peter: Analytische Philosophie des 
Geistes
The philosophical concepts of  materialism, behaviourism, 
functionalism, physicalism, reducibility, intentionality, men-
tal states and representations, self-reference, self-awareness, 
the subjective character of  experience and of  different kinds 
of  dualism, are discussed in the book. Contributions from 
different authors are compiled together, providing complex 
discussions on these matters.
A lot of  crucial questions are asked, such as, for exam-
ple: How can it be explained that mental phenomena evolve 
from physical, chemical and biological processes occurring 
in a system made up of  molecules, cells and neurons? But 
the results are poor. The discussions typically conclude with 
statements like: “The current discussion on the question, 
what can be concluded from phenomenal qualities for the 
concepts of  functionalism, did not lead to a clear result, but 
seems to turn to the disadvantage of  the functionalism. If  
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this tendency cannot be changed in the future, the function-
alism as a common theory of  the mind will be failed.” (Bieri 
2007, 51)
The book seems to make clear that the “analytical philos-
ophy of  mind” is nowadays nothing more than the mainte-
nance of  a huge lack of  knowledge, accompanied by unten-
able philosophical speculations.
But the question of  how mental phenomena and experienc-
es might occur can easily be answered from the perspective 
of  the SPP model. According to the SPP model, mental phe-
nomena occur as inner experiences in terms of  the direct 
and hypothetical projection of  information to the evaluative 
focal plane, in which the brain plays the role of  a medium 
to reflect and combine informational and emotivational pat-
terns with no limit. For more details refer to the section enti-
tled “Conscious experiences” and the preceding descriptions 
in Part 1.
There are at least three topics that are explained in the book 
which might correspond to the SPP model to a certain ex-
tent:
Chapter 5. “Hilary Putnam: The nature of  mental states” in 
Bieri 2007, 123ff., covers the following statement:
“All organisms who are able to suffer pain are probabil-
istic automata.” (Bieri 2007, 128; original: Putnam 1975)
It is explained that this kind of  automata bases decisions and 
behaviours on transition probabilities between (functional) 
neural states and between neural patterns etc., rather than 
on logical rules.
It is recommended that how these theses might corre-
spond to the suitability probability based pattern selection 
process, which is proposed as a crucial principle by the SPP 
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model, should be investigated further.
Chapter 12. “Thomas Nagel: What is it like to be a bat?” in 
Bieri 2007, 261ff., covers the following statement:
“But in general an organism has conscious mental states 
then and only then, if  it is in some way to be this organ-
ism – if  it is in some way for this organism.” (Bieri 2007, 
262; original: Nagel 1974)
In the further texts it is emphasised that explanations of  
mental phenomena are not sufficient as long as the subjec-
tive character of  experience is not included at the same time.
These theses should correspond to the basic statement of  
the SPP model that self-regulation or a purposeful compo-
nent is a primary precondition for consciousness.
In the second part: “Intentionality, speech and thinking” in 
“Peter Bieri: Introduction” in Bieri 2007, 139ff., the con-
cepts of  “intentionality” are explained, as discussed recently, 
and it is mentioned that “mental representation” is a topic 
which is today the focus of  the philosophy of  the mind. 
These concepts refer to cognitive science, and the latter top-
ic is particularly concerned with mental representations in 
terms of  mental objects with semantic properties.
It is obvious that the concepts of  intentionality and men-
tal representations might be more detailed explanations of  
what is called direct and hypothetical projection in the sec-
tion entitled “Conscious experiences” in the chapter about 
“The SPP model” in Part 1.
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Psychology
Maslow, A. H.: Motivation and Personality 
Some people say that Maslow’s book from 1954 is obsolete 
(see Maslow 1987, first edition 1954). Some argue that the 
pyramid of  needs is too schematic and inflexible, others ar-
gue that Maslow is no longer applicable to modern living 
conditions, where existential threats are widely excluded and 
basic needs do no longer shape the course of  life. Both ar-
guments are actually wrong.
Maslow did not primarily publish a pyramid of  needs, but 
rather a motivation theory with emphasis on the “Dynamics 
of  the Need Hierarchy” (Maslow 1987, 17). He gives also 
some examples of  how needs can be categorized, but he 
warns at the same time that concrete categorisations can 
only be provisional and incomplete. However, a more cru-
cial statement in his book from 1987 (1954) is rather the 
following:
“It is quite true that humans live by bread alone – when 
there is no bread. But what happens to their desires 
when there is plenty of  bread and when their bellies are 
chronically filled? […] 
At once other (and higher) needs emerge and these, rath-
er than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. 
And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still 
higher) needs emerge, and so on. This is what we mean 
by saying that the basic human needs are organized into 
a hierarchy of  relative prepotency.” (Maslow 1987, 17)
This characterises the actual message from Maslow, not the 
pyramid of  needs, which he is famous for in this day and age. 
This means not that the pyramid of  needs is useless, but it 
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is important to understand that it is more a means to discuss 
the dynamics rather than a scheme which represents a final 
validity on its own.
The second argument – that we are today seldom confronted 
with existential threats and that our life is no longer shaped 
by basic needs – might be valid in one sense, but there are 
also lots of  arguments, why this is not valid in other senses. 
Yes, modern life under affluent circumstances has a strong 
tendency to exclude basic experiences and to replace it by 
fashion, technology, science and fun. But real life is never-
theless characterised by basic needs because of  several rea-
sons. Few examples are just the following:
• Birth, death and disease can never be excluded.
• There are always places in our interconnected world 
where people suffer pain, poverty and deprivation. 
There are always also deplorable biographies in the best 
of  all societies. All these incidents are relevant for each 
of  us, even though one denies this.
• Mastering of  basic needs occurs also as daily incident in 
the affluent society. This is kept away from consumers, 
but consumers might at the same time be profession-
al workers who have to manage basic needs and tackle 
reality for consumers. This can be done in a profession-
al way, widely supported by modern technologies, but 
there are always remaining difficulties and risks, which 
bring hardship to professional workers.
• The higher need levels are characterised by lower need 
levels and basic needs in two ways:
1. The purpose of  higher needs is adopted from lower 
needs. They get their vigour from basic needs via emo-
tivational dependency chains, emotivational stimulus modulation, 
emotional and motivational components in the striving 
for rewards (in the reward system) or via other mecha-
nisms. See also section “Higher needs” in chapter “The 
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SPP model” in Part 1.
2. Higher need levels are characterised to a great extent 
by representations of  lower needs on each level above. 
Higher needs are often interspersed with components 
from lower need levels. See also the examples of  “corre-
sponding representations on each level above” in section 
“Dynamics of  the need hierarchy” in chapter “The 4DI 
model” in Part 1.
Thus, basic needs and lower needs are the actual truth 
behind each more sophisticated demand. This is a rule which 
forces itself  by the nature of  the human nervous system and 
by the character of  consciousness (to say it with Chalmers 2010). 
See also section “Fading consciousness in affluent contexts” 
in chapter “The 4DI model” in Part 1.
Kahneman, Daniel: Thinking, Fast and 
Slow
A central thesis of  Kahneman 2012 is that the brain is 
equipped with two systems or two modes of  thinking, re-
spectively:
“Psychologists have been intensely interested for sever-
al decades in the two modes of  thinking […]. I adopt 
terms originally proposed by the psychologists Keith 
Stanovich and Richard West, and will refer to two sys-
tems in the mind, System 1 and System 2.
• System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with lit-
tle or no effort and no sense of  voluntary control.
• System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental 
activities that demand it, including complex com-
putations. The operations of  System 2 are often 
associated with the subjective experience of  agen-
cy, choice, and concentration.” (Kahneman 2012, 
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“PART 1. TWO SYSTEMS”, 20f.)
This correlates with the theses of  the SPP model as follows:
• System 1 refers to control levels (1)-(4) and to the un-
conscious part of  the situational preparation processes, 
which perform always quick and highly efficient in rela-
tion to the current environment of  the individual.
• System 2 refers to control levels (4)-(5), the conscious 
part of  the situational preparation processes and to the 
creative preparation processes in general.
It is a starting point in Kahneman 2012 that the human tends 
to see himself  as a rational being. The main effort of  the 
book is then spent on explaining that and why this is in-
correct. The peculiarities of  irrational decision making of  
humans, which are mostly produced by the strong influence 
of  System 1, are the main topic over all parts of  the book 
after part 1, which describes the two systems. Part 2 faces to 
“heuristics and biases”, part 3 to “overconfidence”, part 4 to 
typical behaviours of  humans in making “choices” and part 
5 to the “two selves” – the experiencing self  and the remem-
bering self  – which deviate in their perceptions. In relation 
to part 4 of  his book, Kahneman explains, for example:
“The focus of  part 4 is a conversation with the discipline 
of  economics on the nature of  decision making and on 
the assumption that economic agents are rational. This 
section of  the book provides a current view, informed 
by the two-system model, of  the key concepts of  pros-
pect theory, the model of  choice that Amos and I pub-
lished in 1979. Subsequent chapters address several ways 
human choices deviate from the rules of  rationality. I 
deal with the unfortunate tendency to treat problems in 
isolation, and with framing effects, where decisions are 
shaped by inconsequential features of  choice problems. 
These observations, which are readily explained by the 
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features of  System 1, present a deep challenge to the 
rationality assumption favored in standard economics.” 
(Kahneman 2012, 14)
The SPP-4DI model has an opposite approach. It sees the 
brain as a machine which is able to select neural patterns in 
highly efficient manner and to align this process to the re-
quirement to act in the natural environment for the own ben-
efit. It is postulated that this occurs as suitability probability 
evaluation process in a system which is described as attention 
assessment controller. It is clear that this cannot a priori result in 
rational decisions in the mathematical/ statistical/ economic 
sense. The brain and its evaluation and decision making ap-
paratus follows many other maxims, which emerged from 
earlier stages of  the evolution. Rational decisions are seen as 
possible, but only under special circumstances, namely when 
the 4D stress field can be managed in a good way (see chap-
ter “The 4DI model” in Part 1 of  this book). Hence, the 
human cannot be seen as a rational being per se, but rather as 
an intuitive being who might also be able to cultivate rational 
views under special circumstances with special efforts.
Kahneman describes among other things that we tend to 
make irrational decisions because of  a “Loss Aversion” – 
see pages 283ff. in Kahneman 2012. It is explained that we 
dislike losses of  any kind and that we are able to make unfa-
vourable decisions, seen on a rational or mathematical point 
of  view, because of  this antipathy. This is seen by Kahneman 
as one of  the many irrational potentials of  humans.
From the perspective of  the SPP-4DI model, the loss aver-
sion is neither seen as disadvantageous nor as irrational. To 
lose an object or a piece of  the familiar environment is al-
ways accompanied by the risk to lose a piece of  behavioural 
effectiveness from the neural pattern library, which must be 
substituted again by more or less effortful training or ex-
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ploration. That’s why it is mostly better to prevent losses 
initially, although there are promising gains on the other side 
of  the coin. I am sure that the human is able to overcome 
his loss aversion, but this is only recommendable if  there is 
enough time to include also the potential neural cost into 
the balances by thorough reflection. For quick decisions it is 
always better – and also more rational – to prevent losses of  
any kind empathically.
Kahneman describes the human being as claiming for ra-
tionality, but as burdened with several biases and irrational 
intuitions. But I see this in a different way: There is only one 
real bias: to see the human as a rational being; the other bias-
es and irrational seeming intuitions are rather natural peculi-
arities of  human mind. Besides this should both approaches 
be consistent to each other.
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Brain and computer
Commonalities and differences between 
brain and computer
There are many differences between brain and computer, 
but there are also commonalities on an abstract level.
Note: Here is the talk of  the human brain and of  the 
classic computer with von Neumann architecture or with a 
similar processor type.
Commonalities
1)  Both brain and computer are information processing 
engines. They process information and control behav-
iour, based on external information, internal states, and 
stored data.
2) Both brain and computer are potentially also engines 
which control states and behaviours of  a larger sys-
tem. In this case, they do their work based on external 
information, internal states of  the larger system, and 
stored data.
Examples of  larger systems, which can be controlled by 
brains are: biological organisms, mammals, humans. 
Examples of  larger systems, which can be controlled by 
computers, are: machines, robotics, production lines, in-
frastructure facilities.
3) Both brain and computer produce continuous se-
quences of  operations, at which subsequent opera-
tions are dependent on precedent operations, external 
information, internal states and stored data. The results 
of  these sequences of  operations are sequences of  in-
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formational patterns, which can be stored, sent to exter-
nal systems or exploited as behaviours. Both brain and 
computer can interact with other systems by this way.
This can lead to various capabilities and performances 
for both brains (mammals, humans etc.) and computers 
(machines, production lines etc.), including solution of  
complex problems and goal-oriented behaviour over a 
long time.
4) Both brain and computer are dedicated to an abstract 
purpose.
Differences
1) The brain is a biological system. Information is rep-
resented in this system in the form of  electrochemi-
cal excitations in nerve cords, at which the excitations 
have analogous values (firing rates) between zero (no 
excitation) and extremely high. These excitations are 
processed via networks of  synapses in gradual manner. 
Data is stored persistently in the form of  patterns of  
analogous values by establishing appropriate synaptic 
networks and by varying the degrees of  excitation and 
inhibition at the involved synapses. Interactions are done 
via sensory organs (inbound), and muscles, limbs and 
glands (outbound).
The computer is a technical system. Information is rep-
resented in this system in the form of  dual states, which 
are called Bits, and which can only have two states: true 
or false. This information is processed via arithmetic 
logic processors in digital manner. Data is stored per-
sistently as digital patterns (Bits and Bytes) on storage 
devices (e.g. hard disks). Interactions are done via sen-
sors and measurement devices (inbound), and motors, 
switches and any types of  actuators (outbound).
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2) A brain is typically utilised for control the behaviour of  a 
biological organism (his owner, which might be a mam-
mal or a human). Internal states of  the system are bound 
into the brain via hypothalamus, endocrine system, pain 
sensation etc.
A computer can be utilised for control the behaviour 
of  a technical system (e.g. a machine, a production line). 
Internal states of  the system are bound into the comput-
er vial special sensor systems and interfaces, which are 
established for this purpose.
3) The selection of  subsequent operations, based on prec-
edent operations, external information, internal states 
and stored data, occurs in completely different manner 
for brains and computers. This is done by continuous 
pattern evaluation processes in neural networks in brains 
(see chapter “The SPP model” in Part 1), and it is done 
by binary decision logic and arithmetic operations in 
computers (see concepts “special purpose registers” – 
“instruction pointer” and “arithmetic logic unit”; see 
how conventional programming languages work).
4) The inherent (abstract) purpose of  a brain is: thriving of  
its owner and species under the circumstances of  evolu-
tionary competition.
A computer has no inherent purpose. It follows the pur-
pose that has been dedicated to it by its inventor and 
user. So it follows the inherent purpose of  brains, but 
only indirectly – as a tool.
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The biggest open questions
The brain topic provides always much more open questions 
than answers. This book tries to discuss some possible an-
swers on an abstract conceptual level, but the uncertainties, 
details which have yet to be clarified and remaining open 
questions are huge. It is not the intention to discuss these 
gaps in detail, but four of  the questions will be mentioned 
here.
Question 1
A special question, which is extraordinary important, arises 
in relation to interactions between the basal ganglia loops 
(see chapter “Basal ganglia (BG) and frontal cortex”) and the 
memory system (see section “The types of  memory”).
It is known that the basal ganglia circuits support parallel 
processing and synchronisation of  the major part of  the ex-
citation processes in the brain. That excitation processes are 
controlled widely independently in parallel is known for skel-
etomotor control, oculomotor control, associative processes 
and limbic processes – see chapter “Basal ganglia (BG) and 
frontal cortex”, section “The four parallel circuits through 
the basal ganglia (BG)”. But what cannot be clarified here 
(in this book) is the question: How are the excitations, 
which are controlled independently in parallel by the 
four BG circuits, divided from one another in the in-
volved cortical areas? There are always also pathways and 
interdependencies between the four segregated systems, and 
it is not very clear, how it is achieved that the systems are 
able to act independently on the first hand, to interact on the 
second hand and that this does not lead to total confusion 
and chaotic flow of  excitation on the third hand.
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Regarding memory, it is known which parts of  the associ-
ative areas are to be attributed to the declarative side or rather 
to the procedural side. But there must be an explicit border, 
because memory reinstatement and associative processes on 
the one hand and sensorimotor activity sequences on the 
other hand can be independently controlled in parallel by the 
circuits in the basal ganglia, what might only be possible if  
excitation does not flow unhindered to and fro between both 
sides. It is likely that this question can be answered on the 
basis of  knowledge about the detailed domain specific func-
tions of  each concrete associative area or of  each other brain 
area. But this goes beyond the intended scope of  this book.
Question 2
It is clear that somatosensory perception, sense of  touch 
and other senses – as vision, hearing, taste, smell etc. – are 
incorporated as informational criteria into decision making 
processes. This occurs probably partially via cascades of  
perceptual areas and modules and their final pathways to 
the areas that are responsible for decision making, partially 
via involvement of  perception into situational sensorimotor 
control processes, which are the actual target of  the decision 
making processes, and partially via microrepresentations of  
sensorimotor patterns in the declarative memory (as remem-
bered perception incidents).
But what is not clear, or – more precisely – what is not 
made clear in this book is the question: How is perception 
processing precisely bound into the decision making 
processes? Decision making occurs particularly in the basal 
ganglia (as affective decision making), the prefrontal cortex 
(as value-guided decision making) and in the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (as motor decision making). But it is an open 
field, which is not discussed in this book, how excitation 
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patterns which represent perception (in the informational 
sense) are precisely transferred from the sensory organs via 
the perceptual areas to the decision making instances of  the 
brain. This is a matter which has still to be investigated.
Question 3
It is clear that there must be an emotivational system, which 
involves signals from the amygdala (representing emotions), 
from the autonomic interface (consisting of  hypothalamus, 
endocrine system etc.; representing homeostatic regulation 
and balancing between sympathetic and parasympathetic 
nervous system), from pain sensation (via thalamus) and 
from the reward system, and which forces self-regulation 
and optimisation all over the brain by primarily taking effect 
in the decision making system (basal ganglia, prefrontal cor-
tex, anterior cingulate cortex) and in the declarative memory 
(entorhinal cortex, hippocampus etc.).
But a collection of  remaining questions is: How does 
the emotivational system work in detail? What are the 
concrete pathways, which represent this system? How is it 
achieved that all types of  emotivational signals are combined 
in a manner so that they build a universal assessment and 
evaluation system, which gives meaning to the brain process-
es and to the complete organism?
Question 4
Questions 2 and 3 are closely linked with the explanation 
of  consciousness and conscious experience. Section “Con-
scious experiences” in chapter “The SPP model” in Part 1 
explains conscious experience as projection of  information-
al excitation patterns to the evaluative focal plane or to the 
signals of  the emotivational system or to the attention assess-
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ment controller, respectively. This involves at least the following 
brain areas: basal ganglia (BG), prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). But this is only an abstract 
thesis, which needs further investigation in order to achieve 
profound knowledge in this regard.
The thesis from section “Conscious experiences” might 
be a good starting point for the systematic research of  con-
sciousness. But a collection of  remaining questions is: How 
is consciousness realised in detail in the brain? Where 
are the locations of  the evaluative focal plane in detail, i.e. in 
which concrete modules and circuits meet informational and 
emotivational signals each other and how are they resolved 
in relation to each other? How can projection at the evalu-
ative focal plane be measured and investigated in empirical 
manner? How can the concrete role of  the posterior cingu-
late cortex (PCC) or of  the networks around the complete 
cingulate cortex be defined in this connection and in general?
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